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The Center for Strategic Translation provides statesmen and scholars with the tools needed to interpret the Chinese party-state of today while training a new generation of China specialists with the skills needed to guide our relations with the China of tomorrow.

The Center meets this need through initiatives in translation and education. The Center locates, translates, and annotates documents of historic or strategic value that are currently only available in Chinese. Our introductory essays, glossaries, and commentaries are designed to make these materials accessible and understandable to statesmen and scholars with no special expertise in Chinese politics or the Chinese language.

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General Laws of the Rise of Great Powers

大国崛起的一般规律

Introduction

Empires climb and crumble. Powers wax and wane. Such has it ever been. So shall it ever be. If there is a logic behind this cycle of rise and fall, then the leaders of the Communist Party of China would like to know it. This is the stated aim of National Security and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers, whose third chapter is translated below. Through historical case studies this book promises to reveal the historical forces that decide the fate of nations—and demonstrate how the Party has leveraged these forces to secure China’s national rejuvenation.

National Security and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers (henceforth: Rise and Fall) was published in 2021, seven years after Xi Jinping introduced the Total National Security Paradigm to the Party writ large. The paradigm is a complex of ideas intended to guide cadres as they minimize risk and extinguish threats in all fields of state activity. “The Total National Security Paradigm is not just a guiding principle for the state’s security agencies,” the introduction to Rise and Fall instructs. “It should become the world view and the methodology of every cadre in all tasks. And it should also become a required lesson for the people of China, which is on its path from a big nation to a strong nation.”1

This introduction was written by Peng Yuan, who was then serving as the director of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR).2 CICIR is a research center run by the Ministry of State Security (MSS), China’s premier intelligence agency.3 Like Peng, the nine authors of Rise and Fall are all scholars affiliated with CICIR.4 Their work was published by the Total National Security Paradigm Research Center [总体国家安全观研究中心], a think tank staffed by former CICIR analysts tasked with developing concepts and educational materials for the Central National Security Commission. It is the fifth book in a series. Each title in this series ties the Total National Security Paradigm to a topic of interest, such as “culture” or “biosecurity.”5 Their tone is academic but accessible. As the series introduction puts it, the purpose of this research is to “raise the general awareness for national security” and develop a standard curriculum for all levels of national security studies.

Xi Jinping seeks to instill widespread awareness—what he calls “calamity consciousness” [忧患意识]—of the grand historical stakes at play in the otherwise mundane tasks handled by communist bureaucrats.6  Books like this are part of that program. Though not as authoritative as the doctrinal manuals published by high-level party organs, the books in this series, each written by a collection of MSS analysts and scholars for an internal audience, present the consensus viewpoints of China’s civilian state security apparatus on the grand questions of diplomacy, war, and economic development that in theory should be guiding the priorities of millions of cadres.

Most pages of Rise and Fall are devoted to individual case studies. There are chapter length discussions of imperial Spain and Portugal, the Netherlands, the British Empire, post-Meiji Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The chapter translated below attempts to synthesize the lessons of these case studies into a set of “general laws” [一般规律] with universal application.

These laws are not difficult to summarize: For the last five hundred years international relations have been characterized by intense competition between various great powers. Other things being equal, the relative strength of a state is a function of the territory, population, and natural resources it controls. Yet other things have not been equal. Since the advent of the scientific and commercial revolutions, technology has provided the most decisive advantage on the international stage. Power flows from prosperity. Prosperity, from productivity. Therefore, nations rise by successfully incorporating advanced technology into their national economy. Failure to catch the latest techno-scientific wave means stagnation, decline, and defeat.

Some elements of scientific development lie beyond the control of statesmen. Economic productivity diffuses geographically: the best way to predict whether a country will claim great scientists or build path breaking industries is whether its neighbors are doing the same thing. Nations thus do not rise alone, but in clusters. Successful development in these clusters always follows a specific pattern: foreign investment supports the creation of light industries with minimal capital requirements, such as textiles. The wealth generated by light industry can be invested in more capital-intensive heavy industries, such as steel. As productivity increases the tertiary sector of the economy begins to grow. By this point a rising nation should have the educational and technological infrastructure needed to become a hub of innovation in its own right.

Many failures in development are the result of deviations from this path. So it was with the Communist bloc during the Cold War, whose members unwisely tried to leap directly to the heavy industry stage of industrial development. Rise and Fall argues that the many developing nations that have prioritized political liberalization over industrialization have fallen victim to a similar trap.

 21st century China has avoided all traps. Blessed with enormous advantages in territory, population, and natural resources, integrated into the largest economic trade network in world history, governed by a stable center of rule, and having successfully ridden the development escalator to the frontiers of scientific discovery, the People’s Republic of China has mastered the arts of the rising power. The only thing it now lacks is outright technological supremacy.

Perhaps the most interesting aspects of this narrative are the things missing from it. There is no general discussion of military strategy and military technology; the trade-offs between force structure, readiness, and weapons development; or even the necessary balance between guns and butter. The rise and fall of great powers is not presented as a story of summits, alliances, security compacts, and international organizations, nor one of conquest and colonies. There is no mention of taxation, national debt, monetary policy, fiscal policy, or economic troubles—like financial crises or hyperinflation—that are not directly related to total factor productivity. Nor is there, outside of a few oblique references in the section lauding Xi-style centralized leadership, any mention of corruption, social cohesion, ethnic tensions, inter-elite conflict, or civil war. This chapter is likewise completely silent on the problems posed by espionage, psychological warfare, sabotage, or ideological subversion.

There are other sources, many authoritative, that discuss these other elements of national power at great length and even with great passion. It is nevertheless striking that a report on the rise and fall of great powers composed by Chinese intelligence analysts with the words “national security” in its title has so little to say about diplomacy, strategy, or spycraft. Rise and decline are understood in techno-industrial terms. Everything else is either a distraction from or a downstream consequence of that fundamental.

This analytical approach may have less to do with universal historical patterns than with the perception Chinese analysts have of their own country’s modern rise. The impoverished China of the 1970s did not become the strong China of the 2020s through military conquest or diplomatic acumen. Industrialization paved China’s path to greatness. It is natural for analysts who lived through this transformation to think of national power as a function of total factor productivity—and to find that lesson confirmed to them across the breadth of the historical record.

It is likewise natural for these analysts to link the economic triumphs of China’s recent past to a national telos for China’s country’s future. The obvious takeaway of this study is that China’s future will be determined by China’s ability to master and develop new technologies. International competition is technological competition. This competition must be resourced accordingly.7

In the actual annals of history there are many kingdoms and empires who achieved advantage by other means. Rise and Fall’s synthesis chapter has little to say about them. It offers no guidance to the great power whose economy falters or to the super-power that has fallen behind in the scientific race. It seems that the intellectual apparatus of the state security system lacks stock answers for those problems. Any Central Committee forced to return to traditional tools of diplomacy or defense to secure Chinese power will thus be improvising in uncharted territory. They will not be able to rely on the personal experience of its members to guide their actions—or any set of well-understood historical patterns.

—THE EDITORS

1. Zhongguo Xiandai Guoji Guanxi Yanjiuyuan 中国现代国际关系研究院 China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, Daguo Xingshuai yu Guojia Anquan 大国兴衰与国家安全 [National Security and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers] (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe 时事出版社 [Shishi Publishing], 2021), x.
2. The current president of CICIR is Yang Mingjie [楊明杰]; Yuan Peng [袁鹏] served as the president of CICIR from 2018 to 2023.  According to a Taiwanese news outlet, Yuan changed his name to Yuan Yikun [袁亦鲲] and was appointed deputy minister at the Ministry of State Security in March 2023. See Chen Kuan-yu 陳冠宇, “Zhongguo dui Mei zhuanjia Yuan Peng Gaiming Chu Ren Guo'anbu Fubuzhang 中國對美專家袁鵬改名 出任國安部副部長 [Chinese Expert on the United States Yuan Peng Changes Name and is Appointed Deputy Minister of the Ministry of State Security]," China Times 中时电子报, 8 August 2023; Russel Hsiao, "Personnel Changes at the PRC’s Organs for Taiwan Intelligence Analysis," Global Taiwan Brief Vol 8. Issue 16 (2023), 1-3. Though this appointment has not been confirmed by official sources, it is standard practice for MSS officials who have worked under aliases in the world of Chinese think tanks to revert to their real names upon advancing to a higher level position in the MSS. For examples, see Alex Joske, Spies and Lies (Melbourne: Hardy Grant Books, 2023), passim.  
3. Peter Mattis and Matthew Brazil, Chinese Communist Espionage: An Intelligence Primer (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2019), 57; “Profile of MSS-Affiliated PRC Foreign Policy Think Tank CICIR,” Open Source Center, 25 August 2011.
4. National Security in the Rise and Fall of Great Powers has nine contributors. All were employed by CICIR as analysts at the time the book was published. Zhang Yunchen [张运成] is the president of CICIR’s World Economics Studies Institute and the editor-in-chief of the book. Huang Ying [黄莺] is the vice president of the World Economics Studies Institute and specializes in global financial governance. Chen Wenxin [陈文鑫] is the acting president of the American Studies Institute and specializes in US-China relations, Asian-Pancific strategy, and American foreign policy. Zhao Xiongtu [赵宏图] is the department head of Energies Security Studies Center. Xu Gang [徐刚] is the acting department head of the Belt and Road Studies Center. Ni Jianjun [倪建军] is the acting president of the World Economics Studies Institute and specializes in economic security and international economic governance. Tang Qi [汤祺] is an analyst in the Northeastern Asia Studies Center. Li Yan [李艳] is the department head of the Cyber and Information Security Center and specializes in cyberspace governance. Shi Gang [石刚] is an analyst on piracy.  
The book does not specify the authorship of each chapter. Based on their expertise, this chapter is likely drafted by the CICIR team from the World Economics Studies Institute: Zhang Yunchen, Huang Ying, and Ni Jianjun.  
5. The series connects national security to six different areas of national concerns: Geography and National Security [地理与国家安全] (2021), History and National Security [历史与国家安全] (2021), Culture and National Security [文化与国家安全] (2021), Biosecurity and National Security [生物安全与国家安全] (2021), National Security and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers [大国兴衰与国家安全] (2021), and National Security and the Great Changes Unseen in a Century [百年变局与国家安全] (2021).
6. “Increasing our consciousness of calamity, and being vigilant during times of peace” [忧患意识,居安思危] is an ubiquitous phrase in CPC documents that captures an important aspect of the Party’s psyche. As one People’s Daily article puts it, “the Communist Party of China is a political party born from calamities, grown in calamities, and is becoming stronger from calamities.” This call for awareness of constant danger dates back to Mao Zedong, who admonished his cadres not to become complacent after the success of the revolution. Today, Xi quotes the phrases often to emphasize the challenges ahead. “The brighter the future, the more it is necessary to increase the awareness of potential calamities,” the People’s Daily quotes Xi. One “must be constantly prepared for danger in times of peace, and fully understand and be prepared for major risks and challenges.” For a discussion of the calamity consciousness from a party source, see Chen Shifa, “Zengqiang Youhuan Yishi 增强忧患意识 [Increase our Consciousness of Calamity],” Renmin Ribao 人民日报 [People’s Daily], November 2022.
7. The authors makes this point explicitly in the book's final chapter: 
As society develops the factors that determine the so-called life cycle of nations are not static. As we all know, today's society has entered the information age. The information revolution dominated by information and communication technology (ICT) is not only changing science, technology and the economy, but also is changing politics, the military and social life. Information superiority is becoming the commanding heights of competition in composite national strength. Although material hard power is the basis of composite national strength, soft power can become an ‘amplifier’ of composite national strength. Therefore.... the countries that can occupy leadership positions are not those with the most resources, but those that can control the political environment and make other countries ‘do what they want.’ Whoever leads a new round of scientific and technological revolution led by the information revolution will be able to occupy a leadership position in the future political landscape.
“随着社会的发展,决定所谓国家生命周期的要素并非一成不变。众所周知,当今社会已进入信息化时代,以信息和通信技术(ICT)为主的信息革命不仅改变着科技与经济,也改变着政治,军事和社会生活。信息优势正在成为综合国力竞争的制高点。物质形态的硬实力因素固然是综合国力的基础,但是软实力因素却可以成为综合国力的“倍增器”。因此,哈瑟夫·奈认为,“信息正在变成实力”,权力的性质已由“高资本含量”(capital rich)变为“高信息含量”(information rich)。能够占据领导地位的国家并不是拥有最多资源的国家,而是那些可以控制政治环境并使别国“做其所思”的国家。谁能领导以信息革命为主导的新一轮科技革命,谁就能在未来政治格局中占据领导地位。“ 
See China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, National Security and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers, 283.
Author
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
中国现代国际关系研究院
original publication
National Security and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers
大国兴衰与国家安全
publication date
April 15, 2021
Translator
Dylan Levi King
Translation date
February 2024
Tags
Tag term
Tag term
Leadership Core
领导核心

In Leninist political systems the authority of a party leader does not always align with his formal position in a communist party's hierarchy. Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping exercised immense power despite retiring from all official leadership positions; in contrast, the authority of men like Zhao Ziyang and Hu Jintao was tightly circumscribed despite their selection as General Secretary. The concept of the “leadership core” provides one way for party members to recognize the exceptional standing of a paramount leader without reference to his formal position in the Party. Under this schema, a leader of unusual historical significance will be labeled the “core” [核心] of his leadership cohort.

Xi Jinping is the acknowledged core of the Party today. He was not always honored with this title: it was not until the 6th PLENUM of the 18th CENTRAL COMMITTEE—some four years into Xi’s tenure as formal leader of the Communist Party of China—that state media described Xi Jinping as the core leader of his era.

A speech given by Xi Jinping in early 2013 provides a typical example of the way this title is employed in communist rhetoric. In a ceremony commemorating Hu Jintao’s leadership of the Party, Xi Jinping told the representatives at the People’s Congress that 

Under the leadership of the Party’s first generation of collective leadership with Comrade Mao Zedong as the core, the Party’s second generation of collective leadership with Comrade Deng Xiaoping as the core, the Party’s third generation of collective leadership with Comrade Jiang Zemin as the core, and the Party’s Central Committee with Comrade Hu Jintao as the General Secretary, people of all ethnic groups in the country have worked together, persevered, and overcome various difficulties and obstacles on the path of progress. (Xi 2013)

As this passage makes clear, not all leaders deserve “core” status. The modest achievements and limited power of Hu Jintao vis a vis other leading party members of his era denies Hu this honor. Hu’s historical role only merits the mention of his formal party title, that of “General Secretary.”  

The origins of the “core” designation are found in the early years of the Deng era. Mao was never referred to as the “core” of a collective leadership cohort during his tenure. He preferred titles—such as the “People’s Leader” [人民领袖]—that elevated him far above other members of the revolutionary generation, and which justified the concentration of power in his own hands. For Deng Xiaoping, this was one of the central errors of the late Mao era. As with many other leading cadres, Deng attributed his suffering during the Cultural Revolution to Mao’s incontestable authority. These men hoped that “collective leadership” [集体领导] might preserve the Party from similar disasters in the future. “The overconcentration of power,” Deng said in 1980, “hinders the practice of socialist democracy and of the Party’s democratic centralism, impedes the progress of socialist construction and prevents us from taking full advantage of collective wisdom” (Deng 1980). 

Formalizing mechanisms for collective leadership and instituting “intra-party democracy” [党内民主] was thus a key priority of Deng’s early reform agenda. The 12th Party Congress of 1982 abolished the post of Chairman of the Central Committee, a position that many deemed too powerful. Instead the Party would be formally led by a General Secretary with a ten-year term limit.  Other reforms intended to constrain and distribute political power across the Party included new mandatory retirement ages, the regular holding of party congresses, and the staggered filling of the POLITBURO seats every five years.

Yet Deng’s attempt to institutionalize the CPC power structure was fatally undermined by his own style of leadership. In the 1980s Deng twice identified potential successors and elevated them to the position of General Secretary. Despite their formal authority, the actual power of these chosen heirs was limited. Anytime a contentious issue divided the Party, Deng’s intervention was necessary for a solution to be implemented. On two occasions this solution included the removal of an uncooperative General Secretary from office. Events like these repeatedly offered Deng Xiaoping a choice between procedural integrity and political victory. Deng consistently chose the latter. Aligning policy and personnel with his own preferences behind the scenes weakened the formal institutions, procedures, and norms he hoped would eventually govern the Party in his place. 

It was in this context that the concept of the leadership core was introduced to the Party. Deng Xiaoping neither possessed nor aspired to absolute power: his influence flowed from his indispensability. Loyalty to Deng was the one nexus point holding the various factions of the Party together. Thus Deng concluded that “for the second generation of leaders, I can be considered the core, but the group is still a collective” (Deng 1989a).

In 1989, Deng began working to pass this status on to a new successor. Four days before the denouement of the Tiananmen demonstrations, Deng negotiated with Chen Yun and other party elders of his generation to choose the new General Secretary of the Communist Party of China. Jiang Zemin was their choice. Soon after, Deng further argued that Jiang must be treated as the future “core” of the party’s collective leadership. “A collective leadership must have a core; without a core, no leadership can be strong enough,” said Deng.

The core of our first generation of collective leadership was Chairman Mao. Because of that core, the “cultural revolution” did not bring the Communist Party down. Actually, I am the core of the second generation. Because of this core, even though we changed two of our leaders, the Party’s exercise of leadership was not affected but always remained stable. The third generation of collective leadership must have a core too; all you comrades present here should be keenly aware of that necessity and act accordingly. You should make an effort to maintain the core — Comrade Jiang Zemin, as you have agreed. From the very first day it starts to work, the new Standing Committee should make a point of establishing and maintaining this collective leadership and its core (Deng 1989b). 

Though Jiang Zemin would govern under the shadow of Deng Xiaoping for another five years, the slow passing of the revolutionary generation gave Jiang the opportunity to fill critical party positions with his own people. Jiang’s consolidation of power proved enduring. By the time Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao, rose to the position of CPC General Secretary in November 2002, both the POLITBURO and the CENTRAL COMMITTEE were stocked with Jiang’s men. Jiang himself would stay on as Chairman of the Central Military Commission for several years into Hu’s term. No one was under the illusion that Hu Jintao was the “core” of anything. Instead, his role in the collective leadership was usually described with the phrase “the Party CENTER with Comrade Hu Jintao as General Secretary” [以胡锦涛同志为总书记的党中央]. 

Xi Jinping successfully centralized power in a fashion Hu Jintao never managed. Through bureaucratic restructuring and a colossal anti-corruption drive that removed hundreds of thousands of Party members from the rolls, Xi remade the Communist Party in his own image. He used this power to roll back Deng era norms of collective leadership. Just one year after Xi obtained official recognition as the “core,” the Party abolished the term limit of the General Secretary. At the conclusion of the Party Congress where this occurred, Cai Qi–a Xi loyalist who would soon be elevated to the PBSC–referred to Xi Jinping as the Leader, or lingxiu [领袖], of the Party. Up to this point this grandiose title had only ever been applied to Mao Zedong and his designated successor, Hua Guofeng. Cai maintained that:

In the past five years, historic changes have taken place in the cause of the Party and the state, all of which stem from the fact that General Secretary Xi Jinping, the strong leadership core, is the helmsman [掌舵] of the whole Party. General Secretary Xi Jinping is worthy of being a wise leader [英明领袖], the chief architect of reform, opening up and modernization in the New Era, and the core of this generation of the Party. At all times and in all circumstances, we must resolutely safeguard the authority and centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as its core. (Cai 2017).   

Thus the valence of the term “core” has shifted as the norms of the Deng era have eroded away. If in the Reform era the “core” designation signaled a break from the Maoist past, associating Deng’s pre-eminence with the more restrained language of intra-party democracy, in Xi’s NEW ERA the phrase is deployed in the same breath as titles once reserved for Mao himself, such as “helmsman” and "Leader.” Three decades after its introduction the concept of the leadership core lives on. The associated ideals of collective leadership do not. 

Composite National Strength
综合国力

In Chinese political discourse, the concept of composite national strength is used by strategists and theorists of international relations as a general measure of power and rank. Sometimes translated as “comprehensive national power,” the concept was developed in the early 1980s by strategic analysts in the PLA Academy of Military Science who believed that standard measures of military power–such as naval tonnage or army size–did not capture the true strength of the two Cold War superpowers. They argued that any accurate estimate of national strength must incorporate the full suite of economic, scientific, diplomatic, political, and cultural resources that might contribute to international success. This aggregated measure of all potential elements of national power is a country’s composite national strength.

The concept of composite national strength dates back to the reforms of the 1980s. As the PRC reestablished diplomatic relations with the West, a wave of Chinese academics and theorists began to study Western political science and adapt it to Chinese conditions. An analyst in the strategic studies department at the PLA Academy of Military Science named Huang Shuofeng  introduced the phrase as a translation of “state power,” a term he encountered while studying the realist school of international relations theory. He would present his version of the concept to his colleagues in a 1985 conference on the strategic problems posed by Soviet-American rivalry. There Huang defined composite national strength as “the total strength (both material and non-material) and international influence that a sovereign state wields for its survival and development” (Huang 1999, 5). Huang argued that this type of national power can be naturally divided into seven components: political strength [政治力], economic strength [经济力], scientific and technological strength [科技力], military strength [国防力], cultural and educational strength [文教力], diplomatic strength [外交力], and natural resource endowments [资源力] (Huang 1999, 12). 

This complex of ideas spread across the Chinese strategic community in the decades that followed. Since 1985, the Chinese Academy of Science, the Chinese Academy of Social Science, the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations, and the Academy of Military Science have all sponsored research projects or conferences devoted to different theories of composite national strength (Jia 2015).  However, there is no universal schema for calculating a country’s composite national strength. While there is general agreement among analysts that both material factors (such as industrial capacity) and less tangible factors (such as global cultural influence) must be integrated in any calculation, there is no consensus on which specific factors must be included, nor on the relative importance of any given element of power vis a vis the others. Thus even the most empirically rigorous attempts to calculate international rankings of composite national strength rely on the idiosyncratic judgments of individual researchers. 

The concept is employed far less wonkishly by generalist intellectuals and leading communist cadres. Deng Xiaoping was the first CORE LEADER to use the phrase. During his 1992 “Southern Tour” Deng employed the concept to justify further market reform. In place of the old ideological standards cadres used to use to evaluate policy, Deng proposed three “chief criterion” [三个有利于] for judging the failure and success of a new measure: “[does] it promote the growth of the productive forces in a socialist society, increase the composite national strength of the socialist state, or raise living standards?” (Deng 1992). This usage is typical. In the rhetoric of Chinese communism composite national strength is not a precise measure but a vague policy aim that can be loosely tied to development planning, security theory, technology development, or any other policy that might feasibly hasten the REJUVENATION OF THE CHINESE NATION.

SEE ALSO: DISCURSIVE POWER; TOTAL NATIONAL SECURITY PARADIGM

Great Changes Unseen in a Century
百年未有的大变局

The phrase “great changes unseen in a century,” sometimes translated by official party media as “profound changes unseen in a century,” was first used by Chinese academics following the Great Recession. The phrase is associated with the dangers and opportunities posed by American decline, and has been adopted by THE CENTER as a programmatic assessment of the trajectory of the current world order. The trends which can be feasibly linked to this trajectory are diverse. Commentators have described everything from the rise of populist political parties to breakthroughs in artificial intelligence as falling under the "great changes" label. What unites these different trends is the perception that they pose a mortal threat to Western leadership of the international order.

“Great changes” was officially elevated into the party lexicon in 2017, when then-State Councilor Yang Jiechi described it as a guiding tenet of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy. Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy was formally adopted by the Party in a 2018 Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, where Xi informed the collected leadership of the Chinese diplomatic corp and state security apparatus that

China now finds itself in the best period for development it has seen since the advent of the modern era; [simultaneously], the world faces great changes unseen in a century. These two [trends] are interwoven, advancing in lockstep; each stimulates the other. Now, and in the years to come, many advantageous international conditions exist for success in foreign affairs (Xi 2020).

Xi’s comments followed a tradition laid out in innumerable Party documents, speeches, and regulations, which present declarations of  policy, especially foreign policy, as following from an assessment of the “overall landscape” [全局] “inherent tendencies” [大势], or “the great trends” [大趋势] of the historical moment in which the Party finds itself. “Great changes unseen in a century” is a shorthand for the central leadership’s current assessment of the future trajectory of the international order.

The slogan invokes a slew of great changes that shook global politics one century ago: the collapse of British hegemony and the European imperial system following WWI and the concurrent rise of the United States and the Soviet Union as the predominant powers of world politics. The slogan implies that a similar power transition is now underway, with America playing the role of faltering hegemon, and China the rising  power.  

More substantive discussions of the slogan by Chinese academics and state affiliated scholars trace this power transition to myriad causes: the growing wealth of the developing world, the rise of right-wing populism in Western countries, the debilitating effects that neoliberalism and identity politics have on American power, the resurgence of nationalism across the globe, advances in novel technologies not pioneered by the West, and the proliferation of non-traditional security threats (such as pandemics and terrorist attacks) are all common explanations for the crumbling of the American-led international order. 

Though the phrase was introduced in a rather triumphal tone, the slogan has taken on a darker valence as Sino-American relations have worsened and China has grown more isolated in the international arena. Party propagandists and Chinese academics alike now pair the phrase “great changes unforeseen in a century” with increasingly dire warnings about the unique risks and dangers China faces in the final stage of NATIONAL REJUVENATION. Thus the slogan has come to also signify a warning that China sails into uncharted waters. As Xi Jinping reported in his address to the 20th Congress:

Great changes unseen in a century are accelerating across the world… the once-in-a-century pandemic has had far-reaching effects; a backlash against globalization is rising; and unilateralism and protectionism are mounting… The world has entered a new period of turbulence and change… [where] external attempts to suppress and contain China may escalate at any time.

Our country has entered a period of development in which strategic opportunities, risks, and challenges are concurrent and uncertainties and unforeseen factors are rising... We must therefore be more mindful of potential dangers, be prepared to deal with worst-case scenarios, and be ready to withstand high winds, choppy waters, and even dangerous storms (Xi 2022).

See also: ADVANCING TOWARDS THE CENTER OF THE WORLD STAGE; COMMUNITY OF COMMON DESTINY FOR ALL MANKIND; GREAT REJUVENATION OF THE CHINESE NATION;  NEW ROUND OF TECHNO-SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION AND INDUSTRIAL UPGRADING; PERIOD OF STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY.

Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation
中华民族伟大复兴

General Secretaries of the Communist Party of China have described “national rejuvenation” [民族复兴] as the central mission of their Party since the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987. Their wording intentionally echoes the language used by Sun Yat-sen and the nationalist revolutionaries who overthrew the Qing Dynasty at the cusp of the modern era. Those revolutionaries dreamed of restoring a broken nation to its traditional station at the center of human civilization.Though he lives a century after Sun Yat-sen’s death, Xi Jinping rarely gives a speech without endorsing the same aspiration. As Xi describes it, national rejuvenation is a “strategic plan” for “achieving lasting greatness for the Chinese nation” (Xi 2022). The formal term for this plan is the “National Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation,” a term that could be alternatively translated as the “National Rejuvenation of the Chinese Race.” In the modern era national rejuvenation has been formally identified as the overarching goal of all activities of both party and state.

The work of a Leninist party is inherently goal oriented. Chinese governance depends on a  “high pressure system” [压力型体制] that uses a mix of campaign tactics and career incentives to focus the work of millions of cadres on a shared set of tasks, all of which are nested in a hierarchy of overarching goals. During the Maoist era China’s leadership identified the  “the realization of communism” as the “ultimate aim of the Party,” and proposed “victory in class struggle” as the path for reaching this end (Perrolle 1976). The CPC of today still endorses the“realization of communism” as the “highest ideal and ultimate aim” of the Party, but argues that “the highest ideal of communism pursued by Chinese Communists can be realized only when socialist society is fully developed and highly advanced,” a historical process that will “take over a century” to achieve (Constitution of the CPC 2022). In contrast, the “lasting greatness” associated with national rejuvenation can be accomplished on a more feasible timescale. The Party expects to lead the Chinese race to this desired end state by 2049, the centenary of the People’s Republic of China. Achieving the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation by this date is the overarching goal of the Chinese party-state.

To attain national rejuvenation, party leadership has argued that China must become a “great and modern socialist state” [社会主义现代化强国]. In Xi Jinping’s NEW ERA this imperative has been broken down into five aspirational end states: prosperity and strength [富强],democracy [民主], advanced culture [文明], social harmony [和谐], and beauty [美丽]. The first category emphasize the Party’s drive to build a country whose COMPOSITE NATIONAL POWER is commensurate with a civilization at the leading edge of modernity; the next three identify the desired relationship between the Communist Party and a unified Chinese nation; the last is associated with campaigns to reduce pollution and forge a healthier relationship between industrial development and the natural environment. 

With sub-components as broad as these, almost any policy promoted by THE CENTER falls under the remit of “national rejuvenation.” The breadth of this mandate is intentional. As communist utopia retreats ever further into the future, Party leadership has bet that reclaiming lost Chinese greatness is the one cause “the entire Party and all the Chinese people [will] strive for” (Xi 2022). 

See also: ADVANCING TOWARDS THE CENTER OF THE WORLD STAGE; CENTURY OF NATIONAL HUMILIATION

Key Core Technologies
关键核心技术

In official party terminology, the term “key core technologies” refers to all existing or emerging technologies that promise critical strategic advantages to nations that control their production, distribution, or use. The phrase is used most often when Party leaders and state planning documents discuss technologies that Chinese firms lack the ability to manufacture, or that they can only manufacture by relying on foreign suppliers for parts or expertise. The term is intended as a call to action. When a Chinese leader identifies a specific field or product as a “key core technology” he is urging cadres, scientists, and industrialists to build the academic, financial, industrial, or legal infrastructure China needs to engineer this technology with Chinese resources alone.

The phrase key core technologies first appeared in mid-2010s, but its antecedents predate Xi Jinping. Economic planning and science policy documents produced by the Communist Party of China and the Chinese government in the early 2000s reference “core technologies in key areas” [关键领域核心技术]. The “National Medium and Long-term Science and Technology Development Plan Outline,” a communique published by the State Council in 2006, provides a typical example. The communique argues that “in key areas related to the lifeline of the national economy and national security, real core technologies cannot be bought.” (State Council 2006). The communique presents the indigenous development of these “core technologies” as a prerequisite for sovereign control of Chinese economic development. To secure Chinese economic growth on the long run, the communique directs officials to build a National Innovation System [国家创新体系] focused on achieving Chinese self-sufficiency in eleven “important fields and priority topics,” eight “cutting-edge fields,” and four “fields of basic research,” including renewable energy, materials science, and protein research.

These documents largely operate in a market-friendly frame. The core technologies in key fields were presented as essential to the modernization of the Chinese economy. Chinese firms would learn to engineer these technologies not by isolating themselves from the global economy, but by integrating with it. This reflected the consensus of the times: China faced a rare PERIOD OF STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY where foreign capital and know-how could safely serve the REJUVENATION OF THE CHINESE NATION

This consensus eroded in the 2010s. Over this decade Chinese science and technology policy became more ambitious, more security-oriented, and more state-directed. These changes are reflected in the highest level guidance offered by Xi Jinping. Indigenous innovation is a central component of his NEW DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT [新发展理念], a framework for reorienting Chinese economic planning towards what Xi Jinping calls “high quality development.” During the reform era Chinese economic growth was largely driven by investments in fixed assets and cheap foreign exports. Xi’s New Development Concept, in contrast, calls for a growth model anchored in high end manufacturing at the edge of the technological frontier. 

Under the aegis of the NEW DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT the phrase “key core technologies” entered top-level economic planning documents. The State Council published an “Innovation-Driven Development Strategy Outline” in 2016 which highlighted China’s inability to produce several key core technologies: 

We must also note that certain industries in our country are still at the mid- and low-end of the global value chain, and certain key core technologies are under others’ control. Developed countries still have a clear lead in [advancing] the scientific frontier and high-tech fields (State Council 2016, emphasis added).

To mitigate China’s relative weakness in the global value chain, the outline proposes a three-stage plan: first, the Chinese state must construct a functioning national innovation system and a MODERATELY PROSPEROUS SOCIETY by 2020; then, it must achieve a leading position in the global science and technology ecosystem by 2030; finally, it must become a “strong techno-scientific power” and achieve NATIONAL REJUVENATION by 2050. 

The outline provides specific directions for which fields of technology must see progress, and by which dates progress must be made. The list is a useful portrait of what sort of technologies are considered “key” and “core.” By 2020, the outline instructs, the Chinese party-state must construct national research-industrial complexes for:  

  • High-end general-purpose chips
  • High-end CNC machine tools
  • Integrated circuit equipment
  • Broadband mobile communications
  • Oil and gas field technology
  • Nuclear power
  • Water pollution control
  • Genetically modified crops
  • New pharmaceutical drugs
  • Infectious disease prevention and control.

By 2030 the same should be accomplished for:

  • Aero-engine and gas turbines
  • Quantum communications
  • Novel information network technology
  • Intelligent manufacturing and robotics
  • Deep space and deep-sea exploration
  • Materials science 
  • Emerging energy sources
  • Brain science
  • Medical systems and care (State Council 2016). 

While many of these technologies have military applications, the drive to establish “technological self-sufficiency and self-empowerment” [科技自立自强] in these fields had more to do with economic security than military power. Dependence on foreign technology, the theory went, means that China’s future economic growth might be held hostage by HOSTILE FORCES outside of China.

These fears were soon vindicated by American export controls. Beijing could no longer trust that it would have access to key technologies on the global marketplace. If China was to successfully construct a NEW DEVELOPMENT PATTERN that relied on Chinese resources to power Chinese growth, then China must possess the ability to produce cutting edge innovations independent of the West. “Breakthroughs in key core technologies,” Xi Jinping concluded in 2020, are a “significant question” in the success or failure of “our state’s development pattern and the key to forming [a development pattern] with our domestic large-scale cycle [of goods and services] as the mainstay [of our economy]” (People’s Daily 2020). 

Assessing the progress of this program is difficult. After the key core technologies schema was codified in the Fourteenth Five Year Plan in 2020, China’s central government ministries and provincial governments began publishing lists of research complexes and megaprojects that they have funded to accelerate technological self-sufficiency. Economists who have studied these lists note that funding is concentrated in sectors where Chinese firms currently have competitive advantages or where there are reasonable prospects of developing such an advantage on the short term. In other words, investment is being channeled to technologies where Chinese firms have the potential to leap-frog over current market leaders, allowing China to pass developed nations “on the curve” [弯道超车] (Naughton et al 2023). However, these efforts are tied to benchmarks that lie many years in the future. Their success or failure may not be apparent for years to come.     

See also:  NEW DEVELOPMENT PATTERN; NEW DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT; ADVANCING TOWARDS THE CENTER OF THE WORLD STAGE; NEW ROUND OF TECHNO-SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION AND INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION

Total National Security Paradigm
总体国家安全观

The Total National Security Paradigm is a set of interlinked concepts that party sources describe as Xi Jinping’s signature contribution to Chinese security theory. Xi introduced the paradigm in a 2014 address where he instructed cadres to “pay attention to both traditional and non-traditional security, and build a national security system that integrates such elements as political, military, economic, cultural, social, science and technology, information, ecological, resource, and nuclear security” (Xi 2014, p. 221-222).  This distinction between traditional [传统] and non-traditional [非传统] security is key to Xi’s paradigm. “Traditional security” is oriented around threats to China’s territorial integrity and threats from foreign military powers. The Total National Security Paradigm guides cadres to place equal emphasis on “non-traditional security” threats which cannot be resolved with military tools, but which are potentially as dangerous as military defeat.

Variously translated as the Holistic Approach to National Security, the Comprehensive National Security Concept, or the Overall National Security Outlook, the core of Xi's security paradigm is a maximalist conception of security. This intellectual framework blurs the lines between hard and soft power, internal and external threats, and traditional distinctions between the worlds of economics, culture, and diplomacy. China’s accounting of its security must be “total” [总体].

Though the Total National Security Paradigm is the most forceful and systematic presentation of this idea, it is not new to Party thought. Mao introduced the phrase PEACEFUL EVOLUTION into the party lexicon to describe the threat posed by Western powers who hoped to overthrow communist regimes by instigating revolution from within. The collapse of the Soviet Union vividly demonstrated what happened to a party who ignored this threat. From that moment to the present day, party leaders and state intellectuals have portrayed the Communist Party of China as safeguarding a system under siege. Be they faced with economic coercion and political isolation or friendly offers to integrate into the international order, party authorities consistently describe their country as the object of hostile stratagems designed to subvert China’s domestic stability and the Party’s unquestioned rule.

Xi Jinping’s solution to this problem differs from its predecessors more in scale than concept. Officials in the Jiang and Hu eras offered regular warnings about the danger that ideological dissent, social protest, online media, and official corruption posed to the Party’s hold on power. The Total National Security Paradigm formalized these warnings into a more systematic conceptual framework. In Leninist systems theoretical frameworks like these are the necessary prerequisite of bureaucratic overhaul. If this was the concept’s purpose it seems to have accomplished its aim: by the 20th Congress, the Chinese government was spending more on its internal security budget than on military power, the state security apparatus saw fresh expansion down to lower levels of government, and new national bodies like the Central National Security Commission (CNSC) [中央国家安全委员会] were coordinating state security functions across China’s bureaucratic labyrinth.

See also: CORE INTERESTS; HOSTILE FORCES; PEACEFUL EVOLUTION; SOFT BONE DISEASE; COMPOSITE NATIONAL POWER

Central Committee
中国共产党中央委员会

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, until 1927 called the Central Executive Committee (中央执行委员会), is the central administrative and decision-making body of the Chinese party-state. 

In the post-Mao era members of the Central Committee have been elected by the National Congress of the CPC every five years. These elections are a confirmation vote based on a candidate list where the number of candidates slightly exceeds the number of available seats. Usually only 8% to 12% of candidates are not elected to the Central Committee; it is customary for the Committee to include the governors and party secretaries of China’s provinces, the heads of central government bodies, major SOEs, and national party organizations, and high ranking military officers in the PLA among its members. 

The Central Committee has the nominal power to elect the members of the Secretariat, Politburo, and its Standing Committee, but in practice it merely confirms candidates pre-selected by the top leadership.  At select points in modern Chinese history–such as the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Party Congress–meetings of the Central Committee, called PLENUMS, have served as forums for substantive intra-party debates. More often the Central Committee makes small adjustments to plans already agreed on by the POLITBURO ahead of time. Documents drafted during Central Committee meetings are among the most authoritative in the Chinese policy process; each condenses the various guidelines, policies, and tasks issued since the previous plenum into a baseline directive for the entire party.

See also: CENTER, THE; PLENUM

Center, The
中央

“The Center” is a literal rendering of zhōngyāng. The phrase is is most commonly used as an abbreviation for the CENTRAL COMMITTEE of the Communist Party of China (中国共产党中央委员会), and official Chinese translations almost always opt for translating it as “The Central Committee.” The term, however, is more ambiguous than most translations into English allow. Cheng Zhenqiu, who directed  the English translation of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, described his dissatisfaction with his own translation with these comments:

Lexically, there are still many issues…for example, the translation of zhōngyāng [中央]….Sometimes zhongyang refers to the Central Standing Committee [中央常委], sometimes it refers to the Central Politburo [中央政治局], and more often it refers to the Central Committee. Abroad some have begun translating it as “the Center”; on this issue there’s room for further research (Snape 2021).

The kaleidoscopic nature of the term is evident in Party regulations governing the Central Committee, which declares that 

The Central Committee, Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) are the brain and central hub of the Party organization. Only the Party Centre has the mandate to make decisions and interpret Party-wide and state-wide important principles and policies  (Xinhua 2020).

The usefulness of a term whose definition can stretch to describe either the Central Committee, the POLITBURO, or the POLITBURO STANDING COMMITTEE as contingency requires has been recognized since the days of Mao Zedong, when obedience to The Center was first codified as part of the “FOUR OBEYS” regulating Party life. In particular, obfuscating the specific source of new directives means that decisions that may have only been made by a small group of leading cadres are cloaked with the mantle of larger party organs, suggesting a shared consensus or collective decision making process that may not actually exist.

See also: CENTRAL COMMITTEE; POLITBURO

National Rejuvenation
民族复兴
New Development Pattern
新发展格局

The new development pattern—sometimes translated by Chinese state media as the new development dynamic—describes a proposed structure for the Chinese economy that was first introduced to the Party in the early stages of the coronavirus pandemic and subsequently adopted as a guiding principle in the China’s Fourteenth Five Year Plan (2021-2025). As a blueprint for China’s future development, the new development pattern imagines a country whose economic growth and technological progress is not dependent on fickle global markets or foreign HOSTILE FORCES. While urging China towards self-reliance, the new development pattern is not a call for autarky. Instead, Xi Jinping instructs cadres to engineer a pattern of growth where “the domestic cycle is the mainstay, with the domestic cycle and international cycle providing mutual reinforcement.” (Xi 2022, p. 178).  Under this “dual cycle” or “dual circulation” [双循环] formula, China is expected to contribute to and benefit from global markets even as it transitions towards an economic model whose near-term growth primarily flows from domestic demand for Chinese goods and whose long term promise rests on China’s indigenous capacity for scientific and technological innovation. 

Chinese economists first began characterizing China’s economic development in terms of  “large scale cycles” [大循环] in the era of Deng Xiaoping. In 1987 Wang Jian, an economist then working for the State Planning Commission, proposed that China’s future growth could be best guaranteed by securing a place in the “large-scale international cycle” of trade and capital. Burdened with decaying heavy industry and a surplus pool of labor, Wang argued that China could reverse these trends by developing light industries like textiles and consumer appliances. The slogan “two ends extending abroad, with a high-volume of  imports and exports” [两头在外, 大进大出] captured the logic of the proposed development pattern. Under this schema, Chinese firms would first purchase raw materials for production from foreign markets (one of the two “ends extending abroad”), exploit China’s surplus labor to manufacture goods at low cost, and then sell the finished products in the global marketplace (the other “end” of the slogan). Trade would occur at volumes high enough to accumulate foreign exchange, which in turn could be used to purchase the new machinery needed to revitalize China’s out-of-date heavy industries. Enmeshing China in the “large-scale international cycle” of trade and capital flows outside of China would thus create a virtuous cycle of climbing wealth and growing industry inside China.     

This strategy was openly endorsed by General Secretary Zhao Ziyang; under his successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao the integration of the Chinese economy with the global market would continue apace. There was a quiet geopolitical calculation behind this development strategy. The “two ends extending abroad” approach took economic interdependence as a prerequisite for China’s continued growth. This required a period of time where China could safely leverage the gains of integration without provoking opposition from foreign powers alarmed by its growing strength and wealth. Party leaders concluded that globalization would offer China such a PERIOD OF STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY—a period they predicted would last through the first two decades of the 21st century.

These predictions proved prescient: globalization's assigned role in Chinese economic growth was downgraded as the 2010s came to a close. Two developments would undermine the choice position of global integration in Chinese development planning. The first was a waning commitment to economic growth as the be-all and end-all of the Party’s work. When Xi Jinping came to power, the negative consequences of the Party’s growth-at-all-costs mindset were apparent: noxious pollution, rising class tensions, regional wealth disparities, massive debt on local government ledgers, and a ubiquitous culture of corruption all undermined the Party’s quest for national rejuvenation. To address these problems Xi Jinping incorporated a new intellectual framework for economic development inside the Thirteenth Five Year Plan (2016-2020). This framework, dubbed the NEW DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT, instructed cadres to prioritize “high quality development” [高质量发展] over narrower metrics of GDP growth. The concept called for the Party to achieve these aims by transitioning away from growth driven by fixed asset investments and cheap foreign exports to growth driven by domestic consumption and high end manufacturing at the edge of the technological frontier.

Parallel to these changes in development philosophy was the transformation of Chinese security theory. Under the auspices of Xi Jinping’s TOTAL NATIONAL SECURITY PARADIGM, Chinese security officially began to blur existing distinctions between hard and soft power, internal and external threats, and traditional dividing lines between the worlds of economics, culture, and diplomacy. From this viewpoint, emerging problems in any of these domains might threaten the Party’s hold on power and thus must be viewed through the lens of regime security. Viewed from this perspective, the economic gains that international integration promised must be balanced against increased exposure to hostile forces from the outside world.

These two streams—economic planning and security strategy—began to merge as American export controls and tariffs placed pressure on the Chinese economy. The high-tech development strategy envisioned by the New Development Concept assumes access to crucial technological components that Chinese firms do not yet have the capacity to manufacture. Party leaders began to worry that without the capacity to manufacture these components at home, China’s ADVANCE TO THE CENTER OF THE WORLD STAGE might be held hostage by hostile foreign powers. These anxieties were only reinforced by the dramatic drop in global demand for Chinese goods and equally dramatic rise in global anti-China sentiment caused by the 2020 pandemic. The lesson was clear: the PERIOD OF STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY was closing. Chinese development was dangerously dependent on foreign powers. In this environment China could no longer afford a development pattern that prioritized economic growth and global integration over self-reliance. 

“We have become more aware that security is a prerequisite for development and development guarantees security,” Xi concluded in a Politburo study session in October 2020. “Our country is exposed to the risk of various problems and dangers now and in the future, and risks – both foreseeable and unforeseeable – are on the increase” (Xi 2022, p. 133). To mitigate these risks, China needed to “integrate the planning of security and development” [统筹发展和安全]. 

In April 2020 Xi Jinping laid out what a “secure” development pattern must look like. Chinese development can no longer take the  “large-scale international cycle” as its foundation. Instead, the Party must construct a “large-scale domestic cycle” [国内大循环] to serve as the mainstay of future growth, with the “international cycle” [国际循环] serving as a supplement. As much as possible, planners should locate both the materials used as inputs for Chinese manufacturing and the consumers of China’s manufactured goods (the “two ends extending abroad” in the old slogan) within China’s own borders.

This development strategy has both macroeconomic and security rationales. Chinese observers note that from a macroeconomic standpoint, raising domestic consumption promises to right an economy that has long been described as “unbalanced.” As Chinese wages rise and the labor supply shrinks, China can no longer maintain a growth model premised on low-end manufacturing for the global market. Intentional investment in emerging technologies and key strategic industries is one route around the feared “middle income trap.” It is also a way to escape technological dependence on hostile foreign powers. Xi Jinping describes the drive for technological self-sufficiency as “vital to the survival and development of [the] nation” (Xi 2021, p. 204). By reshoring technological supply chains, as well as key economic inputs like food and energy, the new development pattern promises to secure China against sanction or blockade.

However, the new development pattern is less a bid for autarky than a plan for “hedged integration” with the global economy (Blanchette and Polk 2020). Chinese economists expect that rising Chinese consumer demand will fuel economic growth for exporters across the globe; if China successfully pushes forward the technological frontier, Chinese firms expect to export their new products to every corner of the earth. As one manual designed to teach cadres about the strategy concludes: “Constructing a new development pattern is... a forward-looking gambit for seizing the initiative of future growth.” The ultimate goal of self-reliance is not to cut China off from the world, but to make China more central to it. If realized, the new development pattern will “allow us to attract essential resources from across the globe, become powerful competitors in a fierce international competition, and become a powerful driving force in the allocation of the world’s natural resources” (Office of the Central National Security Commission 2023). 

See also: ADVANCING TOWARDS THE CENTER OF THE WORLD STAGE; GREAT REJUVENATION OF THE CHINESE NATION; INITIAL STAGE OF SOCIALISM; NEW DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT; SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS; TOTAL NATIONAL SECURITY PARADIGM;

Moderately Prosperous Society
小康社会

In 1979, leaders of the People’s Republic of China began describing the creation of a “moderately prosperous society” as a unifying aim of all work done by the Communist Party of China. Alternatively translated as a “well-off society,” the term’s origins lie in a classical Confucian phrase for a prospering social order that nevertheless falls short of utopian ideals. Reformers elevated the term to orthodoxy both to signal that the Maoist struggle for utopia was over and that party work should henceforth be focused on the more practical needs of normal economic development. For several decades party leaders identified the year 2021—the centennial of the CPC’s founding—as the date on which China would secure its status as a moderately prosperous society. When in 2021 Chinese officials duly declared that China had in fact become moderately prosperous, they were not only celebrating the economic successes of the previous three decades but justifying the Party’s transition away from a narrow focus on economic growth to a broader pursuit of NATIONAL REJUVENATION on all fronts. 

The idea of “moderate prosperity,” or xiǎokāng [小康], dates back to the Book of Rites, one of the canonical texts of the Confucian tradition. There Confucius described a past golden age where “the world was shared by all alike. The worthy and the able were promoted to office and men practiced good faith and lived in affection. Therefore they did not regard as parents only their own parents, or as sons only their own sons” (Chen 2011). Confucius called this utopic past dàtóng [大同] , or “the Great Unity.” He contrasted this with the xiǎokāng societies founded by worthy rulers of his own day, which despite being well-ordered, governed by ritual, and relatively wealthy did not attain the harmony and moral excellence of the distant past. 

Exposure to Western thought prompted Chinese intellectuals to reimagine these Confucian ideals for modern conditions. Both the late Qing reformer Kang Youwei (1858-1927) and his political opponent, the aspiring democrat Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), endorsed dàtóng as the ultimate goal of their political programs (Kang redefined “moderate prosperity” as a social stage that would immediately precede dàtóng). Mao Zedong equated dàtóng with the promise of communism, arguing that his revolution would create the “conditions where classes, state power and political parties will die out very naturally.” Mao predicted that once the proletariat’s internal class enemies had been defeated “China can develop steadily, under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party, from an agricultural into an industrial country, and from a new-democratic into a socialist and communist society, [and then] can abolish classes and realize dàtóng” (Mao 1949). 

It is against this backdrop that Deng Xiaoping revived the idea of “moderate prosperity” as an achievable alternative to utopia. In a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira, Deng explained that “moderate prosperity” was the CPC’s mid-term goal for the modernization of China. “Even if we reach [moderate prosperity],” he confessed, “we will still be a backward nation compared to Western countries. However, at that point China will be a country with comparative prosperity and our people will enjoy a much higher standard of living than they do now” (Deng 1979). For party apparatchiks used to the grandiose plans of the Mao era, the new slogan was a remarkably honest assessment of China’s national conditions and served as a realistic goal for national development. Deng even pegged his version of moderate prosperity to a specific dollar amount: China would be a moderately prosperous society when it had per capita gross national income (GNI) of $800 to $1,000 USD.

The economic boom years forced a reassessment of the phrase’s meaning. Though China’s GNI per capita reached $800 in 1998, stark disparity between urban and rural economic had emerged and many regions of China remained in extreme poverty. It was evident that Deng’s index was insufficient to capture the full scope of what a moderately prosperous society would look like. As Jiang Zemin remarked, “The moderately prosperous life we are leading is still at a low level, it is not all-inclusive and is very uneven” (Jiang 2002). In 1997, he expanded the concept to encompass a more holistic set of goals: GDP growth, rural development, improved living standards, the implementation of a social security system, the strengthening of governing institutions and education, poverty alleviation, and protection of the environment. Jiang codified these goals with the new slogan “comprehensively [全面] building a moderately prosperous society.” Jiang further stated that this all around version of the moderately prosperous society would be achieved by 2020.   

Xi Jinping endorsed “comprehensively building a moderately prosperous society” as key to his own domestic platform, codifying it as the first item in a quartet of policy aims known as the FOUR COMPREHENSIVES. He often articulated this goal as a battle to eradicate extreme poverty. In Xi’s words, "it is a solemn promise made by our party to ensure that poor people and poor areas will enter a moderately prosperous society together with the rest of the country“ (State Council Information Office 2021). 

In early 2021, the Communist Party of China declared that this promise had been fulfilled. The battle was over: extreme poverty had been officially eradicated from China, and moderate prosperity has been officially extended throughout the country. A host of critics pounced on these pronouncements, pointing to gaps between official rhetoric and ground realities in China’s poorest regions. Yet declaring the mission accomplished was less about self-congratulations on the part of party leaders than an urgent sense the Party needed to reorient itself around a new set of goals. REFORM AND OPENING had made China rich: now it was time for China to become strong. Accordingly, the first item of the Four Comprehensives was changed from “comprehensively building a moderately prosperous society" to "comprehensively building a modern socialist country [全面建设社会主义现代化国家]."

See also: DENG XIAOPING THEORY; FOUR COMPREHENSIVES; INITIAL STAGE OF SOCIALISM; ONE CENTER, TWO BASIC TASKS; PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT ARE THE THEMES OF THE TIMES; PERIOD OF STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY; REFORM AND OPENING.

The National Congress of the Communist Party of China
中国共产党全国代表大会

The National Congress of the Communist Party of China—commonly referred to as the “Party Congress”—is in principle the highest decision-making body in Chinese politics. Assembled for a week long session every five years in the Hall of the People in Beijing, thousands of delegates from across China comprise each Party Congress. On paper this assembly possesses the authority to amend the CPC Charter, determine national policy, and select the membership of the Party’s highest leadership organs. In reality, questions of personnel and policy are settled by THE CENTER before any Party Congress convenes. Formal decisions made by a congress, the content of reports given to the assembly, and the behavior of individual delegates are all carefully choreographed months ahead of time. The function of a Party Congress is thus more performative than deliberative. A smoothly run Party Congress signals the unity of the Party leadership, while the massive propaganda apparatus mobilized for each congress broadcasts shifts in policy or ideology to the Party membership writ large.  

The first Party Congress was held in 1921. It lasted two days and was comprised of only 13 delegates. Assembled in times of revolution, war, or domestic upheaval, the subsequent nine congresses were not held at regular intervals, and varied greatly in location, format, and the number of delegates assembled. The more norms that govern the Party Congress today can be traced to the post-Mao Party Congresses helmed by Hua Guofeng and by Deng Xiaoping. Determined to smooth leadership transitions and strengthen what he called “intra-party democracy” [党内民主], Deng insisted that Party Congresses occur at regular intervals to allow for orderly changes in party leadership. 

Leadership transitions remain the most important task of the Party Congress. The congress confirms the membership of the CENTRAL COMMITTEE, Central Military Commission [中央军事委员会], and Central Commission for Discipline Inspection [中央纪律检查委员会]. Though ostensibly elected during the congress itself, this leadership cohort is chosen by negotiations between sitting leaders and retired ‘party elders’ [长老] in the months leading up to a Party Congress. The vote itself is largely ceremonial: cadres selected to join one of these leadership organs often claim the seats reserved for central leaders before any formal vote has taken place. 

The central event of any Party Congress is the presentation of the incumbent Central Committee’s “political report.” [政治报告]. The agenda of the Party Congress is not organized around specific policy problems; instead it centers on the delivery of various reports and resolutions which are subsequently discussed and adopted by the delegates. The political report, customarily delivered as a televised speech by the General Secretary at the opening of the congress, is the most important item on this agenda. Every political report recapitulates the victories and setbacks the Party experienced over the previous five years, announces changes in the Party’s ideological line, and establishes the goals intended to guide all party and state activity in the years to come.

 This is the most authoritative document in the Chinese political system. Its contents are crafted with care. The drafting process often lasts an entire year. It begins with the formation of a “drafting group” [起草小组] typically led by the man who will serve as General Secretary after the conclusion of the congress. Before it is delivered hundreds of leading cadres provide feedback on the sections of the report most relevant to their responsibilities. This pre-congress drafting process matters more for the substance of party policy than anything that occurs during the congress itself. It is during this stage that key ideological questions are settled and consensus for the party platform is built. The relative importance of each stage is seen in length of the documents each produces. The longest political reports are more than sixty pages in their official English translation. In contrast, the resolution produced at a Party Congress to endorse a political report generally fits on a single page. 

Though its elections are rigged and the policies it will endorse are decided months before hand, a tremendous amount of pomp and ceremony attends every Party Congress. This pageantry has a purpose. The Party Congress embodies core ideals of the Communist Party of China. These include loyalty, unity, and an unwavering commitment to shared purpose. Committing the entire party to a shared purpose is the ultimate aim of this assembly. In the days, months, and years that follow the Party Congress, communist leaders and propagandists exhort cadres to study the central “themes” and implement the “spirit” [精神] of the most recent congress. By these means party leaders steer the activities entire Chinese party-state.  

See also: CENTER, THE; CENTRAL COMMITTEE; PLENUM; POLITBURO; LEADERSHIP CORE

New Round of Techno-Scientific Revolution and Industrial Transformation
新一轮科技革命和产业变革

When Chinese leaders speak of a “new round of techno-scientific revolution and industrial transformation” they envision a suite of new technologies whose development will have an economic impact comparable to the invention of steam power, electricity, or the computer. The leadership of the Communist Party of China believes the world has already entered the first stages of this scientific revolution. Just as steam power and the other inventions of the industrial revolution reshaped the global balance of power in the 19th century, China’s communist leaders predict that the newest round of technological change has the potential to subvert the existing global order. The aim of science, technology, and industrial policy under Xi Jinping is to make China a leading force in this revolution, thereby securing China’s ADVANCE TO THE CENTER OF THE WORLD STAGE.

Historians of science often divide the technological innovations of the last three centuries into three waves. The first wave, also called the “first industrial revolution,” began in Great Britain during the mid-18th century with the invention of the steam engine and subsequent application of steam power to transportation and industry. The second industrial revolution, which began in the mid-19th century in Europe and the United States, saw the invention of modern steel production, fossil fuels, industrial chemicals, and electrification. The third revolution in industry followed the 20th century invention of transistors, modern computing, and the internet. Chinese statesmen and technologists predict that the 21st century will witness a fourth wave of transformative technology—in other words, a “new round of techno-scientific revolution and industrial transformation.” 

This hope is not unique to China. The idea of “Fourth Industrial Revolution” was popularized by the founder of the World Economic Forum in the mid-2010s (Schwab 2015; Schwab 2016) and in Chinese political rhetoric the phrase “Fourth Industrial Revolution” [第四次工业革命] and “a new round of techno-scientific revolution” are often linked. However, Chinese leaders were dreaming of transformative technology long before these buzzwords spread among the Davos set. From the days of Mao Zedong China has sought to catch up with the west by leap-frogging traditional models of development. In the 1980s many Chinese intellectuals hoped that China could leverage emerging information technologies to power its economic rise (Gerwitz 2022). As the Chinese economy boomed in the 2000s these hopes grew into an earnest expectation that China might one day lead global technological development. Xi Jinping was one of these expectants. As General Secretary one of the very first POLITBURO study sessions that he organized was on the importance of an innovation-driven development strategy. It was in this study session the phrase “new round of techno-scientific revolution and industrial transformation” officially entered China’s communist lexicon (People’s Daily 2013).  

There is both a geopolitical and economic logic behind this fixation with novel technology. Chinese leaders often blame the eclipse of traditional China on its failure to industrialize; they are also acutely aware that the two geopolitical hegemons of the last three hundred years were also the leading innovators in the last three techno-scientific revolutions. The lesson is clear and has been reduced to a saying taught to Chinese school children: in times of trouble “the backward will be beaten” [落后就要挨打]. If the GREAT REJUVENATION OF THE CHINESE NATION is to be secured, China must find its way to the techno-scientific frontier. 

This quest is also seen as increasingly central to Chinese economic growth. When Xi Jinping introduced the NEW DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT he acknowledged that China’s existing economic model was no longer an adequate engine for the Chinese economy. Imminent breakthroughs in clean energy, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, materials science, and quantum computing could, if aggressively pursued, become the foundation for a new model of growth. Thus beginning in 2016 the Communist Party of China began orienting its industrial policy around the needs of China’s high technology industries (Naughton 2021).

This task is pursued with great urgency. Just as the globalizing forces of the nineties and aughts presented China with a PERIOD OF STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY to catch up with its global rivals, Chinese statesmen believe that the new round of industrial transformation presents China with a rare window of opportunity. For the first time in many centuries China has the chance to get in on the ground floor of a new technological revolution. As Xi Jinping instructed his cadres in a 2021 essay:

Since the beginning of the 21st century, global scientific and technological innovation has entered a period of unprecedented intensity and activity. A new round of techno-scientific revolution and industrial transformation is reshaping the global innovation landscape and economic structure… Never before had science and technology had such a profound impact on the future and destiny of the country… If China wants to be strong and rejuvenated, it must vigorously develop science and technology and strive to become the world's major science center and innovation highland. We are closer to the goal of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation than at any time in history, and we need to build a world power in science and technology more than at any time in history! (Xi 2021)  

See also: ADVANCING TOWARDS THE CENTER OF THE WORLD STAGE; GREAT CHANGES UNSEEN IN A CENTURY; KEY CORE TECHNOLOGIES; NEW DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT

第三章 大国崛起的一般规律

人类历史上,大国兴衰的交互更替是一种常见现象。无数的专家学者、智者精英对此都进行过深入的研究和思考,试图找出深蕴其中的历史规律,但迄今尚无令人满意的标准答案。不过,历史总在一定范围内存在因果逻辑,各有特点的大国崛起也不乏相似的路径和经验。具备基本条件的后发国家,只有充分吸纳先发国家经验,制定适合自身和时代特色的战略,才能抓住机遇实现崛起。

大国地位往往取决于人口、领土、自然资源、地理位置、经济实力、军事力量和软实力等一系列因素,其中人口、领土、资源等是基本要素和物质基础,决定着一国成为世界大国的潜力。但潜力能否得到发挥及发挥到何种程度,在很大程度上取决于后天的战略和机遇等。恰当的国家战略不仅可以助推大国崛起,少走弯路,也事关大国地位的延续。如英国在丧失世界主导地位后,决定适应美国唤起而非对抗,将影响力又延续了几十年。

大国具备的优势越多,综合实力越强,繁荣持续的时间也更久。英美在科技创新、政府效率等方面优势都较突出,分别引领了第一次和第二次工业革命,各自形成前所未有的世界超级大国地位。但美国成就更大、霸权更突出,除后发优势外,主要在于人口、领土和资源等底蕴史深厚,规模效应更持久。不过,某些方面极其突出也可以部分弥补大国其他方面的不足。如葡萄牙、西班牙及荷兰,虽然人口较少,但凭借商业和军事等方面的压倒性优势而成为称霸一时的世界大国。

大国地位还取决于国际竞争态势。保罗·肯尼迪在《大国的兴衰》一书中表示,大国的兴衰是相对的,取决于当时环境下与其他国冢实力升降的比较。20世纪最后10年,苏联这个实力相当的竞争对手的倒下,成就了美国前所未有的唯一超级大国地位。中国在宋朝时被认为是当时世界上最先进的文明,在科技和经济等方面都处历史上的巅峰,但不幸生逢游牧民族实力超群的时代。西夏党项人、辽国契丹人、金国女真人及蒙古人四个主要敌人都有着强大的骑兵,平抑掉宋朝作为农业大国在财富上的优势,阻止了其成为“中国治下世界秩序”的霸主。

得天独厚开盈尺

得天独厚通常是指成功所需具备的优越条件和机遇,出自清代诗人洪亮吉的诗句“得天独厚开盈尺,与月同圆到十分”。在大国崛起的过程中,天时、地利、人和同样不可或缺。其中,优越的地理、人口等发展要素与环境,有时比制度等更重要、更具决定性影响。具备这些条件的,不一定必然崛起为世界大国,但若没有这些基本条件,则肯定无法称其为大国。在科技等其他条件相似的情况下,地缘和人口等方面的优势越突出,崛起为世界大国的可能性越大,持续时间也更久。

“人多力量大”

自马尔萨斯提出“人口论”后,国际社会对人口的消极影响强调较多,认为人口增长阻碍了贫困国家的发展。但近年来,人口对经济增长的正面影响受到越来越多关注。一定的人口和领土是大国崛起重要的前提条件。领土意味着资源和发展空间,人口代表着劳动力和市场。历史上,波斯、罗马、马其顿、汉、唐等帝国无不拥有众多人口和广袤疆域。葡萄牙、西班牙和荷兰虽凭借大量殖民地及商业资本、航海及军事等方面的优势而成为世界大国,但也因本土人口和领土规模不足而很快衰落。在工业时代,社会分工越来越复杂,对劳动力和市场的要求更高,不具备人口和领土优势的国家成为世界大国的难度越来越大。

工业革命前夕,英国的人口已具相当规模。工业革命后,英国凭借巨大的先发优势,将人口和资源潜力发挥到极致。在鼎盛时期,只占世界人口2%的英国,GDP占全球的30%以上,对外贸易额占世界的1/5,制造业贸易额占世界的2/5。不过,随着其他西方国家先后完成工业化,英国在人口和资源方面的局限开始显现。英国政治家利奥·艾默瑞指出:“在美、德等庞大而富有的帝国快速发展的情况下,这些小岛的支配地位怎么可能长期维持下去呢?我们的人口只有4000万,怎么可能与人口是我们2倍的那些国家竞争呢?”

美国的人口规模远超英、法、德、日等,领土更是它们的多倍,人口增长前景也优于其他发达国家。这决定了美国在劳动力、资源,特别是在市场等方面有着其他西方国家不具备的巨大优势。一定程度上,如果说英、德、法、日等的工业化分别只有一个发动机驱动的话,美国的东、中、西部以人口和面积衡噩相当千两三个甚至更多的发动机。因此,美国的工业化全面完成所需时间更长,经济繁荣持续得更久,取得的世界大国地位和霸权也前无古人。如布热津斯基在《大棋局》一书中所言:“美国成为第一个也是唯一真正的全球性大国,在全球享有至高无上的地位。”

日本人口较少,政治和文化阻力小,"船小好调头”,在明治维新后迅速进入工业化。由于取得先发优势,通过中日甲午战争赔款、国际资金和技术的挤占效应等,日本在较短时间内完成工业化,跻身发达国家行列。与英国类似,日本也以较小的人口规模和领土面积一度创造了世界第二大经济体的奇迹。但人口和领土也限制了增长空间,随着人力、市场、技术等逐渐接近极限,日本外向型经济增长的潜力日渐耗尽,在20世纪90年代后陷入长期低迷。

人口与地域等优势使得中国成为古代四大文明中唯一延续至今的文明,具有强大的"容纳之槛与消化之功"。斯塔夫里阿诺斯表示:"中国太大、太具有疑聚力,不可能像印度和东南亚国家那样被彻底彻服,总能同化或驱逐入侵者。”也正是人口规模庞大、传统文化根深蒂固,使得中国工业化启动面临的阻力大、需要的时间长,经历了多次尝试与失败。改革开放之初,人口一度成为负担,计划生育政策一定程度上助推中国摆脱"贫困陷阱"。经济起飞后,巨大的“人口红利”被认为是中国奇迹的重要因素。当前传统的“人口红利”减弱,但教育水平和人均收入的提高将带来前所未有的“人才红利”和“市场红利”, 13亿人一旦有了钱,就出现了一个超级市场。

印度庞大的人口和广袤的领土使其古代文明在世界上占据重要地位,也成为工业化起步的很大负担。2020年初,印度超过英国和法国成为世界第五大经济体。高盛预测,2040年印度将成为世界第三大经济体。在欧洲和东亚等国家因日益严重的老龄化而面临增长难题的情况下,印度在人口数队和构成方面有着巨大的优势和潜力,"继续拥有一个充裕的年轻人群体”。美国知名学者扎卡利亚断言:“如果人口决定命运的话,印度的未来将高枕无忧。”

“远亲不如近邻”

针对中国改革开放后取得的经济成就,美国威斯康辛大学教授爱德华·弗里曼曾指出,其中一个重要原因在于中国 “位于东亚而非东非”。在这里,他重点强凋的是中国崛起的重要周边环境。改革开放后,中国处于二战后总体快速发展的东亚地区,相关经济成就的取得在一定程度上得益于东亚的群体性崛起一—先是日本的现代化和战后工业化的完成,再有亚洲“四小龙”,之后从中国沿海开始的工业化浪潮逐渐扩展到内地。

邻国间的摩擦一般较多,但在文明和经济发展层面,往往是 “远亲不如近邻”。历史上,大多数文明古国和强国都集中在欧亚大陆,呈接力式和群体性崛起。工业革命后,发达国家主要集中在欧洲和北美。诸多大国的兴衰表明,经济发展和文明进步有着较强的集群效应和周边扩散效应。这在东亚群体性崛起或“亚太世纪"的来临中有着更为充分的体现,也将在中国倡导的“一带一路”建设的推进过程中得到进一步证明。

欧洲的”起飞”是一个整体过程。威尼斯等意大利城邦、葡萄牙、西班牙和荷兰先后以商业为核心的崛起为欧洲群体性崛起开了先河,卖定了坚实基础。英国经济建立在大西洋沿岸国家的贸易基础之上,是大西洋经济。工业革命后,英国资本等跨过英吉利海峡向法国等西欧地区外溢。与此同时,现代制造业在北美登陆,在某种程度上美国经济成为英国经济的传承和继续。欧洲为美国经济的发展提供了资金、劳动力、技术及市场。19世纪晚期,欧洲落后国家不断追赶欧美先进国家,大西洋经济各实现整体起飞。

20世纪中叶后,日本承接了许多从美国转移出来的制造业,进入高速增长时代。20世纪末,中国成为又一个“世界工厂”。新中国曾在20世纪50—60年代接收了苏联援建的企业和设备,为后来丁业 “起飞” 打下了基础。20世纪70年代末的改革开放,可以看作工业化西进的重要一站。“工业化东进与西进在中国的交汇最终实现了中国的工业化,创造了 ‘中国奇迹’”。

500年来,世界范围内发生了三次结构性的权力转移,也见证了部分区域的大国群体性崛起。第一次权力转移是欧洲的崛起。第二次权力转移是美国及其盟友的崛起。目前,国际社会正经历着近现代历史上的第三次权力转移,即亚太地区的群体性和 “雁阵式” 崛起。未来随着 “一带一路” 建设的加速推进,人们也有望见证部分 “一带一路”国家的群体性崛起。彼得·弗兰科潘在《丝绸之路一一部全新的世界史》一书中强调,“世界旋转的轴心正在回到那个让它旋转千年的初始之地一丝绸之路”。

打造高质批的朋友圈

从500年来大国崛起的时空顺序上看,后发大国不是先发大国的邻国,就是“远亲”或朋友,即在文化或政治等方面存在特殊关系的国家,如宗主国、盟国等。社会与政治距离对贸易和投资有着重要的影响,相似的文化环境易于知识和技术的传播。埃里克·琼斯在《欧洲奇迹一一-欧亚史中的环境、经济和地缘政治》一书中称,欧洲海外属地的兴起表明,文化和政治制度等因素在很大程度上可以弥补地理上的距离,如美国、加拿大、澳大利亚、新西兰甚至南非等都先后实现了工业化。也正因文化和政治制度迥异,“欧洲工业化的火苗在伊斯兰世界的’石棉’边缘陡然熄灭了”。

日本屈服西方文明,除了自身积极“脱亚入欧“外,美国在战略上的重视与扶持对日本的崛起起着非常重要的作用。在被美国打开国门后,日本成为美国的出口市场和航运补给站。在此后美国的国际战略中,日本成为越来越重要的一环。二战后,日本成为美国重点扶持以抗衡东方的对象,经济援助、直接投资和美国市场等有利条件是其高速发展的重要外因。

在西方经济科技占主导地位的时期,与经济发达国家的疏远乃至敌对使许多国家错失发展良机。阿根廷错失经济成功的良机被认为与结盟失策密切相关。丹比萨·莫约在《增长危机》一书中指出:“阿根廷最大的失误发生在1944年,当时它未能与美国结盟,而美国随后开始了经济腾飞。阿根廷领导人选择与英国结盟,从那时起阿根廷开始了经济衰退。” 二战后,东欧等国家加入苏联阵营,推行苏式工业化,从而远离了世界中心市场与核心技术。

 国向工则日新日智

经资增长是大国崛起的前提和基础,维持大国地位面临的最一大挑战往往也来自经资。保罗·肯尼迪在《大国的兴衰》一书中强调:大国之兴衰,最终、更重要、更具决定性的因素,是相对于他国而言的经济实力。农业经济时代,世界大国往往是农业发达的国家。大航海后,葡萄牙、西班牙和荷兰等领土和人口规模有限的国家先后崛起,依靠的是当时无与伦比的商业和军事等实力。进入工业社会后,实现工业化是大国崛起的必备条件。现代经济体要想真正实现繁荣富强,就必须有强大、多样和富于创造性的制造业。

制造业兴国

制造业是技术创新的源泉,是经济增长的原动力。与前工业社会相比,工业革命使生产力惊人地提高。公元元年到公元1400年,世界经济年均增长率仅有0.05%,而17世纪的荷兰  工业革命后的英国、19世纪的美国和20世纪后半期的东亚经济体的年均增长率分别增至0.5%       2%、4%和8%- 10%。15世纪前,世界经济总量翻番需要1400年,而20世纪的东亚经济体经济总量翻番只需7一8年。

18世纪末,英国就已经建立起强大的工业基础,不仅拥有大批工艺稍湛的手工家庭作坊,还有令人敬畏的造船能力,生铁产显占据全球总产砬的15%左右。1870年,英国在全球制造业产出中占近1/3。

得益于独一无二的自然秉赋和来自欧洲的移民、投资等,美国在建国之初就成为一个庞大的经济体。南北战争结束后.美国迅速进入工业化进程。1870年,美团制造业占全球的比例不足 1/4,但到19世纪80年代末就增至36%左右。在此后一个世纪里,美国一直维持着世界制造业霸主的地位。

德国在19世纪下半叶最后30年起飞,完成从农业经济向工业经济的转型。在煤炭和钢铁等传统支柱产业的基础上,化学和电气等新兴产业得到迅速发展,德国成为世界级的化学工业大国,1877年合成燃料产挝占世界的一半。此后虽经历希特勒时期畸形的军事工业发展和二战后的分裂,但在1990年重新统一后,德国再次成为世界重要的制造业大国和贸易大国。

制造业占世界比例的变化也反映出大国格局的演变。1750年,中国生产全球制成品的1/3'居世界第一,印度排第二。 1860年左右,英国超过中国。1900年,美国排名第一,英闰和德国分居第二、第三。1953年,世界制造业的顺序变为美国、苏联和英国,不过美团领先苏联达4倍以上。1980年,美国和苏联继续领跑,日本超过英国成为第三名。

成为制造业大国是实现中华民族伟大复兴的重要保防。新中国成立之初,基本是一个“一穷二白”的落后农业国。中国现已成为世界第一大工业国,是全世界唯一拥有包括41个工业大类的最完整现代工业体系的国家,500种主要工业品中有200多种产掀居全球第一。2010年中国制造业增加值首次超过美国, 2018年中国制造业增加值占世界份额达28%以上。世界工业大国的基本国情,有力支撑了“两个一百年“目标的逐步实现。习近平总书记在“改革开放40周年庆祝大会”上指出:成为全球制造业第一大国,标志着“中国人民在富起来、强起来的征程上迈出了决定性的步伐!”

顺应工业化规律

现代经济发展一般意味着从农业向低技术产业再到高技术产业和服务业的转型。各国工业化道路不尽相同,但产业递进规律相似,基本上按照食品、纺织、机械、化工、电子等序列有重点、有先后地发展。随着第一、二、三产业在社会生产中主体地位的依次演变,主导产业也由劳动密集型逐渐向资金和技术密集型升级。发达国家的工业化,均是先发展轻工业,后发展重工业。

许多后发国家在工业化过程中急于求成,颠倒发展顺序,走了不少弯路。“十月革命”后,苏联在计划经济下继续工业化进程。1929年发布第一个五年计划,重点发展煤炭、钢铁等行业,调动全国资源实现重工业化。苏联的工业化虽取得一定成就,但由于政府强力干预、过于注重重工业,产业发展失调。新中国成立后,模仿苏联实行计划经济,重点发展重工业。20世纪50年代末的“大跃进”又破坏了工业化的农业基础,延缓了工业化进程。从重工业起步的工业化,由于内在生产要素配置的扭曲和政治的过度干预,往往难以持久。

而顺应产业发展规律,先轻后重、逐级递进是新兴工业化国家成功的重要经验。20世纪80年代初,中国也放弃了优先发展重工业战略,轻纺工业得到迅速发展。20世纪90年代,中国的电子信息产业成为发展最快的产业部门之一。从20世纪90年代末开始,中国进入重化工业阶段,重工业的增速超过轻工业。

融入国际产业链

顺利承接国外的劳动密集型产业是后发国家实现工业化的重要前提。19世纪下半叶,美国凭借其良好的自然资源、与欧洲紧密的人文纽带、便利的海洋运输条件,特别是强劲的经济发展势头,成为英国产业海外转移的最大受益者。 1914年,美国资本输入规模居世界之首,其中英国对美债券投资占其总投资的85.9%。此次国际产业转移后,美国逐渐成为新的“世界工厂”。

美国在确立了全球经济和产业技术领先地位后,率先进行产业结构调整,将钢铁、纺织、日化、造船、普通工业机械等传统产业向外转移。日本、联邦德国等因经济发展水平较低但又具有较好的发展基础以及战略盟友关系而成为美国产业转移的主要承接地,很快成为全球劳动密集型产品的主要供应者。两国因此大大加快了工业化进程,综合国力迅速提升。日本发展成又一个 “世界工厂",联邦德国也成为世界经济强国。

20世纪70年代,日本向外转移轻纺等劳动密集型产业及钢铁、化工和造船等资本密集型产业,造就了亚洲“四小龙”的经济奇迹。但“四小龙“经济体盘小,产业升级周期短,在承接了日本高科技产业后,急需把劳动密集型产业转移出去。而此时大力改革开放的中国凭借低成本和地理等优势成为亚洲“四小龙”劳动密集型产业转移的主要承接者。在国内积极推进市场经济、国外积极吸引海外投资、充分发挥产业比较优势的基础上,中国工业化进程显著加快,成为新的“世界工厂”。

2008年全球金融危机以后,全球掀起新一轮国际产业转移浪潮。中国成为主要输出国和引领者,承接地除中国中西部地区外,主要是“一带一路”沿线国家。亚洲经济与贸易的高增长态势也有望同步向“一带一路”地区传递。预计未来,“一带一路”国家GDP年均增速将显著高千全球平均水平,有望打造成新的世界经济增长带。

走好创新先手棋

科技创新是经济增长的重要动力,也是大国实力的主要标志。在20世纪50年代前,经济发达国家科技进步的贡献率为20%- 40%, 60年代以来升至60%-80%。在2001—2009年间,美国高技术产业增加值占制造业增加值的比重由17%升至21.3%。对后发国家而言,模仿和吸收发达国家的先进技术是崛起的重要途径,但要成为主导性的世界大国,就必须有革命性的科技创新做支撑,如英国和美国对前几次科技革命的引领。

科技支撑崛起

经济发展最终要靠获取并掌握先进技术来实现。“大航海”以来,科技作用日益突出。亚当·斯密指出:劳动分工和市场的扩大促进了技术创新,国家财富增长直接源于劳动生产率的提高。诺贝尔经济学奖获得者罗伯特·索洛认为:长期看,经济增长的唯一源泉是技术进步。美国20世纪前半期人均产出的增长中,有7/8要归因于技术进步。

世界大国权力在地理上的转移也往往伴随着科技发展中心的转移。美国知名历史学家威廉·麦克尼尔认为,公元750一1100年,伊斯兰世界在科学和技术方面远远超过欧洲。公元1000年后,中国的科学技术世界领先。到了15世纪,世界科技中心开始向地中海和欧洲转移。葡萄牙全国人口只相当于南京的人口,但它船队的威慑力远远超过郑和的大船队。“大航海”后,西方崛起,意、英、法、德、美等先后成为世界科技中心。

16世纪中期,意大利城邦出现了一批重要的自然哲学家,使之成为近代科学活动中心。英国在16—17世纪涌现出吉尔伯特、波义耳、牛顿、哈雷等各领域大师,开辟了力学、化学、生理学等多个现代学科。18世纪中期到19世纪中期,法国涌现出达朗伯、拉普拉斯等一大批科学家、在热力学、化学、天体力学等领域做出突出贡献,为内燃机革命和化学革命提供了理论基础。19世纪20年代起,德国科学发展突飞猛进,有机化学、量子力学等成为引领世界的带头学科。20世纪20年代,美国取代德国成为世界科学中心,抓住信息技术革命等机遇,站上世界科学前沿。

当前世界科技中心主要集中在欧美发达国家,但呈现出向亚太转移的趋势。日本科技实力依然突出,新兴经济体在全球研发中的占比越来越高,技术创新能力明显增强。中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院院长潘教峰等指出,世界正酝酿新一轮科技革命和产业变革,为中国建设世界科技中心、再次引领世界科技发展提供了难得的机遇。

引领高新产业

经济成功的国家往往高度重视科技创新,18世纪新技术的领先者英国迅速成为欧、洲乃至世界一流工业强国。 2012年,美国、日本和德国的《专利合作条约》(PCT)专利申请匮分别达到世界总掀的26.44%、22.35%和9.61%。科技创 新来源千广泛的工业实践和商业驱动。清华大学教授文一认为: “只要踏上工业革命的大道,成为世界工厂,任何国家都可能成为全球技术创新的领导者,但若一个工业化国家放弃制造业,就很可能逐渐丧失技术优势和创新力。”

美国的科学技术一直以强大著称于世。人类历史上很重要的发明,如白炽灯、轧棉机、通用零件、生产线等都源自美国。瓦拉科夫·斯米尔在《美国制造--国家繁荣为什么离不开制造业》一书中指出:“美国在1865年之后实现飞跃的主要动力在于技术进步,这些进步不仅让美国成为世界最大的大宗商品生产国,也让美国在新发明的商业化、推行新生产模式和提高劳动生产率等方面成为领导者。一个多世纪后,美国乃至整个世界仍在受益千其中很多具有划时代意义的技术发明。”

目前,美国经济增长面临诸多难题,但在科技方面仍是世界第一强国。在信息化、航天、人工智能、医学、军工等高新科技领域,美国均有蓿压倒性的技术优势。美国研发支出居世界首位,有着强大的基础科学研究实力及雄厚的科技人力资源。  1901-2019年,共有613位科学家获诺贝尔奖,其中美国籍为287人。美国人几乎垄断了计算机科学领域的图灵奖,汇聚了59%的世界顶级人工智能研究人员。美国还拥有40所世界百强大学,汇聚着全球大部分顶尖科技公司。

引进先发国家资本、人才和设备等是后发大国缩短技术差距的主要途径。1789年,英国人斯莱特来到美国,凭记忆造出阿克莱特纺织机,成为美国近代工业的开端。19世纪中叶,德、美铁路开通之始,输入了英国的机器和资本。在苏联早期,列宁的新经济政策曾把某些企业租给美、日等国经营。第一个五年计划期间,斯大林聘请了美、德等国专家做重点企业建设的顾问。二战后,日本大足输入英、美先进技术,有时把西方产品拆开,以反向设计加以仿造改进。在汽车制造、光学器材、精密仪器和精密机床等方面,日本的这种模仿式创新取得较大的成功。

中国在历史上的很长时期内都居于世界科技领先地位,但在过去500年里错过了前几次科技革命。新中国成立后,科技发展呈后来居上之势,在“两弹一星”等高端科技领域取得突出成绩。近年来,中国在电子通信、5G、人工智能等诸多领域实现重大突破.加快向世界科技强国迈进。在2017年全球批准的专利中,中国占30%,高于美、日、韩和欧洲的23%、14%、9%和 8%。自2007年起,中国每年授予的自然科学和工学博士学位超过美国。

中国在科技领域和美国比仍有不小的差距,但增长速度快、发展潜力大。2000一2017年,中国研发支出年均增长17.3%,远超美国的4.3%。乔治·杂尔和马克斯·冯·泽德绯茨在《从中国制造到中国创造:中国如何成为全球创新者》一书中指出: “实用主义、企业家精神、大规模研发投入、儒家文化传统及互联网高度普及等,将推动中国成为全球创新者。”

沧海横流显砥柱

自20世纪80年代起,新自由主义和“华盛顿共识”广为传播,发达国家纷纷要求发展中国家采取一系列所谓的“好政策”和“好制度”来促进经济发展。但实际上,这些政策和制度多数是工业化的结果。相对于“西式民主",稳定的政局和良好的社会秩序在后发国家工业化和大国崛起过程中起着更为重要的作用。那些盲目接受“华盛顿共识”的国家,不仅未实现经济增长,多数还陷入政治动荡。

强大高效的政府

寒缪尔·亨廷顿在《变革社会中的政治秩序》一书中指出:在第三世界国家现代化过程中,经济发展和社会文化改造具有优先地位,政治现代化只有在前者发展后才能水到渠成。那些企图在短期内跨越到西方现代制度的国家,忽视了政治现代化的渐进性,往往欲速则不达。要实现从传统到现代的过渡,必须建立起强大的政府,即有能力制衡政治参与和政治制度化的政府。“各国间最重要的政治分野不在于政府的形式,而在于有效程度。”

赫尔普曼在《经济增长的秘密》一书中指出:强大政治体制支撑着国家发展和经济增长,存续较长的政权更利于形成促进增长的政策。在发展中国家,若没有可靠的政府行政、警务和司法部门,糟糕的经济结果往往会接踵而至。丹比萨·莫约在《增长危机》一书中强调:“2014年,暴力使全球经济损失14.3万亿美元,占世界GDP的13.4%。20世纪30年代起阿根廷经济急剧衰退,一个重要原因是1930年至20世纪70年代爆发了六次军事政变。”

稳定的政府更容易在公共服务和基础设施等方面进行长远投资,推动经济增长。扎卡利亚指出:日本、美国、欧洲和中国的发展故事有一条共同的主线,就是强大和可信赖的政治体制。“中国政府有很高的民意支持率,有助于其贯彻执行既定的战略”。印度政府官员曾表示:“我们不得不做了许多政治上广受欢迎的蠢事,这些愚蠢的做法会削弱我们的长期经济潜力,但政治人物在短期内需要的是选票,而中国政府则可以做长远打算。”

开放包容的对外战略

当今全球化远未完成,国界和地理仍然阻碍要素流动,开放对后发国家经济增长更为重要。衡盐贸易开放度的很多指标都与经济增长正相关,而自由贸易的扭曲与经济增长负相关,贸易开放国家的增速往往比闭关自守的国家要快一倍以上。格泽高兹·科勒德克在《21世纪政治经济学:世界将何去何从》一书中指出:封闭的经济体不可能出现长期快速增长,大国兴衰的历史多次证明,“宽容”是大国形成的必要条件,而“孤立“往往与没落相关。

改革开放是中国现代化建设不断取得成就的重要法宝。习近平总书记在党的十九大报告中,提出“推动形成全面开放新格局",强调“开放带来进步,封闭必然落后“中国开放的大门不会关闭,只会越开越大”“中国坚持对外开放的基本国策,坚持打开国门搞建设“。2020年11月12日在浦东开发开放30周年庆祝大会上,习近平总书记进一步指出,要深入推进高水平制度型开放,敞开大门欢迎各国分享中国发展机遇,积极参与全球经济治理。

美国曾是一个高度开放的国家。从西进运动到工业的爆炸式发展,再到第二次世界大战的胜利,移民推动了美国的进步和成功。美国之所以在原子弹研制竞赛中获胜,与它能吸引那些欧洲移民科学家密不可分。计算机时代初期,美国在技术和经济领域取得突出的领导地位,同样与能吸引世界各地大批天才移民相关。硅谷催生了人类史上的财富爆炸,移民的创造力至关重要。

但美国耶鲁大学教授艾米·蔡表示:美国“今天正失去这种优秀素质,其优势正面临前所未有的威胁"。扎卡利亚指出:美国政治已经病入膏肓,深陷党派斗争中难以自拔,运作效率十分低下。特别是特朗普政府上台后,处处强调“美国优先”,大搞贸易保护主义,极力限制移民。开放政策的倒退,将进一步侵蚀美国的大国地位。

坚强有力的领导核心

领袖人物在历史发展中有着特殊的作用,关系到大国崛起的方向和速度。恩格斯曾指出,权威是植根于人类行为的一种普遍现象。政治学上的"蜘蛛网模型”表明,再复杂的蜘蛛网,也有一个“网核"。亨廷顿认为、现代化要求具有变革能力的权威,而权威必须集中于某些坚强有力的个人或集团手中。

领袖人物在历史的转折关头往往起着非比寻讯的作用。诸多世界大国的崛起,都离不开那些改变国家命运的重要人物和领导人。《解放军报》理论部原主任刘新如认为,一个有权威的领导核心是大国崛起的关键要素,越是大国崛起的关键时期,越离不开强有力的领导核心和引领时代的领袖人物。

葡萄牙和西班牙在从封建分裂状态中走出后,形成统一的民族国家,出现了强大的中央政府及王权权威。葡萄牙以国家名义支持航海家对未知世界的探索,航海大发现成为有计划、有组织的国家战略。亨利王子主持建立起人类历史上第一所国立航海学校,组建了世界一流的船队。西班牙成为统一民族国家后,伊莎贝尔女王雄心勃勃地谋划远洋探险计划,为资助哥伦布远航,甚至卖掉了王冠上的明珠。

英国在伊丽莎白王权力显支持下,建立起欧洲最强大的海军。法国国王路易十四建立起绝对王权,把法国从一盘散沙的贵族封建制政权凝聚成一个强大国家。德国“铁血宰相"俾斯麦大规膜实施社会改革,使德国综合国力跃居欧洲大陆之首。沙皇俄国的彼得一世发起具划时代意义的“强制性的现代化运动”,成为俄罗斯历史上“最伟大的帝王”。日本通过明治维新废除了贵族世袭特权,加强了中央集权,强制推行政治、经济和社会改革,最终跻身世界大国行列。

美国首任总统华盛顿,在开国和建章立制等方面都发挥了重要作用,1787年主持制宪会议制定了沿用至今的宪法,在制度上确立了总统作为同家元首的权威;民主党创始人杰斐逊主笔起草了《独立宣言》,通过外交等手段使美国领土增加了近一倍;林肯领导取得了南北战争的胜利,颁布了“解放黑奴宣言”,维护了联邦的统一;富兰克林·罗斯福的“新政”从经济危机的深渊中拯救了美国,使之得以赢得二战并在战后成为超级大国。

从历史上看,没有领导核心的国家往往会陷入"俾斯麦陷阱"。在普法战争后,俾斯麦从孤立、削弱法国的战略目的出发,主张在法国实行多党执政的共和制,认为一个不稳定的共和制政权可以使法国像一座不稳定的火山。1875—1940年,法国更换了102届政府,平均每个内阁只存活5个多月,甚至有两个内阁仅存在一天。苏联亡党亡国原因复杂,但执政党权威的丧失是重要原因之一。

“万山磅礴看主峰”,确立强有力的领导核心,是中国共产党取得革命胜利的宝贵经验。邓小平曾深情地说:“如果没有毛泽东,中国人民还要在黑暗中摸索更长的时间”。党的十八大以来,党和国家事业取得历史性成就,根本在于以习近平同志为核心的党中央的掌舵领航。在中华民族迈向伟大复兴的关键时刻,习近平总书记充分展现了自信笃定的政治意志力,战略判断高瞻远瞩,发挥着“主心骨” “中流祗柱”作用。

参考文献

1.【英】保罗·肯尼迪著,王保存等译:《大国的的兴衰:1500-2000年的经济变革与军事冲突》,中信出版社2013年版。

2.【美】寒缪尔·亨廷顿著,王冠华等译:《变革社会中的政治秩序》,生活·读书·新知三联书店1989年版。

3.【美】贾雷德·戴蒙德著,栾奇译:《为什么有的国家富裕,有的国家贫穷》,中信出版社2017年版。

4.【美】茲比格涅夫·布热津斯基著,中国国际问题研究所译:《大棋局--美国的首要地位及其地缘战略》,上海人民出版社1998年版。

5.【美】斯塔夫里阿诺斯著,吴象婴,梁赤民 ,董书慧 , 王昶译:《全球通史--从史前到21世纪》,北京大学出版社2006年版。

6.【美】 法里德·札卡瑞亚著,赵广成、林民旺译:《后美国世界: 大国崛起的经济新秩序时代,中信出版社2009年版。

7.【美】艾米.蔡著, 刘海青 杨礼武译:《大国兴亡录》新世界出版社2010年版。

8.【美】欧阳泰著,张孝铎译:《从丹药到枪炮:世界史上的中国军事格局》,中信出版社2019年版。

9.【美】 丹比萨·莫约,王雨晴译:《增长危机》,中信出版社2019年版。

10.【美】 瓦科拉夫·斯米尔,李凤海,刘寅龙译:《美国制造:国家繁荣为什么离不开制造业》,机械工业出版社2014年版。

11.【美】威廉·麦克尼尔,  孙岳 陈志坚 于展译:《西方的兴起:人类共同体史》,中信出版社2018年版。

12.【英】埃里克·琼斯著,陈小白译,《欧洲奇迹欧亚史中的环境、经济和地缘政治》,华夏出版社2015年版。

13.【英】张夏准著,严荣译,《富国的伪善: 自由贸易的迷思与资本主义秘史》,社会科学文献出版社2009年版。

14.【波兰】格泽高滋·W.科勒德克著,龙云安译:《 21世纪政治经济学:世界将何去何从》,中央编译出版社2015年版。

15.【日】大前研一著,朱悦玮译:《 低增长社会: 保护主义与反全球化危机的应对之道》,北京时代华文书局2019年版。

16. 张帆:《产业漂移: 世界制造业和中心市场的地理大迁移》,北京大学出版社2019年版。

17 文一:《伟大的中国工业革命 “发展政治经济学”一般原理批判纲要》,清华大学出版社2016年版。

Chapter Three: General Laws of the Rise of Great Powers

The rise and decline of great powers, with each power replacing the next in its turn, is a common phenomenon in human history. Innumerable expert scholars and elite thinkers have conducted thorough research and contemplation of this in an attempt to find deep underlying laws, but, thus far, there is no satisfactory solution to uphold as a standard. Nevertheless, history contains to some degree an internal causal logic, and there are shared characteristics in the path and the experience of nations that have risen in the past. For late developing countries with the necessary fundamental conditions the only way to seize the opportunity and realize such a rise is to absorb the experience of early developing countries and formulate strategies appropriate to both their own conditions and those of their age.

Achieving the status of a great power most often depends on population [levels], territory [size], natural resources, geographical location, economic power, military strength, soft power, and other factors of this sort. Among these, population, territory, and natural resources are the most fundamental factors.1 They are the material basis for determining whether a country has the potential to become a great power. But whether and to what extent that potential can be realized depends to a great extent on acquired strategies and favorable opportunities. A suitable national strategy can not only propel the rise of a great power and help it to avoid potential detours along the way, but it also has a bearing on whether a great power can hold on to its [great power] status. For example, after losing its status as the dominant global power Britain was able to hold onto its influence for several more decades. This was because they made the decision to play along with the United States rather than offering opposition. 

The more areas of superiority that a great power possesses, the greater its composite national strength will be, and the longer its age of prosperity will last. The outstanding advantages of Britain and the United States in the elements that confer superiority, such as scientific innovation and government efficiency, as well as their leadership, respectively, of the First and Second Industrial Revolutions, secured their status as unprecedented global superpowers.2 But American achievements were greater and their supremacy more outstanding. Apart from the benefits of latecomer's advantage, [America’s success] is due to a historical heritage that provided population, territory, and natural resources, which allowed it to benefit from economies of scale. However, if a great power is deficient in certain aspects, [these deficiencies] can be compensated by [strength] in other aspects. For instance, Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands had relatively small populations, but they relied on their overwhelming commercial and military superiority to become, at least for a time, dominant global powers. 

Great power status also depends on the conditions of international competition. Paul Kennedy, in his book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, says that the rise and fall of great powers is relative, and must be considered against the global situation and in comparison to the prospects of other nations.3 In the final decade of the 20th century, the collapse of the Soviet Union, formerly a peer competitor of the United States, gave its rival the unprecedented status of sole global superpower. China during the Song dynasty was considered to be the most advanced civilization in the world, and was at the pinnacle of scientific, technological, and economic power, but it was, unfortunately, reaching that status at a time when nomadic peoples were becoming the preeminent powers. The four main rivals of the Song, namely the Tangut people of the Western Xia, the Khitan of the Great Liao, the Jurchens of the Great Jin, and the Mongolians, had powerful cavalry forces that neutralized the wealth advantage of the agrarian great power, obstructing its potential rise as the overlord of a “global order under Chinese governance.”4 

Every Measurement Conforms to its Standard When Blessed By the Gifts of Nature


A poem by Qing dynasty poet Hong Liangji reads: “When blessed by all the gifts of nature, one's every measurement conforms to its standard / As perfect as the roundness of the moon.”5 This line about being exceptionally blessed by natural conditions refers to the superior factors and opportunities needed for success. As great powers rise, temporal, geographic, and demographic factors are all indispensable. Superior geography or demography, as well as other similar development factors, can sometimes be more important and have a more decisive influence than institutions and systems. There is no guarantee that these conditions will produce the rise of a great power; the lack of these fundamental conditions, however, necessarily precludes the possibility of the rise of a great power. When the level of science and technology [among competing powers] is similar, then geographic and demographic conditions become more important for ensuring the rise of a great power and for [that power’s ability to] persist over time.

There is Strength in Great Numbers

After Malthus proposed his “population theory,” international society has paid close attention to the potential negative impacts of population, believing that population growth can hinder the development of poor nations. However, in recent years more and more attention is being paid to the positive impact of population growth on development. Population and territory are important preconditions for the rise of a great power. Territory means natural resources and space for development; population represents a labor force and a market. Without exception, historical empires such as Persia, Rome, Macedonia, the Han, and the Tang had large populations and vast territory. Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands relied on extensive colonies, as well as their advantages in other areas, such as commercial capital, maritime navigation, and military power, but they quickly declined due to an insufficient population in their core territory and a lack of territory. In the industrial age, the division of labor in society became increasingly complex, with more demands made on the labor force and the market, making it difficult for countries lacking in population and territory to rise as great powers.

On the eve of the Industrial Revolution, the population of Britain was quite large. After the Industrial Revolution, Britain, having had the benefit of developing early, used the full potential of her population and natural resources. At the peak of its prosperity, Britain, which possessed only 2% of the global population, held more than 30% of global GDP, accounted for a fifth of global trade, and held two-fifths of manufacturing trade volume. However, as other Western countries successively industrialized, the limitations of Britain’s limited population and natural resources became apparent. British politician Leo Amery asked, “How can these little islands hold their own in the long run against such great and rich empires as the United States and Germany are rapidly becoming? How can we, with forty million people, compete with states nearly double our size?”6

The population of the United States was far greater in scale than that of England, France, Germany, and Japan, its territory was many times larger, and its prospects for population growth outstripped those of other developed nations. To a certain extent, if we say that the industrialization of Britain, Germany, France, and Japan were each driven by a single motor, the eastern, central, and western regions of the United States, with their population and land area, are equivalent to two, three, or more motors. Consequently, the time needed by the United States to complete full industrialization was longer, its economic prosperity of a longer duration, and its position as a great power and hegemonic power unprecedented. As Zbigniew Brzezinski says in The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, America is “the sole and, indeed, the first truly global power.”7

As the saying goes, “a small boat is easy to maneuver.” Japan, with its relatively low population, as well as minimal political and cultural resistance, was able to rapidly embark on industrialization after the Meiji Restoration. As a result of the advantages of early development, and using indemnities paid after the First Sino-Japanese War, international financing, and a technological crowding-out effect, Japan completed industrialization in a relatively short span of time and progressed to the ranks of developed nations. Much like Britain, Japan pulled off a miracle despite its small-scale population and territory and rose to become the second-largest economy in the world. But population and territory limited their space for growth, and as labor power, markets, and technology reached their limits, growth based on Japan's export-oriented economy was gradually exhausted, and after the 1990s it fell into a prolonged depression.

Population and territorial superiority allowed China to become the only one of the four great ancient civilizations to have continued to the present, and provided it with “a threshold for accommodation and an ability to absorb.” L. S. Stavrianos said that “being too large and cohesive to be conquered outright like India and the other countries of Southeast Asia, China was never to succumb entirely [to the Western challenge].”8 But it was precisely China’s massive population and deep-rooted traditional culture that provided great resistance to and delayed the beginning of the country’s early industrialization, which experienced numerous failed attempts and defeats. At the beginning of Reform and Opening, the population once again became a burden, and a certain amount of family planning policy was required to free China from the “poverty trap.” After the country's economic takeoff, the massive “demographic dividend” was considered a major factor in the Chinese miracle. At present, the “demographic dividend” has expired, but educational level and per-capita income will provide an unprecedented “talent dividend” and “market dividend.” Once a population of 1.3 billion people has grown wealthy, the result will be a supersized marketplace.

India’s massive population and expansive territory gave its civilization an important position in the ancient world, but these [factors] also became a burden at the beginning of industrialization. In early 2020, the Indian economy surpassed those of England and France, becoming the fifth-largest in the world. Goldman Sachs projects that India will have the third-largest economy in the world by 2040.9 As countries in Europe and East Asia face increasingly grave issues with aging and shrinking populations, India’s population numbers and [age] composition present massive advantages and potential. They can rely on “a continued abundance in their youth cohort.” [As] the American scholar [Fareed] Zakaria says: “If demography is destiny then India is secure.”10

Neighbors Are Dearer Than Distant Relatives11

Considering the economic achievements of China after Reform and Opening, University of Wisconsin-Madison professor Edward Friedman said that one of the important factors was that China was “located in East Asia and not East Africa.”12 Here he is emphasizing the importance of the environment on China’s periphery to China's rise. After Reform and Opening, China [joined] a trend of postwar development in East Asia. To a certain extent China’s economic achievements are due to the collective rise of the region—beginning with Japan's modernization and the accomplishment of postwar industrialization, spreading to the Four Asian Tigers, and then turning into an industrialization wave that reached China's shores and gradually spread inland.

There is usually a fair deal of friction between neighboring countries, but at the level of civilizational and economic development, it is often the case that “neighbors are dearer than distant relatives.” Historically, the great majority of ancient and powerful states were concentrated on the Eurasian Continent, and they tended to rise and fall in sequence and as groups. After the Industrial Revolution, the main developed countries were found in Europe and North America. Looking at the rise and fall of many great powers, we see the cluster effect and peripheral diffusion effect quite strongly in economic development and civilizational progress. This is seen even more clearly in the collective rise of East Asia, or the arrival of what is called the “Asia-Pacific century.” The course of China’s Belt and Road Initiative provides further evidence [for this fact].

The “takeoff” of Europe was also a collective process. The rise of Venice and other Italian city-states, Portugal, Spain, and Holland provided an economic core and a stable foundation for the collective rise of Europe. The British economy rose on a foundation of trade with countries on the coast of the Atlantic. It was part of an Atlantic economy. After the Industrial Revolution, British capital leaped beyond the English Channel and spread to France and other Western European regions. In the same time period, modern manufacturing made landfall in North America; to a certain extent, the economy of the United States represents an inheritance and continuation of the British economy. Europe provided funding, labor, technology, and a market for the United States. In the late 19th century, the backward countries of Europe caught up with advanced countries in Europe and North America without interruption, and the Atlantic economies experienced a collective takeoff.

After the midpoint of the 20th century, Japan was the destination for much of the manufacturing capacity transferred out of the United States, and it entered a period of high-speed growth. At the end of the 20th century, China became another “factory of the world.” In the 1950s and 1960s, New China received the support of the Soviet Union to build enterprises and facilities, building a foundation for the later “takeoff.” Reform and Opening at the end of the 1970s can be seen as another stop on the westward march of industrialization. “The meeting of the westward and eastward advances of industrialization created the ‘Chinese miracle.’”

Over the previous five centuries, there have been three structural power shifts, as well as the successive rise of great powers and their [respective] regional communities. The first power shift came with the rise of Europe. The second power shift was the rise of America and its allies. Currently, the international community, following a “flying geese paradigm,” with the Asia-Pacific region at the head of a “V” formation, is undergoing a third modern power shift. As the Belt and Road Initiative gathers momentum, people expect to see the collective rise of the Belt and Road countries. In The Silk Roads: A New History of the World, Peter Frankopan writes: “The world is spinning on its axis back to where it began a thousand years before on the Silk Road.”13

Craft a High-Quality Friend Circle

Looking back over the last five centuries at the temporal and spatial sequence with which great powers rose, late developing great powers were either neighbors of great powers that rose before them, or they were the "distant relatives" or friends, namely states with which they had a close relationship based on shared cultural, political, or other relationship–for example, the relationship between a tributary state and the suzerain, or between states in an alliance. Social and political proximity has a major impact on trade and investment; similar cultural environments make it easier to pass knowledge and technology. In The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia, Eric Jones takes the rise of Europe’s overseas dependencies as proof that [shared] elements, such as culture and political systems, can to a great extent make up for the geographical distance. The examples of this include America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and even South Africa, which all realized industrialization. It was because of large differences between their culture and political systems that the [wildfire of] European industrialization “abruptly died” at “the asbestos edge of the Muslim sphere.”14

Japan has submitted to Western civilization; apart from Japan's own “abandon Asia, learn from Europe” strategy,15 the great strategic importance attached to the country and the support extended to them by the United States had a major role in the rise of Japan. After the country was opened up by the United States Japan became an American export market and shipping depot. After that Japan became an increasingly important element of America’s international strategy. Following the Second World War, Japan started to receive support from America to counterbalance Eastern powers; economic aid, direct investment, and favored access to American markets were the most important external causes of Japan's rapid development.

During the period when Western powers took the dominant position in economics, science, and technology, estrangement or even antagonism caused many countries to lose timely opportunities for development. Argentina's missed opportunities to achieve economic success are considered to be related to its unwise diplomatic alliances. As Dambisa Moyo points out in Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth—and How to Fix It: “Among the biggest policy errors occurred when Argentina failed in 1944 to align itself with the United States, which was beginning its economic ascendancy. Instead, its leaders chose to align with Britain, just then commencing its economic decline.”16 After the Second World War, countries in Eastern Europe and elsewhere joined the Soviet camp, pursuing Soviet-style industrialization, and thereby distancing themselves from the center of global markets and core technologies.

The State that Esteems Industry will Increase in Wisdom Day by Day17


Economic growth is a prerequisite to and a necessary foundation for the rise of a great power; this is one of the greatest challenges faced by great powers in maintaining their status. Paul Kennedy, in his book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, emphasizes that the rise and fall of a great power comes down most decisively to relative economic power over other nations. In the era of agricultural economies, the great powers of the world were usually those with a high degree of agricultural development. After the Age of Discovery, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and other countries with limited population and territory rose in succession, relying on commercial and military power that had no previous precedents. After the arrival of industrial society, a timely realization of industrialization became a precondition for the rise of great powers. For a modern economy to be prosperous and strong it requires a powerful, diversified, and creative manufacturing industry.

Manufacturing can Rejuvenate a Nation

The manufacturing industry is the source of technological innovation and the force behind economic growth. In comparison to pre-industrial society, the Industrial Revolution produced astonishing increases in productivity. From the first year of the common era to 1400 the annual growth of the global economy was on average only 0.05%. In contrast, in the Netherlands during the 17th century, post-Industrial Revolution Britain, the United States during the 19th century, and the East Asian economies during the second half of the 20th century had average respective growth rates of 0.5%, 2%, 4%, and 8-10%, respectively. Before the 15th century, it took 1400 years for the global economy to double in size, but it took the East Asian economies only seven or eight years to pull off the same feat in the 20th century.

By the end of the 18th century, Britain had already established the foundations for industrialization, not only in the form of artisans’ workshops but also a highly-regarded shipbuilding industry, and its pig iron production accounting for around 15% of world output. By 1870, Britain possessed a third of the world's manufacturing output.

Owing to its unparalleled natural endowments and immigration and investment from Europe, the American economy was quite large from its founding. After the Civil War, the United States rapidly carried out the process of industrialization. In 1870, the United States accounted for less than a quarter of the world's manufacturing capacity, but that rose to around 36% by the 1880s. In the century that followed, America held onto its hegemony over global manufacturing.

Germany’s takeoff came in the final three decades of the 19th century when it completed the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy. On the foundation of coal, iron, and other traditional pillar industries, the chemical and electrical industries also quickly developed; Germany became a global leader in the chemical industry, producing half of the world's synthetic fuel. Despite the distorted development of military industrialization under Hitler and the postwar division of the country, Germany recovered its status as a major manufacturing power and a major trading power following the reunification of the country in 1990.

Changes in the proportion of global manufacturing held by individual powers are reflected in shifts in the patterns of development of great powers. In 1750, China produced a third of global finished goods, putting it in first place ahead of India. Around 1860, Britain overtook China; America captured the top spot in 1900, followed by England and Germany in second and third place, respectively. In 1953, the system had shifted so that the manufacturing industry was captured [entirely] by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain. However, America still [had a commanding lead], outstripping Soviet production by four times or more. In 1980, the United States and the Soviet Union were still out ahead, but Japan overtook Britain for third place.

Becoming a major manufacturing power provides crucial security for the goal of realizing the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation. At the founding of New China, the country was fundamentally a grindingly poor and backward agricultural nation.18 China has now become the foremost industrial power in the world. The modern industrial system of China is the most comprehensive, encompassing forty-one major industrial categories, and producing over two hundred of the top five hundred industrial products in the world. In 2010, China surpassed the United States in manufacturing value-added, and by 2018, the Chinese manufacturing industry commanded 28% of global output. The fundamental national conditions produced by becoming a major industrial power support the realization of the Two Centenary Goals.19 At the gathering to celebrate the 40th anniversary of Reform and Opening, General Secretary Xi Jinping stated that becoming the foremost manufacturing power was necessary for “the Chinese people to take a decisive step on their journey towards wealth and strength.”20

Conforming to the Laws of Industrialization

In the modern sense, economic development usually means a transition from agriculture to low-tech industry, then on to high-tech industries and service industries. Each country's path to industrialization is not identical, but they conform to a similar law of industrial progress, usually developing industry in a sequence that begins with food, moves next to textiles, then machinery, chemicals, electronics, and so on, developing around these focal points in turn. As primary, secondary, and tertiary industries evolve successively to take the main position in social production, the dominant industry also upgrades gradually from labor-intensive to capital- and technology-intensive. In the industrialization of developed nations, light industry usually develops first, followed by heavy industry.

Many late developing countries became impatient for results, rearranged this development sequence, and wandered off the path [of industrialized development]. After the October Revolution, the Soviet Union continued its process of industrialization under a planned economy. In the first Five-Year Plan, issued in 1929, the emphasis was on developing coal, iron and steel, and other industries, mobilizing the natural resources of the entire country toward heavy industrialization. Although Soviet industrialization achieved some degree of success, there were imbalances owing to the fact that forceful government intervention was excessively focused on heavy industry. After its founding, New China mimicked the Soviet Union's planned economy and emphasis on heavy industry. In the 1950s, the process of industrialization was delayed by the arrival of the Great Leap Forward, which destroyed China’s agricultural foundation.21 Industrialization began with heavy industry, but due to distortions in the process of distributing the essential factors of production and excessive political interference, it was hard to sustain.

However, for newly industrializing countries, following the law of industrial development–in which light industry follows heavy industry and there is progressive step-by-step development–has proven a crucial element of success. At the beginning of the 1980s, China also gave up on the strategy of prioritizing heavy industry, allowing light industry to develop rapidly. In the 1990s, the Chinese electronic information industry was one of the fastest growing industrial sectors. From the end of the 1990s, China entered a stage of heavy industrialization, with heavy industry outstripping the expansion of light industry.

Integrating With the International Industrial Chain

One important prerequisite for the industrialization of late-developing countries is successfully taking on labor-intensive industries for international markets. Based on its natural resources, close cultural ties, and convenient maritime links with Europe, and especially its powerful economic momentum, the United States became in the second half of the 19th century the largest beneficiary of the overseas transfer of manufacturing from Britain. In 1914, the United States ranked first place globally in terms of the scale of capital input, with British bond investment accounting for 85.9% of foreign investment. After this international transfer of industry, America gradually became the new “factory of the world.”

After the United States established itself as the global economic, industrial, and technological leader, it undertook a program of industrial restructuring, which saw the manufacture of iron and steel, textiles, chemicals, ships, common industrial machinery, and other similar products move overseas. Although they had a lower level of development, relatively good foundations for development and strategic relationships with the United States meant that Japan and West Germany became the destination for American manufacturing. They quickly became top global suppliers of labor-intensive manufactured goods. Consequently, the pace of industrialization in these two countries increased with tremendous speed, and their composite national strength rapidly grew. Japan became yet another “factory of the world,” and West Germany became a major economic power.

In the 1970s, it was Japan's outbound transfer of the labor-intensive textile and other light industries, as well as capital-intensive industries, like iron and steel, chemicals, and shipbuilding that created the economic miracle of the Four Asian Tigers. The scope of the economic systems of the Four Asian Tigers was small, however, and the pace of industrial upgrading was rapid, which meant th fat taking up high-tech manufacturing from Japan required them, too, to start moving labor-intensive industries overseas. It was at this time that China, vigorously pursuing Reform and Opening, and with the advantage of low costs and geographic advantages, became the main destination for labor-intensive industry transfers from the Four Asian Tigers. Through actively promoting the domestic market economy, actively calling for foreign investment, and taking advantage of a relatively good industrial foundation, China's industrialization process experienced a remarkable acceleration; China became another “factory of the world.”

The aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis set off a new round of global industrial transfers. China became a major exporting country and also a recipient; excepting central and western regions in China, much of the industrial transfer was directed toward countries along the Belt and Road. There is hope that the Belt and Road countries might synchronize with Asia, which has high rates of economic and trade growth. Estimates hold that the average annual GDP growth rate of the Belt and Road countries will be significantly higher than the global average, opening up the hopeful possibility of a new global economic growth area. 

Take the Initiative in Innovation


Scientific and technological innovation is a key force for economic growth, and it serves as a crucial indicator of the actual strength of a great power. Prior to the 1950s, the contribution of scientific and technological progress to the economies of developed countries was 20-40%, rising to 60-80% in the 1960s. Between 2001 and 2009, the value added for high tech industries in the manufacturing sector in the United States went from 17% to 21.3%.22 For late developing countries, copying and assimilating advanced technologies from developed countries is key to their rise as a nation, but becoming the dominant global power requires the assistance of revolutionary scientific and technological innovations, as occurred in the United States and Britain following their respective scientific and technological revolutions.

Science and Technology Sustain the Rise of Nations

Economic development ultimately relies on obtaining and mastering advanced science and technology. Putting science and technology to use has become increasingly important since the Age of Discovery. As Adam Smith pointed out, the division of labor and the expansion of markets stimulate technological innovation; the wealth of nations is increased through greater labor productivity [produced by the division of labor and technology]. Robert Solow, winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, holds the belief that, in the long-term, the only source of economic growth is industrial progress.23 Seven-eighths of the growth in the per capita GDP of the United States during the first half of the 20th century can be attributed to technological progress.

Geographical power shifts among great powers often follow shifts among the centers of scientific and technological development. The well-known American historian William H. McNeill believes that the Islamic world was far more scientifically and technologically advanced between 750 and 1100 AD than Europe.24 After the year 1000, China became the global leader in science and technology. By the 15th century, the global center of science and technology began to shift to the Mediterranean region and Europe. Although the entire population of Portugal was equal only to that of Nanjing, that country's maritime fleet had military coercive power that far exceeded Zheng He's armada. After the Age of Discovery, the West rose, and Italy, Britain, France, Germany, America, and other nations successively became global techno-scientific centers.25

In the middle 16th century, a number of important thinkers in natural philosophy emerged in the city-states of Italy, transforming them into centers of scientific activity. Through the 16th and 17th centuries a number of thinkers in Britain burst forth, including William Gilbert, Robert Boyle, Isaac Newton, Edmond Halley, and others, who initiated a number of modern scientific disciplines, including physics, chemistry, and physiology. From the mid-18th to mid-19th centuries, France produced a great number of scientific thinkers, including Jean le Rond d'Alembert and Pierre Simon Marquis de Laplace, who made outstanding contributions in a number of fields, including thermodynamics, chemistry, and celestial mechanics, which would provide the theoretical foundation for the internal combustion revolution and the chemical revolution. From the 1820s forward German science advanced by leaps and bounds. Germany became the world leader in disciplines such as organic chemistry and particle physics. In the 1920s, the United States, taking advantage of the revolution in information technology, replaced Germany as the global scientific center, and took a position at the front line of scientific progress. 

At present, the major global science and technology centers are concentrated in the developed nations of Europe and North America, but trends show a shift toward the Asia-Pacific region. Japanese scientific and technological power remains impressive, but developing economies are claiming a greater proportion of research and development, which has led to an enhanced capacity for technological innovation. Pan Jiaofeng, President of the Institutes of Science and Development of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, is among those who have pointed out that a new round of techno-scientific revolution and industrial transformation is currently being fermented, which will provide China with the opportunity to become the center of global science and technology and the world leader in techno-scientific development.26

Lead in High Technology Industries

Economically successful nations generally place a high degree of emphasis on scientific and technological innovation. [For example,] when 18th century Britain became a technological leader it rapidly became a powerful European, Continental, and world power. In 2012, the United States, Japan, and Germany accounted, respectively, for 26.44, 22.35, and 9.61% of patent applications under the Patent Cooperation Treaty. Scientific and technological development emerges from a wide range of industrial practices and commercial drivers. Wen Yi, a professor at Tsinghua University, believes that “So long as a nation steps out onto the road of Industrial Revolution and becomes the factory of the world, it has the possibility of becoming the world leader in technological innovation. But if an industrialized nation abandons its manufacturing industry, it will very likely come by degrees to lose its technological advantage and capacity for innovation.”27

American science and technology has always been considered formidable and is renowned as among the best in the world. Many of the most important inventions in human history, including the incandescent bulb, the cotton gin, universal machine parts, and the production line came from the United States. Vaclav Smil writes in his Made in the USA: The Rise and Retreat of American Manufacturing: “[America's] enormous post-1865 leap was primarily driven by technical advances. These developments made the United States not only the largest mass producer of goods but also the leader in commercializing new inventions, setting up entirely new industries, introducing new ways of production, and raising labor productivity. More than a century later the country, and the world, still continue to benefit from many of those epoch-making advances.”28

Presently, the United States faces many problems in economic growth, but it is still the preeminent global power in science and technology. In informatization, aerospace, artificial intelligence, medicine, military technology, and other high-tech industries, the United States has overwhelming technical superiority. American research and development expenditures are the highest in the world, and the country has a strong foundation in basic scientific research and abundant resources in scientific and technical manpower. Between 1901 and 2019, a total of 613 scientists received the Nobel Prize, among which 287 were American citizens. Americans have a near monopoly on the Turing Award in computer science, and the country is home to 59% of researchers in artificial intelligence. The United States also claims forty of the world's top hundred universities, as well as the majority of the top technology companies.

Drawing on the capital, expertise, and equipment of early developing countries is the main way that late developing countries can rapidly close the technology gap. In 1789, when Briton Samuel Slater went to the United States and built from memory his own version of Richard Arkwright's spinning jenny, his machine kicked off the beginning of modern American industrialization.29 In the middle 19th century, German and American railways were only opened by importing British equipment and capital. In the early years of the Soviet Union, Lenin's New Economic Policy leased certain enterprises to management from America, Japan, and other countries. During the first Five-Year Plan, Stalin engaged experts from America, Germany, and other countries as advisers on key enterprises. After the Second World War, Japan imported advanced technology from Britain and America; they would sometimes go so far as to dismantle Western products in order to reverse engineer the designs. In the manufacture of some products, like automobiles, optical equipment, precision instruments, and precision machine tools, Japan's style of imitation led to great success.

For long periods of time, China was the global leader in science and technology, but it has missed out on the techno-scientific revolutions of the past five hundred years. New China is an example of a country catching up from behind in science and technology, with the country making outstanding achievements in high-tech fields, with the Two Bombs, One Satellite project as one example.30 In recent years, China has pulled off quantum leaps in numerous fields, including digital information technology, 5G, and artificial intelligence, accelerating its progress into the ranks of the global leaders in science and technology. Among patents approved globally in 2017, China claimed 30%, with the United States taking 23%, Japan 14%, South Korea 9%, and Europe 8%. Beginning in 2007, China began to award more doctorates in the natural sciences and engineering each year than the United States does.

China still has a not insignificant gap to close with the United States in the fields of science and technology, but the [Chinese] growth rate is rapid and there is potential for development. Between 2000 and 2017, China's research and development expenditures grew at an average of 17.3%, easily beating the American rate of 4.3%. In their book Created in China: How China is Becoming a Global Innovator, Georges Haour and Max von Zedtwitz point out: "China’s pragmatic and entrepreneurial spirit, massive investment in R&D, compounded by its Confucian tradition and the extensive use of the Internet by its urban population, means that the country is about to become a major country for innovation.”31

Rough Seas Reveal the Strength of the Mast32


Since the 1980s, the ideas of neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus have been widely disseminated, and developed countries demanded that developing nations adopt what are termed “good policies” and “good institutions” in the interests of economic development. But in actual practice, these sorts of policies and institutions [can only be] the result of industrialization. For late developing countries in the process of rising as a great power, a stable government and good social order play a larger role in the process of industrialization than “Western-style democracy.” Many of those countries that blindly accepted the Washington Consensus did not merely fail to grow their economies but sank into political turmoil.

Strong and Effective Government

In Political Order in Changing Societies, Samuel Huntington points out that in third world countries, the process of modernization, economic development, and socio-cultural transformation take priority.33 Political modernization is only possible with their realization. Those countries that attempt to jump forward to a modern Western system in a short period of time  ignore the reality that political modernization is a gradual process. They inevitably discover that attempting to accelerate the process paradoxically leads to delays. The transition from tradition to modernity requires a strong government, namely a government with the ability to balance political participation against political institutionalization. “In terms of observable behavior, the crucial distinction between a politically developed society and an underdeveloped one is the number, size, and effectiveness of its organizations.”

In The Mystery of Economic Growth, Elhanan Helpman says that a powerful political system supports national development and economic growth, and that longer-lasting regimes are better for the creation of policy that accelerates growth.34 In developing countries, a lack of reliable government administration, law enforcement, and justice usually leads to terrible economic outcomes. As Dambisa Moyo notes in Edge of Chaos: “In 2014, violence cost the global economy US $14.3 trillion—or 13.4 percent of world GDP.”35 One of the key reasons given for Argentina's "steep decline" since the 1930s is that “over a fifty-year period, between 1930 and the mid-1970s, Argentina had six military coups.”

As well as promoting economic growth, stable governments are more likely to make long-term investments in things like public services and infrastructure. Zakaria points out that the stories of development in Japan, the United States, Europe, and China share a single thread, which is strong and reliable political institutions. “The Chinese government enjoys a high rate of popular support,” Zakaria writes, “which helps make it possible to carry out designated strategies.”36 He notes the comments of a senior Indian government official: “We have to do many things that are politically popular but are foolish. They depress our long-term economic potential. But politicians need votes in the short term. China can take the long view. And while it doesn't do everything right, it makes many decisions that are smart and far-sighted.”

An Open and Inclusive Strategy for Foreign Relations 

Since at present globalization is still far from complete, and national boundaries and geography remain boundaries to the flow of key elements [of the economy], openness is crucial for the economic growth of late developing countries. There is a positive correlation between economic growth and many indexes of openness to trade; there is a negative correlation between disruptions of free trade and economic growth; and countries open to trade tend to grow at twice the rate of countries that adopt a closed-door policy. In Whither the World: The Political Economy of the Future, Grzegorz Kołodko points out that closed economies are not able to grow quickly over the long term.37 Looking at the rise and fall of great powers gives us ample proof that "tolerance" is an essential condition for the rise of great powers, and "isolation" inevitably leads to decline.

Reform and Opening has been the magic formula in China's modernization drive. In General Secretary Xi Jinping's report at 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, he spoke about “promoting a new [development] pattern of opening-up on all fronts”; he emphasized that “openness brings progress, while self-seclusion leaves one lagging behind,” and “China will not close its doors to the world but will only open them wider”; and he concluded that “China adheres to the fundamental national policy of opening up and pursues development with its doors open wider.”38 At a November, 12th, 2020 celebration of the 30th anniversary of Pudong's development and opening-up, General Secretary Xi Jinping went a step further, calling for the need to promote high quality institutional opening up, to further open up the door to the country, so that every nation might partake of the opportunities provided by China's development, and to actively participate in global economic governance.39

The United States was once a country with a high degree of openness. From the westward march of technology to explosive industrial development, and then in its victory in the Second World War, immigrants have contributed to the advancement and success of the United States. America's victory in the race to the development of the atomic bomb is inseparable from the fact that it was able to attract immigrant scientists from Europe. At the dawn of the computer age, the United States gained its position as the [world’s] technological and economic leader through this same ability to attract talent from around the world. Silicon Valley produced one of the greatest explosions of wealth in human history, and the creativity of immigrants was crucial to that story, too.

But Yale professor Amy Chua says that the United States is “losing this excellent quality, and its dominance faces an unprecedented threat.”40 Zakaria claims: American politics is now beyond cure, mired in factional struggle, and increasingly inefficient.41 With Trump's victory came the popularity of the slogan "America first"; this meant vigorous trade protectionism and active restrictions on immigration. The reversal of the open-door policy is another step down the road to America losing its status as a great power.

Build a Strong Leadership Core42

Leaders in the development of history can play important functions, directly affecting the trajectory and velocity of a rising great power. Engels pointed out that authority is a universal phenomenon in human behavior.43 The "cobweb model" of political science proves that even the most complex web has a core.44 Huntington believes that modernization requires authority with a transformative capacity, and authority must be concentrated in the hands of certain powerful individuals or groups.45

Leaders can play a key role at turning points in history. Behind the rise of many great powers were important individuals and leaders who were capable of transforming the fate of the nation. Liu Xinru of the theory department of People's Liberation Army Daily argues that a strong leadership core is a crucial element for the rise of a great power.46 This is particularly true in critical periods when a strong leadership core and a leader capable of making history is indispensable. 

After Portugal and Spain emerged from feudal division and became unified nation-states, there emerged strong central governments and monarchical powers. Portugal sponsored seafarers to explore new territory in the name of the state, and voyages of discovery became a planned and organized national strategy. Prince Henry [the Navigator] created the first state-run school for maritime navigation in human history and built a world-class armada. After Spain became a unified nation-state, Queen Isabella planned ambitious maritime expeditions and even sold her jewels to fund Columbus's expedition.

Britain built the most powerful navy in Europe with the support of Queen Elizabeth. King Louis XIV of France established absolute monarchical power, transforming the country from a disunited feudal aristocracy into a great and powerful nation. Bismarck, the “Iron Chancellor” of Germany, implemented social reforms, propelling Germany's composite national strength to become the strongest in continental Europe. Peter the First, Tsar of Russia, initiated an epoch-making modernization movement for which he is remembered as the "greatest ruler" in Russian history. In the Meiji Restoration, Japan abrogated the authority of a hereditary aristocracy, reinforced central authority, and forced through political, economic, and social reforms. Japan’s rise to great power status was the final result [of these centralizing reforms].

George Washington, the first president of the United States, had an important role in many aspects of the establishment and founding of the country. In 1787 he presided over the Constitutional Convention that gave the country the basic law that is still in use today, and established the authority of the president as the head of state.Thomas Jefferson, the founder of the Democratic Party, drafted the Declaration of Independence, and through diplomatic and other methods nearly doubled the territory of the United States. Abraham Lincoln won victory in the Civil War and issued the Emancipation Proclamation, preserving the integrity of the federation. Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal saved the United States from the abyss of economic crisis, allowing it to win the Second World War and become a superpower.

Historically, countries without a strong leadership core often fall into the "Bismarck trap."47 After the Franco-Prussian War, Bismarck, attempting to isolate and weaken France, advocated France adopt a multi-party republican system, believing that an unstable republican system would turn France into an unstable volcano. Between 1875 and 1940, France was ruled by 102 separate administrations, each lasting an average of five months, with two lasting a single day. The Soviet Union collapsed for a complex set of reasons, but one of the most important was the loss of authority by the ruling party.48

“Among majestic mountains, the great peak stands out.” Establishing a strong leadership core for the Party was one of the great lessons of revolutionary victory. “Without Mao Zedong,” Deng Xiaoping proclaimed with great emotion, “the Chinese people would have been forced to grope in the dark for much longer.”49 The historic achievements made by the Party and the country since the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party are fundamentally linked to the ability of the o, with Xi Jinping as its core, to steer the ship of state. At a crucial moment for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation, General Secretary Xi Jinping demonstrated a self-confident political will, and made farsighted strategic decisions, showing his willingness to take on the role of “the guiding spirit” and the “strong mast in rough seas.”

Bibliography

1. [UK] Paul Kennedy, translated by Wang Baozun et al. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. Published by CITIC Press in 2013.

2. [US] Samuel P. Huntington, translated by Wang Guanhua et al. Political Order in Changing Societies. Published by Lifelong·Reader·New Knowledge Joint Publishing Co., Ltd. in 1989.

3. [US] Jared Diamond, translated by Luan Qi. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. Published by CITIC Press in 2017.

4. [US] Zbigniew Brzezinski, translated by China Institute of International Studies. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. Published by Shanghai People's Publishing House in 1998.

5. [US] L. S. Stavrianos, translated by Wu Xiangying, Liang Chimin, Dong Shuhui, Wang Chang. A Global History: From Prehistory to the 21st Century. Published by Peking University Press in 2006.

6. [US] Fareed Zakaria, translated by Zhao Guangcheng, Lin Minwang. The Post-American World: The Rise of the Rest. Published by CITIC Press in 2009.

7. [US] Amy Chua, translated by Liu Haiqing, Yang Liwu. Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance - and Why They Fall. Published by New World Press in 2010.

8. [US] Tonio Andrade, translated by Zhang Xiaoduo. The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History. Published by CITIC Press in 2019.

9. [US] Dambisa Moyo, translated by Wang Yuqing. Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth—and How to Fix It. Published by CITIC Press in 2019.

10. [US] Vaclav Smil, translated by Li Fenghai, Liu Yinlong. Made in the USA: The Rise and Retreat of American Manufacturing. Published by China Machine Press in 2014.

11. [US] William H. McNeill, translated by Sun Yue, Chen Zhijian, Yu Zhan. The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community. Published by CITIC Press in 2018.

12. [UK] Eric Jones, translated by Chen Xiaobai. The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia. Published by Huaxia Publishing House in 2015.

13. [UK] Zhang Xiazhun, translated by Yan Rong. The Hypocrisy of Wealth: The Myth of Free Trade and the Hidden History of Capitalism. Published by Social Sciences Academic Press in 2009.

14. [Poland] Grzegorz W. Kolodko, translated by Long Yun'an. Whither the World: The Political Economy of the Future. Published by Central Compilation and Translation Press in 2015.

15. [Japan] Kenichi Ohmae, translated by Zhu Yuewei. A Society of Stagnation: How Protectionism and the Anti-Globalization Crisis Can Be Addressed. Published by Beijing Times-Huawen Publishing House in 2019.

16. Zhang Fan. Industrial Shift: The Geographical Migration of World Manufacturing and Central Markets. Published by Peking University Press in 2019.

17. Wen Yi. The Great Industrial Revolution in China: A Critique of the General Principles of 'Developmental Political Economy.' Published by Tsinghua University Press in 2016.

1. See glossary for COMPOSITE NATIONAL STRENGTH.
2. Historians often divide the industrial revolution into two waves of innovation: the First Industrial Revolution, which saw the application of steam power to mechanized work, occurred roughly between the late 18th century and the mid-19th century, beginning in Britain. The Second Industrial Revolution occurred roughly between the mid-19th century and early 20th century. It was marked by further advancements in technology, particularly in the areas of steel production, electrification, fossil fuel use, and chemical manufacturing. This period also saw the rise of large-scale industrial corporations and the expansion of industrialization to other countries beyond Britain, notably the United States and Germany.
3. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987). 
4. The Xia, Liao, and Jin were all founded by non-Han ethnic groups that rose to power on China's periphery contemporaneously with the Song Dynasty. The Western Xia (1038-1227 AD) was located in what is today the the northwest of China. The Liao Dynasty (907 to 1125 AD) controlled a vast territory in present-day Northeast China, Mongolia, and portions of Russia. The Jin Dynasty (1115 to 1234 AD) conquered the Liao Dynasty in 1125 and then ended the Northern Song period in 1127,  establishing control over all of northern China. The Mongols conquered the remainder of the Song Dynasty in 1279, marking the end of the Southern Song period and the beginning of the Yuan Dynasty in China.
These comments on the Song Dynasty's relative lack of military power passage despite its economic brilliance appear to closely parallel a passage from Tonio Andrade’s The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History. To quote:
Recent work on Song history shows that the Song didn’t neglect war nearly as much as this argument would suggest… So how do we resolve the puzzle of the Song’s inability to prevail? The answer has less to do with the weakness of the Song than with the strength of its enemies. Over its 319 years, the Song faced four primary foes. The most famous (and deadly) was the Mongol Empire, which didn’t just overpower the Song: its conquests stretched from Kiev to Baghdad, Kabul to Kaifeng. Before the Mongols, the Song faced other implacable enemies from Central and Northern Asia: the Tanguts of the Xi Xia dynasty, the Khitans of the Liao dynasty, and the Jurchens of the Jin dynasty.  [...] As Paul Jakov Smith writes, ‘The rapid evolution of Inner Asian statecraft in the tenth to thirteenth centuries allowed states on the northern frontier to support formidable armies that offset agrarian China’s advantages in wealth and numbers, hereby blocking [the] Song from assuming a position of supremacy at the center of a China-dominated world order and relegating it to a position of equal participant in a multi-state East Asian system.’
Tonio Andrade, The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 25-26. 
5. All the section titles are idioms, famous quotes, sayings, or excerpts from classical Chinese literature. 
The stanza, “When blessed by all the gifts of nature, one's every measurement conforms to its standard / As perfect as the roundness of the moon” is excerpted from Book II of “Poetry and Discourse from North of the River” [北江诗话] by Hong Liangji [洪亮吉]  (1746-1809).  
6. This quote is taken from Fareed Zakaria’s 2008 article in Foreign Affairs, “The Future of American Power.” See Fareed Zakaria, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 3 (2008): 18–43.
7. The Chinese is not an exact quote of Brzezinski's. The closest line to this quotation in The Grand Chessboard is the following: “The defeat and collapse of the Soviet Union was the final step in the rapid ascendance of a Western Hemisphere power, the United States, as the sole and, indeed, the first truly global power.” See Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997), xii. 
8. The author are likely paraphrasing the following section from L. S. Stavrianos’ A Global History: From Prehistory to the 21st Century: “China, by contrast, was unable to reorganize itself to meet the Western challenge. Yet, being too large and cohesive to be conquered outright like India and the other countries of Southeast Asia, China was never to succumb entirely." The argument that China's size allowed it to assimilate invaders is not found in Stavrianos' bok. L. S. Stavrianos, A Global History: From Prehistory to the 21st Century (New York: Pearson, 1998). 
9. Goldmsn Sachs still stands by this prediction. See Goldman Sachs, “How India Could Rise to the World’s Second Biggest Economy,” 6 July 2023. 
10. Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: WW Norton, 2008), 132.  
11. The idiom “[close] neighbors are dearer than distant relatives” originates from Book IV of Yuan Dynasty play Dong Tang Lao [东堂老], authored by Qin Jianfu [秦简夫]. 
12. CST editors could not locate the original source of this quotation. But the same view is a commonplace in Chinese international relations scholarship. For example, see Yan Xuetong, “Diplomacy Should Focus on Neighbors,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 27, 2015. 
13. Peter Frankopan, The Silk Roads: A New History of the World (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), xiv.
14. This quotation from Eric Jones’ 1981 book The European Miracle has been modified to better fit within the text, but th description of the Muslim world as "asbestos"perhaps only make sense with a much larger excerpt:.

Nothing is clearer than that the fires of modernisation and industrialisation in Britain and Belgium and the Rhineland, quickly burned to the fringes of this European system. Even Russia and the Christian colonies of the Ottoman empire smouldered. But at the asbestos edge of the Muslim sphere the fires abruptly died. They never took light over most of the non-European world, Europe’s overseas annexes excepted.

See Eric Jones, Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
15. In the Japanese context, “脱亚入欧”abandon Asia, learn from Europeis a Meiji era slogan associated with the famous Japanese political theorist Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901). The phrase first appeared in an anonymous 1885 editorial for the Jiji Shimpo likely written by Fukuzawa.  It advocated that Japan to distance itself from its Asian neighbors and to adopt European political, economic, and cultural models instead. It stemmed from the perception that Europe represented modernity, progress, and power, while Asia was seen as backward and inferior.
16. Dambisa Moyo, Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth—and How to Fix It (New York: Basic Books, 2018), ch. 2.
17. The subtitle 国向工则日新日智A state that esteems industry will increase in wisdom day by dayis taken from Kang Youwei’s 1989 petition to the Qing emperor arguing that the dynasy should establish an award for industrial innovation. The complete couplet is: 国尚农,则守旧日愚;国尚工,则日新日智 [If a country esteems agriculture, it will remain conservative and ignorant day by day; if a country esteems industry, it will progress daily with new knowledge and wisdom].  
18. The idiom 一穷二白 [yī qióng èr bái] is used to describe a person or family in a state of extreme poverty, lacking all possessions and resources necessary for sustenance or improvement of life.
19. The Two Centenary Goals refer to two significant milestones set by the CPC to guide the country's development and to celebrate two important anniversaries. The first centenary goal was to mark the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CPC in 2021 by achieving a MODERATELY PROSPEROUS SOCIETY in all respects [全面建成小康社会]. The second centenary goal is to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China in 2049 by building China into a modern, socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful [富强、民主、文明、和谐、美丽的社会主义现代化国家].
20. See Xi Jinping 习近平, “Zai Qingzhu Gaige Kaifang 40 Zhounian Dahui Shang De Jianghua 在庆祝改革开放40周年大会上的讲话 [Speech at the 40th Anniversary Celebration of Reform and Opening-Up Conference],” Xinhua Wang 新华网 [Xinhua Online], 18 December 2018. 
21. The Great Leap Forward, a Maoist social and economic campaign that lasted from 1958 to 1962, attempted to take China from "feudalism" to "socialism" without (as Marxist theory would predict) any intervening period of capitalism in between. The cash course industrialization program was funded through the requisition of all agricultural surplus. The resulting famine killed tens of millions of people. This event is sometimes glossed over in Chinese historiography as "three years of natural disasters." Frank assessments of the Great Leap Forward's true costs and consequences are not unknown, but few and far enough between that their presence in a document like this should not be taken for granted.
22. The authors of National Security and The Rise and Fall of Great Powers do not include citations for any of the economic statistics cited here, nor can these numbers be found in any of the works included in the bibliography.
23. Robert Solow was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1987 for his contributions to the theory of long term economic growth as a function of capital accumulation, population growth, and productivity growth driven by changing technology.
24. See William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 417-456.
25. Zheng He was a Ming admiral and diplomat who commanded seven expeditionary treasure voyages to Southeast Asia, South Asia, West Asia, and East Africa from 1405 to 1433. The contrast between Zheg He's voyages, which did not lead to sustaied conact between the Chinese state and the places he visited, is often contratsted in global history textbooks wit the smaller but more commercialy successful voyages of the European Age of Discovery.
26. For an example of Pan Jiaofeng’s theory on techno–scientific revolution, see Pan Jiaofeng 潘教峰, “Zhongguo Jianshe Shijie Keji Zhongxin Yinglai Zhanlue Jiyu Qi 中国建设世界科技中心迎来战略机遇期 [China's construction of a Global Science and Technology Center Enters a Strategic Opportunity Period],” CNICN, Feb 2019.
In it, he argues that the current incubation period of a new technological revolution  presents a strategic opportunity for China to establish itself as a global technological center. He argues that China, as a latecomer in technological innovation, must adopt a global perspective, engage in forward-looking research, and strategically position itself to achieve significant advancements in technological innovation and become a world technology center.
27. CST editors are unable to locate the original quote. For an example of Wen Yi’s argument, see Wen Yi, “The Making of an Economic Superpower---Unlocking China’s Secret of Rapid Industrialization,” Working Paper 2015-006B, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2015. In it, Wen argues that China’s economic rise could not be adequately explained by neoclassical economic theory. Instead, he introduces what he calls the “new stage theory” that emphasizes the role of the state’s economic policy in facilitating industrialization and industrial upgrading. 
28. Vaclav Smil, Made in the USA: The Rise and Retreat of American Manufacturing (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015), 23. 
29. Slater's adaptation of the spinning jenny in 1789 is an early example of industrial espionage一and by extension, an American precedent for the widespread IP theft hat powered China's own rise.
30. The “Two Bombs, One Satellite” project refers to China's efforts in the mid-20th century to develop nuclear bombs, hydrogen bombs, and artificial satellites. 
31. Edward T. Johnson and Max von Zedtwitz, Created in China: How China is Becoming a Global Innovator (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 9.
32. 沧海横流显砥柱rough seas reveal the strength of the mastis a Chinese idiom that metaphorically describes a situation where the true essence of a person becomes clear only amidst great turmoil and diversity. It usually appears as a couplet, 沧海横流显砥柱,万山磅礴看主峰, which can be literally translated as “amidst the tumultuous sea, the mast stands firm; in the vast expanse of mountains, the main peak towers above.” The couplet does not originate from a single author. The preceding line is from Guo Moruo [郭沫若]'s “Man Jiang Hong” [满江红], and the following line is from Qing Dynasty Zeng Guofan [曾国藩]’s "Letter to the Former Chen Yu Ming” [复陈右铭太守书]. 
33. See Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 35. 
34. Elhanan Helpman, The Mystery of Economic Growth (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2010).
35. This passage is a combination of two quotes from Dambisa Moyo’s Edge of Chaos. The first can be found on page 54 and the second can be found on page 49.  
36. This passage is quoted from page 95 of Fareed Zakaria’s The Post-American World, but the CICIR researchers–or the translator of a Chinese version of the book–interpret it in a way that subverts Zakaria's original meaning. Zakariaargues that public support does not matter to the Chinese government, not that the Chinese government enjoys such support: “It is awkward to point out, but unavoidable: not having to respond to the public has often helped Beijing carry out its strategy.” Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 95.
37. While this is not presented as a direct quote, it resembles a line from the book: “The contemporary world has no example of a closed economy, tied by protectionist practices, which would be able to grow fast over the long term.” Grzegorz W. Kolodko, Whither the World: The Political Economy of the Future Volume 1 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 91. 
38. Xi Jinping, “Juesheng Quan Mianjian Cheng Xiaokang Shehui Duoqu Xin Shidai Zhongguo Tese Shehuizhuyi Weida Shengli Zai Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shijiu Ci Quan Guo Daibiao Dahui Shang de Baogao 决胜全面建成小康社会 夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利——在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告 [Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in an All-round Way and Winning the Great Victory of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era——Report at the Nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China],” Xinhua, 27 October 2017.
39. Xi Jinping 习近平, “Zai Pudong Kaifang 30 Zhounian Qingzhu Dahui Shang de Jianghua 在浦东开发开放30周年庆祝大会上的讲话 [Speech at the Celebration Conference of the 30th Anniversary of the Development and Opening of Pudong] ,” Xinhua 新华, 12 November 2020. 
40. CST editors could not locate this exact quotation in Chua's work, but the final chapter of Amy Chua's Day of Empire advances a similar argument. Amy Chua, Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance—and Why They Fall (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), 318-343.
41. Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, 211-212.  
42. See the CST glossary entry LEADERSHIP CORE for the meaning of this term. This entire section is a long and transparent justification for the centralization of power under Xi Jinping.  
43. Frederick Engels, "On Authority," Marxists Internet Archive, (or. pub 1872). 
44. The phrase “cobweb model” doe not have an established meanig in contemporary interntional relations; most often the phrase “cobweb model” is used in reference to an economic theory used to analyze supply and demand in markets characterized by time lags and adjustments.  
45. This is a major theme of Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn: Yale Univresity Press, 1968). 
46. CST editors could not locate Lin's original article. 
47.  The term "Bismark trap" is not a well established concept in either western or Chinese scholarship. CST editors were unable to find any mention of it outside of this passage.
48. Debate over the cause of the USSR’s fall has been wide ranging in Chinese academia, with critics of the official position pointing to the systemic decay of the Soviet economy or the failure of the USSR to reform the inflexible and rigid political structure it inherited from Stalin. For examples of critical arguments, see Wang Xiaoxiao 王笑笑, “Sulian Jubiande Genben Yuanyin 苏东剧变的根本原因 [The Fundamental Reason for the Transformation of theSoviet Union]” Aisixiang 爱思想, 4 March 2013; Huang Lifu 黄立茀, “Sulian Yinhe Sangshi Gaige Liangji  苏联因何丧失改革良机? Why did the USSR miss the chanceto reform?” Aisixiang 爱思想, 15 October 2009; Liu Xingyi 刘新宜, “Sugong Kuatai, Sulian Wangguode Yuanyin  苏共垮台、苏联亡国的原因 [Reasons for the Collapse of the Soviet Communist Party and the Demise of the USSR]” Aisixiang 爱思想, 14 November 2004. For longer presentations of the official view published around the same time as Liu’sarticle, see  Cheng Zhihua 陈之骅, “Lishi Xuwuzhuyi Gaoluan Sulian 历史虚无主义搞乱苏联 [Historical Nihilism Ruined the Soviet Union],” Aisixiang 爱思想, 18 September 2013 and Wang Tingyou 汪亭友, “Liang Zhong Duiweide Shijieguan he Lichang Guanchuan SulianYanbian Yanjiu 两种对立的世界观和立场贯穿苏联演变研究 [The Ideological Divide in the Study of the Soviet Collapse],”Aisixiang, 20 Feb 2014.
49. It is unclear when Deng Xiaoping said those words, but they are frequently referenced by party leaders. See Jiang Zemin 江泽民, “Jiang Zemin Zai Mao Zedong Tongzhi Danchen Yibai Zhounian Jinian Dahui Shang De Jianghua. 江泽民在毛泽东同志诞辰一百周年纪念大会上的讲话 [Jiang Zemin's Speech at the Commemoration Ceremony of the 100th Anniversary of Comrade Mao Zedong's Birth], Xinhua, 27 November 2009. 

第三章 大国崛起的一般规律

人类历史上,大国兴衰的交互更替是一种常见现象。无数的专家学者、智者精英对此都进行过深入的研究和思考,试图找出深蕴其中的历史规律,但迄今尚无令人满意的标准答案。不过,历史总在一定范围内存在因果逻辑,各有特点的大国崛起也不乏相似的路径和经验。具备基本条件的后发国家,只有充分吸纳先发国家经验,制定适合自身和时代特色的战略,才能抓住机遇实现崛起。

大国地位往往取决于人口、领土、自然资源、地理位置、经济实力、军事力量和软实力等一系列因素,其中人口、领土、资源等是基本要素和物质基础,决定着一国成为世界大国的潜力。但潜力能否得到发挥及发挥到何种程度,在很大程度上取决于后天的战略和机遇等。恰当的国家战略不仅可以助推大国崛起,少走弯路,也事关大国地位的延续。如英国在丧失世界主导地位后,决定适应美国唤起而非对抗,将影响力又延续了几十年。

大国具备的优势越多,综合实力越强,繁荣持续的时间也更久。英美在科技创新、政府效率等方面优势都较突出,分别引领了第一次和第二次工业革命,各自形成前所未有的世界超级大国地位。但美国成就更大、霸权更突出,除后发优势外,主要在于人口、领土和资源等底蕴史深厚,规模效应更持久。不过,某些方面极其突出也可以部分弥补大国其他方面的不足。如葡萄牙、西班牙及荷兰,虽然人口较少,但凭借商业和军事等方面的压倒性优势而成为称霸一时的世界大国。

大国地位还取决于国际竞争态势。保罗·肯尼迪在《大国的兴衰》一书中表示,大国的兴衰是相对的,取决于当时环境下与其他国冢实力升降的比较。20世纪最后10年,苏联这个实力相当的竞争对手的倒下,成就了美国前所未有的唯一超级大国地位。中国在宋朝时被认为是当时世界上最先进的文明,在科技和经济等方面都处历史上的巅峰,但不幸生逢游牧民族实力超群的时代。西夏党项人、辽国契丹人、金国女真人及蒙古人四个主要敌人都有着强大的骑兵,平抑掉宋朝作为农业大国在财富上的优势,阻止了其成为“中国治下世界秩序”的霸主。

得天独厚开盈尺

得天独厚通常是指成功所需具备的优越条件和机遇,出自清代诗人洪亮吉的诗句“得天独厚开盈尺,与月同圆到十分”。在大国崛起的过程中,天时、地利、人和同样不可或缺。其中,优越的地理、人口等发展要素与环境,有时比制度等更重要、更具决定性影响。具备这些条件的,不一定必然崛起为世界大国,但若没有这些基本条件,则肯定无法称其为大国。在科技等其他条件相似的情况下,地缘和人口等方面的优势越突出,崛起为世界大国的可能性越大,持续时间也更久。

“人多力量大”

自马尔萨斯提出“人口论”后,国际社会对人口的消极影响强调较多,认为人口增长阻碍了贫困国家的发展。但近年来,人口对经济增长的正面影响受到越来越多关注。一定的人口和领土是大国崛起重要的前提条件。领土意味着资源和发展空间,人口代表着劳动力和市场。历史上,波斯、罗马、马其顿、汉、唐等帝国无不拥有众多人口和广袤疆域。葡萄牙、西班牙和荷兰虽凭借大量殖民地及商业资本、航海及军事等方面的优势而成为世界大国,但也因本土人口和领土规模不足而很快衰落。在工业时代,社会分工越来越复杂,对劳动力和市场的要求更高,不具备人口和领土优势的国家成为世界大国的难度越来越大。

工业革命前夕,英国的人口已具相当规模。工业革命后,英国凭借巨大的先发优势,将人口和资源潜力发挥到极致。在鼎盛时期,只占世界人口2%的英国,GDP占全球的30%以上,对外贸易额占世界的1/5,制造业贸易额占世界的2/5。不过,随着其他西方国家先后完成工业化,英国在人口和资源方面的局限开始显现。英国政治家利奥·艾默瑞指出:“在美、德等庞大而富有的帝国快速发展的情况下,这些小岛的支配地位怎么可能长期维持下去呢?我们的人口只有4000万,怎么可能与人口是我们2倍的那些国家竞争呢?”

美国的人口规模远超英、法、德、日等,领土更是它们的多倍,人口增长前景也优于其他发达国家。这决定了美国在劳动力、资源,特别是在市场等方面有着其他西方国家不具备的巨大优势。一定程度上,如果说英、德、法、日等的工业化分别只有一个发动机驱动的话,美国的东、中、西部以人口和面积衡噩相当千两三个甚至更多的发动机。因此,美国的工业化全面完成所需时间更长,经济繁荣持续得更久,取得的世界大国地位和霸权也前无古人。如布热津斯基在《大棋局》一书中所言:“美国成为第一个也是唯一真正的全球性大国,在全球享有至高无上的地位。”

日本人口较少,政治和文化阻力小,"船小好调头”,在明治维新后迅速进入工业化。由于取得先发优势,通过中日甲午战争赔款、国际资金和技术的挤占效应等,日本在较短时间内完成工业化,跻身发达国家行列。与英国类似,日本也以较小的人口规模和领土面积一度创造了世界第二大经济体的奇迹。但人口和领土也限制了增长空间,随着人力、市场、技术等逐渐接近极限,日本外向型经济增长的潜力日渐耗尽,在20世纪90年代后陷入长期低迷。

人口与地域等优势使得中国成为古代四大文明中唯一延续至今的文明,具有强大的"容纳之槛与消化之功"。斯塔夫里阿诺斯表示:"中国太大、太具有疑聚力,不可能像印度和东南亚国家那样被彻底彻服,总能同化或驱逐入侵者。”也正是人口规模庞大、传统文化根深蒂固,使得中国工业化启动面临的阻力大、需要的时间长,经历了多次尝试与失败。改革开放之初,人口一度成为负担,计划生育政策一定程度上助推中国摆脱"贫困陷阱"。经济起飞后,巨大的“人口红利”被认为是中国奇迹的重要因素。当前传统的“人口红利”减弱,但教育水平和人均收入的提高将带来前所未有的“人才红利”和“市场红利”, 13亿人一旦有了钱,就出现了一个超级市场。

印度庞大的人口和广袤的领土使其古代文明在世界上占据重要地位,也成为工业化起步的很大负担。2020年初,印度超过英国和法国成为世界第五大经济体。高盛预测,2040年印度将成为世界第三大经济体。在欧洲和东亚等国家因日益严重的老龄化而面临增长难题的情况下,印度在人口数队和构成方面有着巨大的优势和潜力,"继续拥有一个充裕的年轻人群体”。美国知名学者扎卡利亚断言:“如果人口决定命运的话,印度的未来将高枕无忧。”

“远亲不如近邻”

针对中国改革开放后取得的经济成就,美国威斯康辛大学教授爱德华·弗里曼曾指出,其中一个重要原因在于中国 “位于东亚而非东非”。在这里,他重点强凋的是中国崛起的重要周边环境。改革开放后,中国处于二战后总体快速发展的东亚地区,相关经济成就的取得在一定程度上得益于东亚的群体性崛起一—先是日本的现代化和战后工业化的完成,再有亚洲“四小龙”,之后从中国沿海开始的工业化浪潮逐渐扩展到内地。

邻国间的摩擦一般较多,但在文明和经济发展层面,往往是 “远亲不如近邻”。历史上,大多数文明古国和强国都集中在欧亚大陆,呈接力式和群体性崛起。工业革命后,发达国家主要集中在欧洲和北美。诸多大国的兴衰表明,经济发展和文明进步有着较强的集群效应和周边扩散效应。这在东亚群体性崛起或“亚太世纪"的来临中有着更为充分的体现,也将在中国倡导的“一带一路”建设的推进过程中得到进一步证明。

欧洲的”起飞”是一个整体过程。威尼斯等意大利城邦、葡萄牙、西班牙和荷兰先后以商业为核心的崛起为欧洲群体性崛起开了先河,卖定了坚实基础。英国经济建立在大西洋沿岸国家的贸易基础之上,是大西洋经济。工业革命后,英国资本等跨过英吉利海峡向法国等西欧地区外溢。与此同时,现代制造业在北美登陆,在某种程度上美国经济成为英国经济的传承和继续。欧洲为美国经济的发展提供了资金、劳动力、技术及市场。19世纪晚期,欧洲落后国家不断追赶欧美先进国家,大西洋经济各实现整体起飞。

20世纪中叶后,日本承接了许多从美国转移出来的制造业,进入高速增长时代。20世纪末,中国成为又一个“世界工厂”。新中国曾在20世纪50—60年代接收了苏联援建的企业和设备,为后来丁业 “起飞” 打下了基础。20世纪70年代末的改革开放,可以看作工业化西进的重要一站。“工业化东进与西进在中国的交汇最终实现了中国的工业化,创造了 ‘中国奇迹’”。

500年来,世界范围内发生了三次结构性的权力转移,也见证了部分区域的大国群体性崛起。第一次权力转移是欧洲的崛起。第二次权力转移是美国及其盟友的崛起。目前,国际社会正经历着近现代历史上的第三次权力转移,即亚太地区的群体性和 “雁阵式” 崛起。未来随着 “一带一路” 建设的加速推进,人们也有望见证部分 “一带一路”国家的群体性崛起。彼得·弗兰科潘在《丝绸之路一一部全新的世界史》一书中强调,“世界旋转的轴心正在回到那个让它旋转千年的初始之地一丝绸之路”。

打造高质批的朋友圈

从500年来大国崛起的时空顺序上看,后发大国不是先发大国的邻国,就是“远亲”或朋友,即在文化或政治等方面存在特殊关系的国家,如宗主国、盟国等。社会与政治距离对贸易和投资有着重要的影响,相似的文化环境易于知识和技术的传播。埃里克·琼斯在《欧洲奇迹一一-欧亚史中的环境、经济和地缘政治》一书中称,欧洲海外属地的兴起表明,文化和政治制度等因素在很大程度上可以弥补地理上的距离,如美国、加拿大、澳大利亚、新西兰甚至南非等都先后实现了工业化。也正因文化和政治制度迥异,“欧洲工业化的火苗在伊斯兰世界的’石棉’边缘陡然熄灭了”。

日本屈服西方文明,除了自身积极“脱亚入欧“外,美国在战略上的重视与扶持对日本的崛起起着非常重要的作用。在被美国打开国门后,日本成为美国的出口市场和航运补给站。在此后美国的国际战略中,日本成为越来越重要的一环。二战后,日本成为美国重点扶持以抗衡东方的对象,经济援助、直接投资和美国市场等有利条件是其高速发展的重要外因。

在西方经济科技占主导地位的时期,与经济发达国家的疏远乃至敌对使许多国家错失发展良机。阿根廷错失经济成功的良机被认为与结盟失策密切相关。丹比萨·莫约在《增长危机》一书中指出:“阿根廷最大的失误发生在1944年,当时它未能与美国结盟,而美国随后开始了经济腾飞。阿根廷领导人选择与英国结盟,从那时起阿根廷开始了经济衰退。” 二战后,东欧等国家加入苏联阵营,推行苏式工业化,从而远离了世界中心市场与核心技术。

 国向工则日新日智

经资增长是大国崛起的前提和基础,维持大国地位面临的最一大挑战往往也来自经资。保罗·肯尼迪在《大国的兴衰》一书中强调:大国之兴衰,最终、更重要、更具决定性的因素,是相对于他国而言的经济实力。农业经济时代,世界大国往往是农业发达的国家。大航海后,葡萄牙、西班牙和荷兰等领土和人口规模有限的国家先后崛起,依靠的是当时无与伦比的商业和军事等实力。进入工业社会后,实现工业化是大国崛起的必备条件。现代经济体要想真正实现繁荣富强,就必须有强大、多样和富于创造性的制造业。

制造业兴国

制造业是技术创新的源泉,是经济增长的原动力。与前工业社会相比,工业革命使生产力惊人地提高。公元元年到公元1400年,世界经济年均增长率仅有0.05%,而17世纪的荷兰  工业革命后的英国、19世纪的美国和20世纪后半期的东亚经济体的年均增长率分别增至0.5%       2%、4%和8%- 10%。15世纪前,世界经济总量翻番需要1400年,而20世纪的东亚经济体经济总量翻番只需7一8年。

18世纪末,英国就已经建立起强大的工业基础,不仅拥有大批工艺稍湛的手工家庭作坊,还有令人敬畏的造船能力,生铁产显占据全球总产砬的15%左右。1870年,英国在全球制造业产出中占近1/3。

得益于独一无二的自然秉赋和来自欧洲的移民、投资等,美国在建国之初就成为一个庞大的经济体。南北战争结束后.美国迅速进入工业化进程。1870年,美团制造业占全球的比例不足 1/4,但到19世纪80年代末就增至36%左右。在此后一个世纪里,美国一直维持着世界制造业霸主的地位。

德国在19世纪下半叶最后30年起飞,完成从农业经济向工业经济的转型。在煤炭和钢铁等传统支柱产业的基础上,化学和电气等新兴产业得到迅速发展,德国成为世界级的化学工业大国,1877年合成燃料产挝占世界的一半。此后虽经历希特勒时期畸形的军事工业发展和二战后的分裂,但在1990年重新统一后,德国再次成为世界重要的制造业大国和贸易大国。

制造业占世界比例的变化也反映出大国格局的演变。1750年,中国生产全球制成品的1/3'居世界第一,印度排第二。 1860年左右,英国超过中国。1900年,美国排名第一,英闰和德国分居第二、第三。1953年,世界制造业的顺序变为美国、苏联和英国,不过美团领先苏联达4倍以上。1980年,美国和苏联继续领跑,日本超过英国成为第三名。

成为制造业大国是实现中华民族伟大复兴的重要保防。新中国成立之初,基本是一个“一穷二白”的落后农业国。中国现已成为世界第一大工业国,是全世界唯一拥有包括41个工业大类的最完整现代工业体系的国家,500种主要工业品中有200多种产掀居全球第一。2010年中国制造业增加值首次超过美国, 2018年中国制造业增加值占世界份额达28%以上。世界工业大国的基本国情,有力支撑了“两个一百年“目标的逐步实现。习近平总书记在“改革开放40周年庆祝大会”上指出:成为全球制造业第一大国,标志着“中国人民在富起来、强起来的征程上迈出了决定性的步伐!”

顺应工业化规律

现代经济发展一般意味着从农业向低技术产业再到高技术产业和服务业的转型。各国工业化道路不尽相同,但产业递进规律相似,基本上按照食品、纺织、机械、化工、电子等序列有重点、有先后地发展。随着第一、二、三产业在社会生产中主体地位的依次演变,主导产业也由劳动密集型逐渐向资金和技术密集型升级。发达国家的工业化,均是先发展轻工业,后发展重工业。

许多后发国家在工业化过程中急于求成,颠倒发展顺序,走了不少弯路。“十月革命”后,苏联在计划经济下继续工业化进程。1929年发布第一个五年计划,重点发展煤炭、钢铁等行业,调动全国资源实现重工业化。苏联的工业化虽取得一定成就,但由于政府强力干预、过于注重重工业,产业发展失调。新中国成立后,模仿苏联实行计划经济,重点发展重工业。20世纪50年代末的“大跃进”又破坏了工业化的农业基础,延缓了工业化进程。从重工业起步的工业化,由于内在生产要素配置的扭曲和政治的过度干预,往往难以持久。

而顺应产业发展规律,先轻后重、逐级递进是新兴工业化国家成功的重要经验。20世纪80年代初,中国也放弃了优先发展重工业战略,轻纺工业得到迅速发展。20世纪90年代,中国的电子信息产业成为发展最快的产业部门之一。从20世纪90年代末开始,中国进入重化工业阶段,重工业的增速超过轻工业。

融入国际产业链

顺利承接国外的劳动密集型产业是后发国家实现工业化的重要前提。19世纪下半叶,美国凭借其良好的自然资源、与欧洲紧密的人文纽带、便利的海洋运输条件,特别是强劲的经济发展势头,成为英国产业海外转移的最大受益者。 1914年,美国资本输入规模居世界之首,其中英国对美债券投资占其总投资的85.9%。此次国际产业转移后,美国逐渐成为新的“世界工厂”。

美国在确立了全球经济和产业技术领先地位后,率先进行产业结构调整,将钢铁、纺织、日化、造船、普通工业机械等传统产业向外转移。日本、联邦德国等因经济发展水平较低但又具有较好的发展基础以及战略盟友关系而成为美国产业转移的主要承接地,很快成为全球劳动密集型产品的主要供应者。两国因此大大加快了工业化进程,综合国力迅速提升。日本发展成又一个 “世界工厂",联邦德国也成为世界经济强国。

20世纪70年代,日本向外转移轻纺等劳动密集型产业及钢铁、化工和造船等资本密集型产业,造就了亚洲“四小龙”的经济奇迹。但“四小龙“经济体盘小,产业升级周期短,在承接了日本高科技产业后,急需把劳动密集型产业转移出去。而此时大力改革开放的中国凭借低成本和地理等优势成为亚洲“四小龙”劳动密集型产业转移的主要承接者。在国内积极推进市场经济、国外积极吸引海外投资、充分发挥产业比较优势的基础上,中国工业化进程显著加快,成为新的“世界工厂”。

2008年全球金融危机以后,全球掀起新一轮国际产业转移浪潮。中国成为主要输出国和引领者,承接地除中国中西部地区外,主要是“一带一路”沿线国家。亚洲经济与贸易的高增长态势也有望同步向“一带一路”地区传递。预计未来,“一带一路”国家GDP年均增速将显著高千全球平均水平,有望打造成新的世界经济增长带。

走好创新先手棋

科技创新是经济增长的重要动力,也是大国实力的主要标志。在20世纪50年代前,经济发达国家科技进步的贡献率为20%- 40%, 60年代以来升至60%-80%。在2001—2009年间,美国高技术产业增加值占制造业增加值的比重由17%升至21.3%。对后发国家而言,模仿和吸收发达国家的先进技术是崛起的重要途径,但要成为主导性的世界大国,就必须有革命性的科技创新做支撑,如英国和美国对前几次科技革命的引领。

科技支撑崛起

经济发展最终要靠获取并掌握先进技术来实现。“大航海”以来,科技作用日益突出。亚当·斯密指出:劳动分工和市场的扩大促进了技术创新,国家财富增长直接源于劳动生产率的提高。诺贝尔经济学奖获得者罗伯特·索洛认为:长期看,经济增长的唯一源泉是技术进步。美国20世纪前半期人均产出的增长中,有7/8要归因于技术进步。

世界大国权力在地理上的转移也往往伴随着科技发展中心的转移。美国知名历史学家威廉·麦克尼尔认为,公元750一1100年,伊斯兰世界在科学和技术方面远远超过欧洲。公元1000年后,中国的科学技术世界领先。到了15世纪,世界科技中心开始向地中海和欧洲转移。葡萄牙全国人口只相当于南京的人口,但它船队的威慑力远远超过郑和的大船队。“大航海”后,西方崛起,意、英、法、德、美等先后成为世界科技中心。

16世纪中期,意大利城邦出现了一批重要的自然哲学家,使之成为近代科学活动中心。英国在16—17世纪涌现出吉尔伯特、波义耳、牛顿、哈雷等各领域大师,开辟了力学、化学、生理学等多个现代学科。18世纪中期到19世纪中期,法国涌现出达朗伯、拉普拉斯等一大批科学家、在热力学、化学、天体力学等领域做出突出贡献,为内燃机革命和化学革命提供了理论基础。19世纪20年代起,德国科学发展突飞猛进,有机化学、量子力学等成为引领世界的带头学科。20世纪20年代,美国取代德国成为世界科学中心,抓住信息技术革命等机遇,站上世界科学前沿。

当前世界科技中心主要集中在欧美发达国家,但呈现出向亚太转移的趋势。日本科技实力依然突出,新兴经济体在全球研发中的占比越来越高,技术创新能力明显增强。中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院院长潘教峰等指出,世界正酝酿新一轮科技革命和产业变革,为中国建设世界科技中心、再次引领世界科技发展提供了难得的机遇。

引领高新产业

经济成功的国家往往高度重视科技创新,18世纪新技术的领先者英国迅速成为欧、洲乃至世界一流工业强国。 2012年,美国、日本和德国的《专利合作条约》(PCT)专利申请匮分别达到世界总掀的26.44%、22.35%和9.61%。科技创 新来源千广泛的工业实践和商业驱动。清华大学教授文一认为: “只要踏上工业革命的大道,成为世界工厂,任何国家都可能成为全球技术创新的领导者,但若一个工业化国家放弃制造业,就很可能逐渐丧失技术优势和创新力。”

美国的科学技术一直以强大著称于世。人类历史上很重要的发明,如白炽灯、轧棉机、通用零件、生产线等都源自美国。瓦拉科夫·斯米尔在《美国制造--国家繁荣为什么离不开制造业》一书中指出:“美国在1865年之后实现飞跃的主要动力在于技术进步,这些进步不仅让美国成为世界最大的大宗商品生产国,也让美国在新发明的商业化、推行新生产模式和提高劳动生产率等方面成为领导者。一个多世纪后,美国乃至整个世界仍在受益千其中很多具有划时代意义的技术发明。”

目前,美国经济增长面临诸多难题,但在科技方面仍是世界第一强国。在信息化、航天、人工智能、医学、军工等高新科技领域,美国均有蓿压倒性的技术优势。美国研发支出居世界首位,有着强大的基础科学研究实力及雄厚的科技人力资源。  1901-2019年,共有613位科学家获诺贝尔奖,其中美国籍为287人。美国人几乎垄断了计算机科学领域的图灵奖,汇聚了59%的世界顶级人工智能研究人员。美国还拥有40所世界百强大学,汇聚着全球大部分顶尖科技公司。

引进先发国家资本、人才和设备等是后发大国缩短技术差距的主要途径。1789年,英国人斯莱特来到美国,凭记忆造出阿克莱特纺织机,成为美国近代工业的开端。19世纪中叶,德、美铁路开通之始,输入了英国的机器和资本。在苏联早期,列宁的新经济政策曾把某些企业租给美、日等国经营。第一个五年计划期间,斯大林聘请了美、德等国专家做重点企业建设的顾问。二战后,日本大足输入英、美先进技术,有时把西方产品拆开,以反向设计加以仿造改进。在汽车制造、光学器材、精密仪器和精密机床等方面,日本的这种模仿式创新取得较大的成功。

中国在历史上的很长时期内都居于世界科技领先地位,但在过去500年里错过了前几次科技革命。新中国成立后,科技发展呈后来居上之势,在“两弹一星”等高端科技领域取得突出成绩。近年来,中国在电子通信、5G、人工智能等诸多领域实现重大突破.加快向世界科技强国迈进。在2017年全球批准的专利中,中国占30%,高于美、日、韩和欧洲的23%、14%、9%和 8%。自2007年起,中国每年授予的自然科学和工学博士学位超过美国。

中国在科技领域和美国比仍有不小的差距,但增长速度快、发展潜力大。2000一2017年,中国研发支出年均增长17.3%,远超美国的4.3%。乔治·杂尔和马克斯·冯·泽德绯茨在《从中国制造到中国创造:中国如何成为全球创新者》一书中指出: “实用主义、企业家精神、大规模研发投入、儒家文化传统及互联网高度普及等,将推动中国成为全球创新者。”

沧海横流显砥柱

自20世纪80年代起,新自由主义和“华盛顿共识”广为传播,发达国家纷纷要求发展中国家采取一系列所谓的“好政策”和“好制度”来促进经济发展。但实际上,这些政策和制度多数是工业化的结果。相对于“西式民主",稳定的政局和良好的社会秩序在后发国家工业化和大国崛起过程中起着更为重要的作用。那些盲目接受“华盛顿共识”的国家,不仅未实现经济增长,多数还陷入政治动荡。

强大高效的政府

寒缪尔·亨廷顿在《变革社会中的政治秩序》一书中指出:在第三世界国家现代化过程中,经济发展和社会文化改造具有优先地位,政治现代化只有在前者发展后才能水到渠成。那些企图在短期内跨越到西方现代制度的国家,忽视了政治现代化的渐进性,往往欲速则不达。要实现从传统到现代的过渡,必须建立起强大的政府,即有能力制衡政治参与和政治制度化的政府。“各国间最重要的政治分野不在于政府的形式,而在于有效程度。”

赫尔普曼在《经济增长的秘密》一书中指出:强大政治体制支撑着国家发展和经济增长,存续较长的政权更利于形成促进增长的政策。在发展中国家,若没有可靠的政府行政、警务和司法部门,糟糕的经济结果往往会接踵而至。丹比萨·莫约在《增长危机》一书中强调:“2014年,暴力使全球经济损失14.3万亿美元,占世界GDP的13.4%。20世纪30年代起阿根廷经济急剧衰退,一个重要原因是1930年至20世纪70年代爆发了六次军事政变。”

稳定的政府更容易在公共服务和基础设施等方面进行长远投资,推动经济增长。扎卡利亚指出:日本、美国、欧洲和中国的发展故事有一条共同的主线,就是强大和可信赖的政治体制。“中国政府有很高的民意支持率,有助于其贯彻执行既定的战略”。印度政府官员曾表示:“我们不得不做了许多政治上广受欢迎的蠢事,这些愚蠢的做法会削弱我们的长期经济潜力,但政治人物在短期内需要的是选票,而中国政府则可以做长远打算。”

开放包容的对外战略

当今全球化远未完成,国界和地理仍然阻碍要素流动,开放对后发国家经济增长更为重要。衡盐贸易开放度的很多指标都与经济增长正相关,而自由贸易的扭曲与经济增长负相关,贸易开放国家的增速往往比闭关自守的国家要快一倍以上。格泽高兹·科勒德克在《21世纪政治经济学:世界将何去何从》一书中指出:封闭的经济体不可能出现长期快速增长,大国兴衰的历史多次证明,“宽容”是大国形成的必要条件,而“孤立“往往与没落相关。

改革开放是中国现代化建设不断取得成就的重要法宝。习近平总书记在党的十九大报告中,提出“推动形成全面开放新格局",强调“开放带来进步,封闭必然落后“中国开放的大门不会关闭,只会越开越大”“中国坚持对外开放的基本国策,坚持打开国门搞建设“。2020年11月12日在浦东开发开放30周年庆祝大会上,习近平总书记进一步指出,要深入推进高水平制度型开放,敞开大门欢迎各国分享中国发展机遇,积极参与全球经济治理。

美国曾是一个高度开放的国家。从西进运动到工业的爆炸式发展,再到第二次世界大战的胜利,移民推动了美国的进步和成功。美国之所以在原子弹研制竞赛中获胜,与它能吸引那些欧洲移民科学家密不可分。计算机时代初期,美国在技术和经济领域取得突出的领导地位,同样与能吸引世界各地大批天才移民相关。硅谷催生了人类史上的财富爆炸,移民的创造力至关重要。

但美国耶鲁大学教授艾米·蔡表示:美国“今天正失去这种优秀素质,其优势正面临前所未有的威胁"。扎卡利亚指出:美国政治已经病入膏肓,深陷党派斗争中难以自拔,运作效率十分低下。特别是特朗普政府上台后,处处强调“美国优先”,大搞贸易保护主义,极力限制移民。开放政策的倒退,将进一步侵蚀美国的大国地位。

坚强有力的领导核心

领袖人物在历史发展中有着特殊的作用,关系到大国崛起的方向和速度。恩格斯曾指出,权威是植根于人类行为的一种普遍现象。政治学上的"蜘蛛网模型”表明,再复杂的蜘蛛网,也有一个“网核"。亨廷顿认为、现代化要求具有变革能力的权威,而权威必须集中于某些坚强有力的个人或集团手中。

领袖人物在历史的转折关头往往起着非比寻讯的作用。诸多世界大国的崛起,都离不开那些改变国家命运的重要人物和领导人。《解放军报》理论部原主任刘新如认为,一个有权威的领导核心是大国崛起的关键要素,越是大国崛起的关键时期,越离不开强有力的领导核心和引领时代的领袖人物。

葡萄牙和西班牙在从封建分裂状态中走出后,形成统一的民族国家,出现了强大的中央政府及王权权威。葡萄牙以国家名义支持航海家对未知世界的探索,航海大发现成为有计划、有组织的国家战略。亨利王子主持建立起人类历史上第一所国立航海学校,组建了世界一流的船队。西班牙成为统一民族国家后,伊莎贝尔女王雄心勃勃地谋划远洋探险计划,为资助哥伦布远航,甚至卖掉了王冠上的明珠。

英国在伊丽莎白王权力显支持下,建立起欧洲最强大的海军。法国国王路易十四建立起绝对王权,把法国从一盘散沙的贵族封建制政权凝聚成一个强大国家。德国“铁血宰相"俾斯麦大规膜实施社会改革,使德国综合国力跃居欧洲大陆之首。沙皇俄国的彼得一世发起具划时代意义的“强制性的现代化运动”,成为俄罗斯历史上“最伟大的帝王”。日本通过明治维新废除了贵族世袭特权,加强了中央集权,强制推行政治、经济和社会改革,最终跻身世界大国行列。

美国首任总统华盛顿,在开国和建章立制等方面都发挥了重要作用,1787年主持制宪会议制定了沿用至今的宪法,在制度上确立了总统作为同家元首的权威;民主党创始人杰斐逊主笔起草了《独立宣言》,通过外交等手段使美国领土增加了近一倍;林肯领导取得了南北战争的胜利,颁布了“解放黑奴宣言”,维护了联邦的统一;富兰克林·罗斯福的“新政”从经济危机的深渊中拯救了美国,使之得以赢得二战并在战后成为超级大国。

从历史上看,没有领导核心的国家往往会陷入"俾斯麦陷阱"。在普法战争后,俾斯麦从孤立、削弱法国的战略目的出发,主张在法国实行多党执政的共和制,认为一个不稳定的共和制政权可以使法国像一座不稳定的火山。1875—1940年,法国更换了102届政府,平均每个内阁只存活5个多月,甚至有两个内阁仅存在一天。苏联亡党亡国原因复杂,但执政党权威的丧失是重要原因之一。

“万山磅礴看主峰”,确立强有力的领导核心,是中国共产党取得革命胜利的宝贵经验。邓小平曾深情地说:“如果没有毛泽东,中国人民还要在黑暗中摸索更长的时间”。党的十八大以来,党和国家事业取得历史性成就,根本在于以习近平同志为核心的党中央的掌舵领航。在中华民族迈向伟大复兴的关键时刻,习近平总书记充分展现了自信笃定的政治意志力,战略判断高瞻远瞩,发挥着“主心骨” “中流祗柱”作用。

参考文献

1.【英】保罗·肯尼迪著,王保存等译:《大国的的兴衰:1500-2000年的经济变革与军事冲突》,中信出版社2013年版。

2.【美】寒缪尔·亨廷顿著,王冠华等译:《变革社会中的政治秩序》,生活·读书·新知三联书店1989年版。

3.【美】贾雷德·戴蒙德著,栾奇译:《为什么有的国家富裕,有的国家贫穷》,中信出版社2017年版。

4.【美】茲比格涅夫·布热津斯基著,中国国际问题研究所译:《大棋局--美国的首要地位及其地缘战略》,上海人民出版社1998年版。

5.【美】斯塔夫里阿诺斯著,吴象婴,梁赤民 ,董书慧 , 王昶译:《全球通史--从史前到21世纪》,北京大学出版社2006年版。

6.【美】 法里德·札卡瑞亚著,赵广成、林民旺译:《后美国世界: 大国崛起的经济新秩序时代,中信出版社2009年版。

7.【美】艾米.蔡著, 刘海青 杨礼武译:《大国兴亡录》新世界出版社2010年版。

8.【美】欧阳泰著,张孝铎译:《从丹药到枪炮:世界史上的中国军事格局》,中信出版社2019年版。

9.【美】 丹比萨·莫约,王雨晴译:《增长危机》,中信出版社2019年版。

10.【美】 瓦科拉夫·斯米尔,李凤海,刘寅龙译:《美国制造:国家繁荣为什么离不开制造业》,机械工业出版社2014年版。

11.【美】威廉·麦克尼尔,  孙岳 陈志坚 于展译:《西方的兴起:人类共同体史》,中信出版社2018年版。

12.【英】埃里克·琼斯著,陈小白译,《欧洲奇迹欧亚史中的环境、经济和地缘政治》,华夏出版社2015年版。

13.【英】张夏准著,严荣译,《富国的伪善: 自由贸易的迷思与资本主义秘史》,社会科学文献出版社2009年版。

14.【波兰】格泽高滋·W.科勒德克著,龙云安译:《 21世纪政治经济学:世界将何去何从》,中央编译出版社2015年版。

15.【日】大前研一著,朱悦玮译:《 低增长社会: 保护主义与反全球化危机的应对之道》,北京时代华文书局2019年版。

16. 张帆:《产业漂移: 世界制造业和中心市场的地理大迁移》,北京大学出版社2019年版。

17 文一:《伟大的中国工业革命 “发展政治经济学”一般原理批判纲要》,清华大学出版社2016年版。

Chapter Three: General Laws of the Rise of Great Powers

The rise and decline of great powers, with each power replacing the next in its turn, is a common phenomenon in human history. Innumerable expert scholars and elite thinkers have conducted thorough research and contemplation of this in an attempt to find deep underlying laws, but, thus far, there is no satisfactory solution to uphold as a standard. Nevertheless, history contains to some degree an internal causal logic, and there are shared characteristics in the path and the experience of nations that have risen in the past. For late developing countries with the necessary fundamental conditions the only way to seize the opportunity and realize such a rise is to absorb the experience of early developing countries and formulate strategies appropriate to both their own conditions and those of their age.

Achieving the status of a great power most often depends on population [levels], territory [size], natural resources, geographical location, economic power, military strength, soft power, and other factors of this sort. Among these, population, territory, and natural resources are the most fundamental factors.1 They are the material basis for determining whether a country has the potential to become a great power. But whether and to what extent that potential can be realized depends to a great extent on acquired strategies and favorable opportunities. A suitable national strategy can not only propel the rise of a great power and help it to avoid potential detours along the way, but it also has a bearing on whether a great power can hold on to its [great power] status. For example, after losing its status as the dominant global power Britain was able to hold onto its influence for several more decades. This was because they made the decision to play along with the United States rather than offering opposition. 

The more areas of superiority that a great power possesses, the greater its composite national strength will be, and the longer its age of prosperity will last. The outstanding advantages of Britain and the United States in the elements that confer superiority, such as scientific innovation and government efficiency, as well as their leadership, respectively, of the First and Second Industrial Revolutions, secured their status as unprecedented global superpowers.2 But American achievements were greater and their supremacy more outstanding. Apart from the benefits of latecomer's advantage, [America’s success] is due to a historical heritage that provided population, territory, and natural resources, which allowed it to benefit from economies of scale. However, if a great power is deficient in certain aspects, [these deficiencies] can be compensated by [strength] in other aspects. For instance, Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands had relatively small populations, but they relied on their overwhelming commercial and military superiority to become, at least for a time, dominant global powers. 

Great power status also depends on the conditions of international competition. Paul Kennedy, in his book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, says that the rise and fall of great powers is relative, and must be considered against the global situation and in comparison to the prospects of other nations.3 In the final decade of the 20th century, the collapse of the Soviet Union, formerly a peer competitor of the United States, gave its rival the unprecedented status of sole global superpower. China during the Song dynasty was considered to be the most advanced civilization in the world, and was at the pinnacle of scientific, technological, and economic power, but it was, unfortunately, reaching that status at a time when nomadic peoples were becoming the preeminent powers. The four main rivals of the Song, namely the Tangut people of the Western Xia, the Khitan of the Great Liao, the Jurchens of the Great Jin, and the Mongolians, had powerful cavalry forces that neutralized the wealth advantage of the agrarian great power, obstructing its potential rise as the overlord of a “global order under Chinese governance.”4 

Every Measurement Conforms to its Standard When Blessed By the Gifts of Nature


A poem by Qing dynasty poet Hong Liangji reads: “When blessed by all the gifts of nature, one's every measurement conforms to its standard / As perfect as the roundness of the moon.”5 This line about being exceptionally blessed by natural conditions refers to the superior factors and opportunities needed for success. As great powers rise, temporal, geographic, and demographic factors are all indispensable. Superior geography or demography, as well as other similar development factors, can sometimes be more important and have a more decisive influence than institutions and systems. There is no guarantee that these conditions will produce the rise of a great power; the lack of these fundamental conditions, however, necessarily precludes the possibility of the rise of a great power. When the level of science and technology [among competing powers] is similar, then geographic and demographic conditions become more important for ensuring the rise of a great power and for [that power’s ability to] persist over time.

There is Strength in Great Numbers

After Malthus proposed his “population theory,” international society has paid close attention to the potential negative impacts of population, believing that population growth can hinder the development of poor nations. However, in recent years more and more attention is being paid to the positive impact of population growth on development. Population and territory are important preconditions for the rise of a great power. Territory means natural resources and space for development; population represents a labor force and a market. Without exception, historical empires such as Persia, Rome, Macedonia, the Han, and the Tang had large populations and vast territory. Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands relied on extensive colonies, as well as their advantages in other areas, such as commercial capital, maritime navigation, and military power, but they quickly declined due to an insufficient population in their core territory and a lack of territory. In the industrial age, the division of labor in society became increasingly complex, with more demands made on the labor force and the market, making it difficult for countries lacking in population and territory to rise as great powers.

On the eve of the Industrial Revolution, the population of Britain was quite large. After the Industrial Revolution, Britain, having had the benefit of developing early, used the full potential of her population and natural resources. At the peak of its prosperity, Britain, which possessed only 2% of the global population, held more than 30% of global GDP, accounted for a fifth of global trade, and held two-fifths of manufacturing trade volume. However, as other Western countries successively industrialized, the limitations of Britain’s limited population and natural resources became apparent. British politician Leo Amery asked, “How can these little islands hold their own in the long run against such great and rich empires as the United States and Germany are rapidly becoming? How can we, with forty million people, compete with states nearly double our size?”6

The population of the United States was far greater in scale than that of England, France, Germany, and Japan, its territory was many times larger, and its prospects for population growth outstripped those of other developed nations. To a certain extent, if we say that the industrialization of Britain, Germany, France, and Japan were each driven by a single motor, the eastern, central, and western regions of the United States, with their population and land area, are equivalent to two, three, or more motors. Consequently, the time needed by the United States to complete full industrialization was longer, its economic prosperity of a longer duration, and its position as a great power and hegemonic power unprecedented. As Zbigniew Brzezinski says in The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, America is “the sole and, indeed, the first truly global power.”7

As the saying goes, “a small boat is easy to maneuver.” Japan, with its relatively low population, as well as minimal political and cultural resistance, was able to rapidly embark on industrialization after the Meiji Restoration. As a result of the advantages of early development, and using indemnities paid after the First Sino-Japanese War, international financing, and a technological crowding-out effect, Japan completed industrialization in a relatively short span of time and progressed to the ranks of developed nations. Much like Britain, Japan pulled off a miracle despite its small-scale population and territory and rose to become the second-largest economy in the world. But population and territory limited their space for growth, and as labor power, markets, and technology reached their limits, growth based on Japan's export-oriented economy was gradually exhausted, and after the 1990s it fell into a prolonged depression.

Population and territorial superiority allowed China to become the only one of the four great ancient civilizations to have continued to the present, and provided it with “a threshold for accommodation and an ability to absorb.” L. S. Stavrianos said that “being too large and cohesive to be conquered outright like India and the other countries of Southeast Asia, China was never to succumb entirely [to the Western challenge].”8 But it was precisely China’s massive population and deep-rooted traditional culture that provided great resistance to and delayed the beginning of the country’s early industrialization, which experienced numerous failed attempts and defeats. At the beginning of Reform and Opening, the population once again became a burden, and a certain amount of family planning policy was required to free China from the “poverty trap.” After the country's economic takeoff, the massive “demographic dividend” was considered a major factor in the Chinese miracle. At present, the “demographic dividend” has expired, but educational level and per-capita income will provide an unprecedented “talent dividend” and “market dividend.” Once a population of 1.3 billion people has grown wealthy, the result will be a supersized marketplace.

India’s massive population and expansive territory gave its civilization an important position in the ancient world, but these [factors] also became a burden at the beginning of industrialization. In early 2020, the Indian economy surpassed those of England and France, becoming the fifth-largest in the world. Goldman Sachs projects that India will have the third-largest economy in the world by 2040.9 As countries in Europe and East Asia face increasingly grave issues with aging and shrinking populations, India’s population numbers and [age] composition present massive advantages and potential. They can rely on “a continued abundance in their youth cohort.” [As] the American scholar [Fareed] Zakaria says: “If demography is destiny then India is secure.”10

Neighbors Are Dearer Than Distant Relatives11

Considering the economic achievements of China after Reform and Opening, University of Wisconsin-Madison professor Edward Friedman said that one of the important factors was that China was “located in East Asia and not East Africa.”12 Here he is emphasizing the importance of the environment on China’s periphery to China's rise. After Reform and Opening, China [joined] a trend of postwar development in East Asia. To a certain extent China’s economic achievements are due to the collective rise of the region—beginning with Japan's modernization and the accomplishment of postwar industrialization, spreading to the Four Asian Tigers, and then turning into an industrialization wave that reached China's shores and gradually spread inland.

There is usually a fair deal of friction between neighboring countries, but at the level of civilizational and economic development, it is often the case that “neighbors are dearer than distant relatives.” Historically, the great majority of ancient and powerful states were concentrated on the Eurasian Continent, and they tended to rise and fall in sequence and as groups. After the Industrial Revolution, the main developed countries were found in Europe and North America. Looking at the rise and fall of many great powers, we see the cluster effect and peripheral diffusion effect quite strongly in economic development and civilizational progress. This is seen even more clearly in the collective rise of East Asia, or the arrival of what is called the “Asia-Pacific century.” The course of China’s Belt and Road Initiative provides further evidence [for this fact].

The “takeoff” of Europe was also a collective process. The rise of Venice and other Italian city-states, Portugal, Spain, and Holland provided an economic core and a stable foundation for the collective rise of Europe. The British economy rose on a foundation of trade with countries on the coast of the Atlantic. It was part of an Atlantic economy. After the Industrial Revolution, British capital leaped beyond the English Channel and spread to France and other Western European regions. In the same time period, modern manufacturing made landfall in North America; to a certain extent, the economy of the United States represents an inheritance and continuation of the British economy. Europe provided funding, labor, technology, and a market for the United States. In the late 19th century, the backward countries of Europe caught up with advanced countries in Europe and North America without interruption, and the Atlantic economies experienced a collective takeoff.

After the midpoint of the 20th century, Japan was the destination for much of the manufacturing capacity transferred out of the United States, and it entered a period of high-speed growth. At the end of the 20th century, China became another “factory of the world.” In the 1950s and 1960s, New China received the support of the Soviet Union to build enterprises and facilities, building a foundation for the later “takeoff.” Reform and Opening at the end of the 1970s can be seen as another stop on the westward march of industrialization. “The meeting of the westward and eastward advances of industrialization created the ‘Chinese miracle.’”

Over the previous five centuries, there have been three structural power shifts, as well as the successive rise of great powers and their [respective] regional communities. The first power shift came with the rise of Europe. The second power shift was the rise of America and its allies. Currently, the international community, following a “flying geese paradigm,” with the Asia-Pacific region at the head of a “V” formation, is undergoing a third modern power shift. As the Belt and Road Initiative gathers momentum, people expect to see the collective rise of the Belt and Road countries. In The Silk Roads: A New History of the World, Peter Frankopan writes: “The world is spinning on its axis back to where it began a thousand years before on the Silk Road.”13

Craft a High-Quality Friend Circle

Looking back over the last five centuries at the temporal and spatial sequence with which great powers rose, late developing great powers were either neighbors of great powers that rose before them, or they were the "distant relatives" or friends, namely states with which they had a close relationship based on shared cultural, political, or other relationship–for example, the relationship between a tributary state and the suzerain, or between states in an alliance. Social and political proximity has a major impact on trade and investment; similar cultural environments make it easier to pass knowledge and technology. In The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia, Eric Jones takes the rise of Europe’s overseas dependencies as proof that [shared] elements, such as culture and political systems, can to a great extent make up for the geographical distance. The examples of this include America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and even South Africa, which all realized industrialization. It was because of large differences between their culture and political systems that the [wildfire of] European industrialization “abruptly died” at “the asbestos edge of the Muslim sphere.”14

Japan has submitted to Western civilization; apart from Japan's own “abandon Asia, learn from Europe” strategy,15 the great strategic importance attached to the country and the support extended to them by the United States had a major role in the rise of Japan. After the country was opened up by the United States Japan became an American export market and shipping depot. After that Japan became an increasingly important element of America’s international strategy. Following the Second World War, Japan started to receive support from America to counterbalance Eastern powers; economic aid, direct investment, and favored access to American markets were the most important external causes of Japan's rapid development.

During the period when Western powers took the dominant position in economics, science, and technology, estrangement or even antagonism caused many countries to lose timely opportunities for development. Argentina's missed opportunities to achieve economic success are considered to be related to its unwise diplomatic alliances. As Dambisa Moyo points out in Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth—and How to Fix It: “Among the biggest policy errors occurred when Argentina failed in 1944 to align itself with the United States, which was beginning its economic ascendancy. Instead, its leaders chose to align with Britain, just then commencing its economic decline.”16 After the Second World War, countries in Eastern Europe and elsewhere joined the Soviet camp, pursuing Soviet-style industrialization, and thereby distancing themselves from the center of global markets and core technologies.

The State that Esteems Industry will Increase in Wisdom Day by Day17


Economic growth is a prerequisite to and a necessary foundation for the rise of a great power; this is one of the greatest challenges faced by great powers in maintaining their status. Paul Kennedy, in his book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, emphasizes that the rise and fall of a great power comes down most decisively to relative economic power over other nations. In the era of agricultural economies, the great powers of the world were usually those with a high degree of agricultural development. After the Age of Discovery, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and other countries with limited population and territory rose in succession, relying on commercial and military power that had no previous precedents. After the arrival of industrial society, a timely realization of industrialization became a precondition for the rise of great powers. For a modern economy to be prosperous and strong it requires a powerful, diversified, and creative manufacturing industry.

Manufacturing can Rejuvenate a Nation

The manufacturing industry is the source of technological innovation and the force behind economic growth. In comparison to pre-industrial society, the Industrial Revolution produced astonishing increases in productivity. From the first year of the common era to 1400 the annual growth of the global economy was on average only 0.05%. In contrast, in the Netherlands during the 17th century, post-Industrial Revolution Britain, the United States during the 19th century, and the East Asian economies during the second half of the 20th century had average respective growth rates of 0.5%, 2%, 4%, and 8-10%, respectively. Before the 15th century, it took 1400 years for the global economy to double in size, but it took the East Asian economies only seven or eight years to pull off the same feat in the 20th century.

By the end of the 18th century, Britain had already established the foundations for industrialization, not only in the form of artisans’ workshops but also a highly-regarded shipbuilding industry, and its pig iron production accounting for around 15% of world output. By 1870, Britain possessed a third of the world's manufacturing output.

Owing to its unparalleled natural endowments and immigration and investment from Europe, the American economy was quite large from its founding. After the Civil War, the United States rapidly carried out the process of industrialization. In 1870, the United States accounted for less than a quarter of the world's manufacturing capacity, but that rose to around 36% by the 1880s. In the century that followed, America held onto its hegemony over global manufacturing.

Germany’s takeoff came in the final three decades of the 19th century when it completed the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy. On the foundation of coal, iron, and other traditional pillar industries, the chemical and electrical industries also quickly developed; Germany became a global leader in the chemical industry, producing half of the world's synthetic fuel. Despite the distorted development of military industrialization under Hitler and the postwar division of the country, Germany recovered its status as a major manufacturing power and a major trading power following the reunification of the country in 1990.

Changes in the proportion of global manufacturing held by individual powers are reflected in shifts in the patterns of development of great powers. In 1750, China produced a third of global finished goods, putting it in first place ahead of India. Around 1860, Britain overtook China; America captured the top spot in 1900, followed by England and Germany in second and third place, respectively. In 1953, the system had shifted so that the manufacturing industry was captured [entirely] by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain. However, America still [had a commanding lead], outstripping Soviet production by four times or more. In 1980, the United States and the Soviet Union were still out ahead, but Japan overtook Britain for third place.

Becoming a major manufacturing power provides crucial security for the goal of realizing the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation. At the founding of New China, the country was fundamentally a grindingly poor and backward agricultural nation.18 China has now become the foremost industrial power in the world. The modern industrial system of China is the most comprehensive, encompassing forty-one major industrial categories, and producing over two hundred of the top five hundred industrial products in the world. In 2010, China surpassed the United States in manufacturing value-added, and by 2018, the Chinese manufacturing industry commanded 28% of global output. The fundamental national conditions produced by becoming a major industrial power support the realization of the Two Centenary Goals.19 At the gathering to celebrate the 40th anniversary of Reform and Opening, General Secretary Xi Jinping stated that becoming the foremost manufacturing power was necessary for “the Chinese people to take a decisive step on their journey towards wealth and strength.”20

Conforming to the Laws of Industrialization

In the modern sense, economic development usually means a transition from agriculture to low-tech industry, then on to high-tech industries and service industries. Each country's path to industrialization is not identical, but they conform to a similar law of industrial progress, usually developing industry in a sequence that begins with food, moves next to textiles, then machinery, chemicals, electronics, and so on, developing around these focal points in turn. As primary, secondary, and tertiary industries evolve successively to take the main position in social production, the dominant industry also upgrades gradually from labor-intensive to capital- and technology-intensive. In the industrialization of developed nations, light industry usually develops first, followed by heavy industry.

Many late developing countries became impatient for results, rearranged this development sequence, and wandered off the path [of industrialized development]. After the October Revolution, the Soviet Union continued its process of industrialization under a planned economy. In the first Five-Year Plan, issued in 1929, the emphasis was on developing coal, iron and steel, and other industries, mobilizing the natural resources of the entire country toward heavy industrialization. Although Soviet industrialization achieved some degree of success, there were imbalances owing to the fact that forceful government intervention was excessively focused on heavy industry. After its founding, New China mimicked the Soviet Union's planned economy and emphasis on heavy industry. In the 1950s, the process of industrialization was delayed by the arrival of the Great Leap Forward, which destroyed China’s agricultural foundation.21 Industrialization began with heavy industry, but due to distortions in the process of distributing the essential factors of production and excessive political interference, it was hard to sustain.

However, for newly industrializing countries, following the law of industrial development–in which light industry follows heavy industry and there is progressive step-by-step development–has proven a crucial element of success. At the beginning of the 1980s, China also gave up on the strategy of prioritizing heavy industry, allowing light industry to develop rapidly. In the 1990s, the Chinese electronic information industry was one of the fastest growing industrial sectors. From the end of the 1990s, China entered a stage of heavy industrialization, with heavy industry outstripping the expansion of light industry.

Integrating With the International Industrial Chain

One important prerequisite for the industrialization of late-developing countries is successfully taking on labor-intensive industries for international markets. Based on its natural resources, close cultural ties, and convenient maritime links with Europe, and especially its powerful economic momentum, the United States became in the second half of the 19th century the largest beneficiary of the overseas transfer of manufacturing from Britain. In 1914, the United States ranked first place globally in terms of the scale of capital input, with British bond investment accounting for 85.9% of foreign investment. After this international transfer of industry, America gradually became the new “factory of the world.”

After the United States established itself as the global economic, industrial, and technological leader, it undertook a program of industrial restructuring, which saw the manufacture of iron and steel, textiles, chemicals, ships, common industrial machinery, and other similar products move overseas. Although they had a lower level of development, relatively good foundations for development and strategic relationships with the United States meant that Japan and West Germany became the destination for American manufacturing. They quickly became top global suppliers of labor-intensive manufactured goods. Consequently, the pace of industrialization in these two countries increased with tremendous speed, and their composite national strength rapidly grew. Japan became yet another “factory of the world,” and West Germany became a major economic power.

In the 1970s, it was Japan's outbound transfer of the labor-intensive textile and other light industries, as well as capital-intensive industries, like iron and steel, chemicals, and shipbuilding that created the economic miracle of the Four Asian Tigers. The scope of the economic systems of the Four Asian Tigers was small, however, and the pace of industrial upgrading was rapid, which meant th fat taking up high-tech manufacturing from Japan required them, too, to start moving labor-intensive industries overseas. It was at this time that China, vigorously pursuing Reform and Opening, and with the advantage of low costs and geographic advantages, became the main destination for labor-intensive industry transfers from the Four Asian Tigers. Through actively promoting the domestic market economy, actively calling for foreign investment, and taking advantage of a relatively good industrial foundation, China's industrialization process experienced a remarkable acceleration; China became another “factory of the world.”

The aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis set off a new round of global industrial transfers. China became a major exporting country and also a recipient; excepting central and western regions in China, much of the industrial transfer was directed toward countries along the Belt and Road. There is hope that the Belt and Road countries might synchronize with Asia, which has high rates of economic and trade growth. Estimates hold that the average annual GDP growth rate of the Belt and Road countries will be significantly higher than the global average, opening up the hopeful possibility of a new global economic growth area. 

Take the Initiative in Innovation


Scientific and technological innovation is a key force for economic growth, and it serves as a crucial indicator of the actual strength of a great power. Prior to the 1950s, the contribution of scientific and technological progress to the economies of developed countries was 20-40%, rising to 60-80% in the 1960s. Between 2001 and 2009, the value added for high tech industries in the manufacturing sector in the United States went from 17% to 21.3%.22 For late developing countries, copying and assimilating advanced technologies from developed countries is key to their rise as a nation, but becoming the dominant global power requires the assistance of revolutionary scientific and technological innovations, as occurred in the United States and Britain following their respective scientific and technological revolutions.

Science and Technology Sustain the Rise of Nations

Economic development ultimately relies on obtaining and mastering advanced science and technology. Putting science and technology to use has become increasingly important since the Age of Discovery. As Adam Smith pointed out, the division of labor and the expansion of markets stimulate technological innovation; the wealth of nations is increased through greater labor productivity [produced by the division of labor and technology]. Robert Solow, winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, holds the belief that, in the long-term, the only source of economic growth is industrial progress.23 Seven-eighths of the growth in the per capita GDP of the United States during the first half of the 20th century can be attributed to technological progress.

Geographical power shifts among great powers often follow shifts among the centers of scientific and technological development. The well-known American historian William H. McNeill believes that the Islamic world was far more scientifically and technologically advanced between 750 and 1100 AD than Europe.24 After the year 1000, China became the global leader in science and technology. By the 15th century, the global center of science and technology began to shift to the Mediterranean region and Europe. Although the entire population of Portugal was equal only to that of Nanjing, that country's maritime fleet had military coercive power that far exceeded Zheng He's armada. After the Age of Discovery, the West rose, and Italy, Britain, France, Germany, America, and other nations successively became global techno-scientific centers.25

In the middle 16th century, a number of important thinkers in natural philosophy emerged in the city-states of Italy, transforming them into centers of scientific activity. Through the 16th and 17th centuries a number of thinkers in Britain burst forth, including William Gilbert, Robert Boyle, Isaac Newton, Edmond Halley, and others, who initiated a number of modern scientific disciplines, including physics, chemistry, and physiology. From the mid-18th to mid-19th centuries, France produced a great number of scientific thinkers, including Jean le Rond d'Alembert and Pierre Simon Marquis de Laplace, who made outstanding contributions in a number of fields, including thermodynamics, chemistry, and celestial mechanics, which would provide the theoretical foundation for the internal combustion revolution and the chemical revolution. From the 1820s forward German science advanced by leaps and bounds. Germany became the world leader in disciplines such as organic chemistry and particle physics. In the 1920s, the United States, taking advantage of the revolution in information technology, replaced Germany as the global scientific center, and took a position at the front line of scientific progress. 

At present, the major global science and technology centers are concentrated in the developed nations of Europe and North America, but trends show a shift toward the Asia-Pacific region. Japanese scientific and technological power remains impressive, but developing economies are claiming a greater proportion of research and development, which has led to an enhanced capacity for technological innovation. Pan Jiaofeng, President of the Institutes of Science and Development of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, is among those who have pointed out that a new round of techno-scientific revolution and industrial transformation is currently being fermented, which will provide China with the opportunity to become the center of global science and technology and the world leader in techno-scientific development.26

Lead in High Technology Industries

Economically successful nations generally place a high degree of emphasis on scientific and technological innovation. [For example,] when 18th century Britain became a technological leader it rapidly became a powerful European, Continental, and world power. In 2012, the United States, Japan, and Germany accounted, respectively, for 26.44, 22.35, and 9.61% of patent applications under the Patent Cooperation Treaty. Scientific and technological development emerges from a wide range of industrial practices and commercial drivers. Wen Yi, a professor at Tsinghua University, believes that “So long as a nation steps out onto the road of Industrial Revolution and becomes the factory of the world, it has the possibility of becoming the world leader in technological innovation. But if an industrialized nation abandons its manufacturing industry, it will very likely come by degrees to lose its technological advantage and capacity for innovation.”27

American science and technology has always been considered formidable and is renowned as among the best in the world. Many of the most important inventions in human history, including the incandescent bulb, the cotton gin, universal machine parts, and the production line came from the United States. Vaclav Smil writes in his Made in the USA: The Rise and Retreat of American Manufacturing: “[America's] enormous post-1865 leap was primarily driven by technical advances. These developments made the United States not only the largest mass producer of goods but also the leader in commercializing new inventions, setting up entirely new industries, introducing new ways of production, and raising labor productivity. More than a century later the country, and the world, still continue to benefit from many of those epoch-making advances.”28

Presently, the United States faces many problems in economic growth, but it is still the preeminent global power in science and technology. In informatization, aerospace, artificial intelligence, medicine, military technology, and other high-tech industries, the United States has overwhelming technical superiority. American research and development expenditures are the highest in the world, and the country has a strong foundation in basic scientific research and abundant resources in scientific and technical manpower. Between 1901 and 2019, a total of 613 scientists received the Nobel Prize, among which 287 were American citizens. Americans have a near monopoly on the Turing Award in computer science, and the country is home to 59% of researchers in artificial intelligence. The United States also claims forty of the world's top hundred universities, as well as the majority of the top technology companies.

Drawing on the capital, expertise, and equipment of early developing countries is the main way that late developing countries can rapidly close the technology gap. In 1789, when Briton Samuel Slater went to the United States and built from memory his own version of Richard Arkwright's spinning jenny, his machine kicked off the beginning of modern American industrialization.29 In the middle 19th century, German and American railways were only opened by importing British equipment and capital. In the early years of the Soviet Union, Lenin's New Economic Policy leased certain enterprises to management from America, Japan, and other countries. During the first Five-Year Plan, Stalin engaged experts from America, Germany, and other countries as advisers on key enterprises. After the Second World War, Japan imported advanced technology from Britain and America; they would sometimes go so far as to dismantle Western products in order to reverse engineer the designs. In the manufacture of some products, like automobiles, optical equipment, precision instruments, and precision machine tools, Japan's style of imitation led to great success.

For long periods of time, China was the global leader in science and technology, but it has missed out on the techno-scientific revolutions of the past five hundred years. New China is an example of a country catching up from behind in science and technology, with the country making outstanding achievements in high-tech fields, with the Two Bombs, One Satellite project as one example.30 In recent years, China has pulled off quantum leaps in numerous fields, including digital information technology, 5G, and artificial intelligence, accelerating its progress into the ranks of the global leaders in science and technology. Among patents approved globally in 2017, China claimed 30%, with the United States taking 23%, Japan 14%, South Korea 9%, and Europe 8%. Beginning in 2007, China began to award more doctorates in the natural sciences and engineering each year than the United States does.

China still has a not insignificant gap to close with the United States in the fields of science and technology, but the [Chinese] growth rate is rapid and there is potential for development. Between 2000 and 2017, China's research and development expenditures grew at an average of 17.3%, easily beating the American rate of 4.3%. In their book Created in China: How China is Becoming a Global Innovator, Georges Haour and Max von Zedtwitz point out: "China’s pragmatic and entrepreneurial spirit, massive investment in R&D, compounded by its Confucian tradition and the extensive use of the Internet by its urban population, means that the country is about to become a major country for innovation.”31

Rough Seas Reveal the Strength of the Mast32


Since the 1980s, the ideas of neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus have been widely disseminated, and developed countries demanded that developing nations adopt what are termed “good policies” and “good institutions” in the interests of economic development. But in actual practice, these sorts of policies and institutions [can only be] the result of industrialization. For late developing countries in the process of rising as a great power, a stable government and good social order play a larger role in the process of industrialization than “Western-style democracy.” Many of those countries that blindly accepted the Washington Consensus did not merely fail to grow their economies but sank into political turmoil.

Strong and Effective Government

In Political Order in Changing Societies, Samuel Huntington points out that in third world countries, the process of modernization, economic development, and socio-cultural transformation take priority.33 Political modernization is only possible with their realization. Those countries that attempt to jump forward to a modern Western system in a short period of time  ignore the reality that political modernization is a gradual process. They inevitably discover that attempting to accelerate the process paradoxically leads to delays. The transition from tradition to modernity requires a strong government, namely a government with the ability to balance political participation against political institutionalization. “In terms of observable behavior, the crucial distinction between a politically developed society and an underdeveloped one is the number, size, and effectiveness of its organizations.”

In The Mystery of Economic Growth, Elhanan Helpman says that a powerful political system supports national development and economic growth, and that longer-lasting regimes are better for the creation of policy that accelerates growth.34 In developing countries, a lack of reliable government administration, law enforcement, and justice usually leads to terrible economic outcomes. As Dambisa Moyo notes in Edge of Chaos: “In 2014, violence cost the global economy US $14.3 trillion—or 13.4 percent of world GDP.”35 One of the key reasons given for Argentina's "steep decline" since the 1930s is that “over a fifty-year period, between 1930 and the mid-1970s, Argentina had six military coups.”

As well as promoting economic growth, stable governments are more likely to make long-term investments in things like public services and infrastructure. Zakaria points out that the stories of development in Japan, the United States, Europe, and China share a single thread, which is strong and reliable political institutions. “The Chinese government enjoys a high rate of popular support,” Zakaria writes, “which helps make it possible to carry out designated strategies.”36 He notes the comments of a senior Indian government official: “We have to do many things that are politically popular but are foolish. They depress our long-term economic potential. But politicians need votes in the short term. China can take the long view. And while it doesn't do everything right, it makes many decisions that are smart and far-sighted.”

An Open and Inclusive Strategy for Foreign Relations 

Since at present globalization is still far from complete, and national boundaries and geography remain boundaries to the flow of key elements [of the economy], openness is crucial for the economic growth of late developing countries. There is a positive correlation between economic growth and many indexes of openness to trade; there is a negative correlation between disruptions of free trade and economic growth; and countries open to trade tend to grow at twice the rate of countries that adopt a closed-door policy. In Whither the World: The Political Economy of the Future, Grzegorz Kołodko points out that closed economies are not able to grow quickly over the long term.37 Looking at the rise and fall of great powers gives us ample proof that "tolerance" is an essential condition for the rise of great powers, and "isolation" inevitably leads to decline.

Reform and Opening has been the magic formula in China's modernization drive. In General Secretary Xi Jinping's report at 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, he spoke about “promoting a new [development] pattern of opening-up on all fronts”; he emphasized that “openness brings progress, while self-seclusion leaves one lagging behind,” and “China will not close its doors to the world but will only open them wider”; and he concluded that “China adheres to the fundamental national policy of opening up and pursues development with its doors open wider.”38 At a November, 12th, 2020 celebration of the 30th anniversary of Pudong's development and opening-up, General Secretary Xi Jinping went a step further, calling for the need to promote high quality institutional opening up, to further open up the door to the country, so that every nation might partake of the opportunities provided by China's development, and to actively participate in global economic governance.39

The United States was once a country with a high degree of openness. From the westward march of technology to explosive industrial development, and then in its victory in the Second World War, immigrants have contributed to the advancement and success of the United States. America's victory in the race to the development of the atomic bomb is inseparable from the fact that it was able to attract immigrant scientists from Europe. At the dawn of the computer age, the United States gained its position as the [world’s] technological and economic leader through this same ability to attract talent from around the world. Silicon Valley produced one of the greatest explosions of wealth in human history, and the creativity of immigrants was crucial to that story, too.

But Yale professor Amy Chua says that the United States is “losing this excellent quality, and its dominance faces an unprecedented threat.”40 Zakaria claims: American politics is now beyond cure, mired in factional struggle, and increasingly inefficient.41 With Trump's victory came the popularity of the slogan "America first"; this meant vigorous trade protectionism and active restrictions on immigration. The reversal of the open-door policy is another step down the road to America losing its status as a great power.

Build a Strong Leadership Core42

Leaders in the development of history can play important functions, directly affecting the trajectory and velocity of a rising great power. Engels pointed out that authority is a universal phenomenon in human behavior.43 The "cobweb model" of political science proves that even the most complex web has a core.44 Huntington believes that modernization requires authority with a transformative capacity, and authority must be concentrated in the hands of certain powerful individuals or groups.45

Leaders can play a key role at turning points in history. Behind the rise of many great powers were important individuals and leaders who were capable of transforming the fate of the nation. Liu Xinru of the theory department of People's Liberation Army Daily argues that a strong leadership core is a crucial element for the rise of a great power.46 This is particularly true in critical periods when a strong leadership core and a leader capable of making history is indispensable. 

After Portugal and Spain emerged from feudal division and became unified nation-states, there emerged strong central governments and monarchical powers. Portugal sponsored seafarers to explore new territory in the name of the state, and voyages of discovery became a planned and organized national strategy. Prince Henry [the Navigator] created the first state-run school for maritime navigation in human history and built a world-class armada. After Spain became a unified nation-state, Queen Isabella planned ambitious maritime expeditions and even sold her jewels to fund Columbus's expedition.

Britain built the most powerful navy in Europe with the support of Queen Elizabeth. King Louis XIV of France established absolute monarchical power, transforming the country from a disunited feudal aristocracy into a great and powerful nation. Bismarck, the “Iron Chancellor” of Germany, implemented social reforms, propelling Germany's composite national strength to become the strongest in continental Europe. Peter the First, Tsar of Russia, initiated an epoch-making modernization movement for which he is remembered as the "greatest ruler" in Russian history. In the Meiji Restoration, Japan abrogated the authority of a hereditary aristocracy, reinforced central authority, and forced through political, economic, and social reforms. Japan’s rise to great power status was the final result [of these centralizing reforms].

George Washington, the first president of the United States, had an important role in many aspects of the establishment and founding of the country. In 1787 he presided over the Constitutional Convention that gave the country the basic law that is still in use today, and established the authority of the president as the head of state.Thomas Jefferson, the founder of the Democratic Party, drafted the Declaration of Independence, and through diplomatic and other methods nearly doubled the territory of the United States. Abraham Lincoln won victory in the Civil War and issued the Emancipation Proclamation, preserving the integrity of the federation. Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal saved the United States from the abyss of economic crisis, allowing it to win the Second World War and become a superpower.

Historically, countries without a strong leadership core often fall into the "Bismarck trap."47 After the Franco-Prussian War, Bismarck, attempting to isolate and weaken France, advocated France adopt a multi-party republican system, believing that an unstable republican system would turn France into an unstable volcano. Between 1875 and 1940, France was ruled by 102 separate administrations, each lasting an average of five months, with two lasting a single day. The Soviet Union collapsed for a complex set of reasons, but one of the most important was the loss of authority by the ruling party.48

“Among majestic mountains, the great peak stands out.” Establishing a strong leadership core for the Party was one of the great lessons of revolutionary victory. “Without Mao Zedong,” Deng Xiaoping proclaimed with great emotion, “the Chinese people would have been forced to grope in the dark for much longer.”49 The historic achievements made by the Party and the country since the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party are fundamentally linked to the ability of the o, with Xi Jinping as its core, to steer the ship of state. At a crucial moment for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation, General Secretary Xi Jinping demonstrated a self-confident political will, and made farsighted strategic decisions, showing his willingness to take on the role of “the guiding spirit” and the “strong mast in rough seas.”

Bibliography

1. [UK] Paul Kennedy, translated by Wang Baozun et al. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. Published by CITIC Press in 2013.

2. [US] Samuel P. Huntington, translated by Wang Guanhua et al. Political Order in Changing Societies. Published by Lifelong·Reader·New Knowledge Joint Publishing Co., Ltd. in 1989.

3. [US] Jared Diamond, translated by Luan Qi. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. Published by CITIC Press in 2017.

4. [US] Zbigniew Brzezinski, translated by China Institute of International Studies. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. Published by Shanghai People's Publishing House in 1998.

5. [US] L. S. Stavrianos, translated by Wu Xiangying, Liang Chimin, Dong Shuhui, Wang Chang. A Global History: From Prehistory to the 21st Century. Published by Peking University Press in 2006.

6. [US] Fareed Zakaria, translated by Zhao Guangcheng, Lin Minwang. The Post-American World: The Rise of the Rest. Published by CITIC Press in 2009.

7. [US] Amy Chua, translated by Liu Haiqing, Yang Liwu. Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance - and Why They Fall. Published by New World Press in 2010.

8. [US] Tonio Andrade, translated by Zhang Xiaoduo. The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History. Published by CITIC Press in 2019.

9. [US] Dambisa Moyo, translated by Wang Yuqing. Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth—and How to Fix It. Published by CITIC Press in 2019.

10. [US] Vaclav Smil, translated by Li Fenghai, Liu Yinlong. Made in the USA: The Rise and Retreat of American Manufacturing. Published by China Machine Press in 2014.

11. [US] William H. McNeill, translated by Sun Yue, Chen Zhijian, Yu Zhan. The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community. Published by CITIC Press in 2018.

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15. [Japan] Kenichi Ohmae, translated by Zhu Yuewei. A Society of Stagnation: How Protectionism and the Anti-Globalization Crisis Can Be Addressed. Published by Beijing Times-Huawen Publishing House in 2019.

16. Zhang Fan. Industrial Shift: The Geographical Migration of World Manufacturing and Central Markets. Published by Peking University Press in 2019.

17. Wen Yi. The Great Industrial Revolution in China: A Critique of the General Principles of 'Developmental Political Economy.' Published by Tsinghua University Press in 2016.

1. See glossary for COMPOSITE NATIONAL STRENGTH.
2. Historians often divide the industrial revolution into two waves of innovation: the First Industrial Revolution, which saw the application of steam power to mechanized work, occurred roughly between the late 18th century and the mid-19th century, beginning in Britain. The Second Industrial Revolution occurred roughly between the mid-19th century and early 20th century. It was marked by further advancements in technology, particularly in the areas of steel production, electrification, fossil fuel use, and chemical manufacturing. This period also saw the rise of large-scale industrial corporations and the expansion of industrialization to other countries beyond Britain, notably the United States and Germany.
3. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987). 
4. The Xia, Liao, and Jin were all founded by non-Han ethnic groups that rose to power on China's periphery contemporaneously with the Song Dynasty. The Western Xia (1038-1227 AD) was located in what is today the the northwest of China. The Liao Dynasty (907 to 1125 AD) controlled a vast territory in present-day Northeast China, Mongolia, and portions of Russia. The Jin Dynasty (1115 to 1234 AD) conquered the Liao Dynasty in 1125 and then ended the Northern Song period in 1127,  establishing control over all of northern China. The Mongols conquered the remainder of the Song Dynasty in 1279, marking the end of the Southern Song period and the beginning of the Yuan Dynasty in China.
These comments on the Song Dynasty's relative lack of military power passage despite its economic brilliance appear to closely parallel a passage from Tonio Andrade’s The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History. To quote:
Recent work on Song history shows that the Song didn’t neglect war nearly as much as this argument would suggest… So how do we resolve the puzzle of the Song’s inability to prevail? The answer has less to do with the weakness of the Song than with the strength of its enemies. Over its 319 years, the Song faced four primary foes. The most famous (and deadly) was the Mongol Empire, which didn’t just overpower the Song: its conquests stretched from Kiev to Baghdad, Kabul to Kaifeng. Before the Mongols, the Song faced other implacable enemies from Central and Northern Asia: the Tanguts of the Xi Xia dynasty, the Khitans of the Liao dynasty, and the Jurchens of the Jin dynasty.  [...] As Paul Jakov Smith writes, ‘The rapid evolution of Inner Asian statecraft in the tenth to thirteenth centuries allowed states on the northern frontier to support formidable armies that offset agrarian China’s advantages in wealth and numbers, hereby blocking [the] Song from assuming a position of supremacy at the center of a China-dominated world order and relegating it to a position of equal participant in a multi-state East Asian system.’
Tonio Andrade, The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 25-26. 
5. All the section titles are idioms, famous quotes, sayings, or excerpts from classical Chinese literature. 
The stanza, “When blessed by all the gifts of nature, one's every measurement conforms to its standard / As perfect as the roundness of the moon” is excerpted from Book II of “Poetry and Discourse from North of the River” [北江诗话] by Hong Liangji [洪亮吉]  (1746-1809).  
6. This quote is taken from Fareed Zakaria’s 2008 article in Foreign Affairs, “The Future of American Power.” See Fareed Zakaria, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 3 (2008): 18–43.
7. The Chinese is not an exact quote of Brzezinski's. The closest line to this quotation in The Grand Chessboard is the following: “The defeat and collapse of the Soviet Union was the final step in the rapid ascendance of a Western Hemisphere power, the United States, as the sole and, indeed, the first truly global power.” See Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997), xii. 
8. The author are likely paraphrasing the following section from L. S. Stavrianos’ A Global History: From Prehistory to the 21st Century: “China, by contrast, was unable to reorganize itself to meet the Western challenge. Yet, being too large and cohesive to be conquered outright like India and the other countries of Southeast Asia, China was never to succumb entirely." The argument that China's size allowed it to assimilate invaders is not found in Stavrianos' bok. L. S. Stavrianos, A Global History: From Prehistory to the 21st Century (New York: Pearson, 1998). 
9. Goldmsn Sachs still stands by this prediction. See Goldman Sachs, “How India Could Rise to the World’s Second Biggest Economy,” 6 July 2023. 
10. Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: WW Norton, 2008), 132.  
11. The idiom “[close] neighbors are dearer than distant relatives” originates from Book IV of Yuan Dynasty play Dong Tang Lao [东堂老], authored by Qin Jianfu [秦简夫]. 
12. CST editors could not locate the original source of this quotation. But the same view is a commonplace in Chinese international relations scholarship. For example, see Yan Xuetong, “Diplomacy Should Focus on Neighbors,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 27, 2015. 
13. Peter Frankopan, The Silk Roads: A New History of the World (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), xiv.
14. This quotation from Eric Jones’ 1981 book The European Miracle has been modified to better fit within the text, but th description of the Muslim world as "asbestos"perhaps only make sense with a much larger excerpt:.

Nothing is clearer than that the fires of modernisation and industrialisation in Britain and Belgium and the Rhineland, quickly burned to the fringes of this European system. Even Russia and the Christian colonies of the Ottoman empire smouldered. But at the asbestos edge of the Muslim sphere the fires abruptly died. They never took light over most of the non-European world, Europe’s overseas annexes excepted.

See Eric Jones, Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
15. In the Japanese context, “脱亚入欧”abandon Asia, learn from Europeis a Meiji era slogan associated with the famous Japanese political theorist Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901). The phrase first appeared in an anonymous 1885 editorial for the Jiji Shimpo likely written by Fukuzawa.  It advocated that Japan to distance itself from its Asian neighbors and to adopt European political, economic, and cultural models instead. It stemmed from the perception that Europe represented modernity, progress, and power, while Asia was seen as backward and inferior.
16. Dambisa Moyo, Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth—and How to Fix It (New York: Basic Books, 2018), ch. 2.
17. The subtitle 国向工则日新日智A state that esteems industry will increase in wisdom day by dayis taken from Kang Youwei’s 1989 petition to the Qing emperor arguing that the dynasy should establish an award for industrial innovation. The complete couplet is: 国尚农,则守旧日愚;国尚工,则日新日智 [If a country esteems agriculture, it will remain conservative and ignorant day by day; if a country esteems industry, it will progress daily with new knowledge and wisdom].  
18. The idiom 一穷二白 [yī qióng èr bái] is used to describe a person or family in a state of extreme poverty, lacking all possessions and resources necessary for sustenance or improvement of life.
19. The Two Centenary Goals refer to two significant milestones set by the CPC to guide the country's development and to celebrate two important anniversaries. The first centenary goal was to mark the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CPC in 2021 by achieving a MODERATELY PROSPEROUS SOCIETY in all respects [全面建成小康社会]. The second centenary goal is to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China in 2049 by building China into a modern, socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful [富强、民主、文明、和谐、美丽的社会主义现代化国家].
20. See Xi Jinping 习近平, “Zai Qingzhu Gaige Kaifang 40 Zhounian Dahui Shang De Jianghua 在庆祝改革开放40周年大会上的讲话 [Speech at the 40th Anniversary Celebration of Reform and Opening-Up Conference],” Xinhua Wang 新华网 [Xinhua Online], 18 December 2018. 
21. The Great Leap Forward, a Maoist social and economic campaign that lasted from 1958 to 1962, attempted to take China from "feudalism" to "socialism" without (as Marxist theory would predict) any intervening period of capitalism in between. The cash course industrialization program was funded through the requisition of all agricultural surplus. The resulting famine killed tens of millions of people. This event is sometimes glossed over in Chinese historiography as "three years of natural disasters." Frank assessments of the Great Leap Forward's true costs and consequences are not unknown, but few and far enough between that their presence in a document like this should not be taken for granted.
22. The authors of National Security and The Rise and Fall of Great Powers do not include citations for any of the economic statistics cited here, nor can these numbers be found in any of the works included in the bibliography.
23. Robert Solow was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1987 for his contributions to the theory of long term economic growth as a function of capital accumulation, population growth, and productivity growth driven by changing technology.
24. See William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 417-456.
25. Zheng He was a Ming admiral and diplomat who commanded seven expeditionary treasure voyages to Southeast Asia, South Asia, West Asia, and East Africa from 1405 to 1433. The contrast between Zheg He's voyages, which did not lead to sustaied conact between the Chinese state and the places he visited, is often contratsted in global history textbooks wit the smaller but more commercialy successful voyages of the European Age of Discovery.
26. For an example of Pan Jiaofeng’s theory on techno–scientific revolution, see Pan Jiaofeng 潘教峰, “Zhongguo Jianshe Shijie Keji Zhongxin Yinglai Zhanlue Jiyu Qi 中国建设世界科技中心迎来战略机遇期 [China's construction of a Global Science and Technology Center Enters a Strategic Opportunity Period],” CNICN, Feb 2019.
In it, he argues that the current incubation period of a new technological revolution  presents a strategic opportunity for China to establish itself as a global technological center. He argues that China, as a latecomer in technological innovation, must adopt a global perspective, engage in forward-looking research, and strategically position itself to achieve significant advancements in technological innovation and become a world technology center.
27. CST editors are unable to locate the original quote. For an example of Wen Yi’s argument, see Wen Yi, “The Making of an Economic Superpower---Unlocking China’s Secret of Rapid Industrialization,” Working Paper 2015-006B, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2015. In it, Wen argues that China’s economic rise could not be adequately explained by neoclassical economic theory. Instead, he introduces what he calls the “new stage theory” that emphasizes the role of the state’s economic policy in facilitating industrialization and industrial upgrading. 
28. Vaclav Smil, Made in the USA: The Rise and Retreat of American Manufacturing (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015), 23. 
29. Slater's adaptation of the spinning jenny in 1789 is an early example of industrial espionage一and by extension, an American precedent for the widespread IP theft hat powered China's own rise.
30. The “Two Bombs, One Satellite” project refers to China's efforts in the mid-20th century to develop nuclear bombs, hydrogen bombs, and artificial satellites. 
31. Edward T. Johnson and Max von Zedtwitz, Created in China: How China is Becoming a Global Innovator (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 9.
32. 沧海横流显砥柱rough seas reveal the strength of the mastis a Chinese idiom that metaphorically describes a situation where the true essence of a person becomes clear only amidst great turmoil and diversity. It usually appears as a couplet, 沧海横流显砥柱,万山磅礴看主峰, which can be literally translated as “amidst the tumultuous sea, the mast stands firm; in the vast expanse of mountains, the main peak towers above.” The couplet does not originate from a single author. The preceding line is from Guo Moruo [郭沫若]'s “Man Jiang Hong” [满江红], and the following line is from Qing Dynasty Zeng Guofan [曾国藩]’s "Letter to the Former Chen Yu Ming” [复陈右铭太守书]. 
33. See Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 35. 
34. Elhanan Helpman, The Mystery of Economic Growth (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2010).
35. This passage is a combination of two quotes from Dambisa Moyo’s Edge of Chaos. The first can be found on page 54 and the second can be found on page 49.  
36. This passage is quoted from page 95 of Fareed Zakaria’s The Post-American World, but the CICIR researchers–or the translator of a Chinese version of the book–interpret it in a way that subverts Zakaria's original meaning. Zakariaargues that public support does not matter to the Chinese government, not that the Chinese government enjoys such support: “It is awkward to point out, but unavoidable: not having to respond to the public has often helped Beijing carry out its strategy.” Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 95.
37. While this is not presented as a direct quote, it resembles a line from the book: “The contemporary world has no example of a closed economy, tied by protectionist practices, which would be able to grow fast over the long term.” Grzegorz W. Kolodko, Whither the World: The Political Economy of the Future Volume 1 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 91. 
38. Xi Jinping, “Juesheng Quan Mianjian Cheng Xiaokang Shehui Duoqu Xin Shidai Zhongguo Tese Shehuizhuyi Weida Shengli Zai Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shijiu Ci Quan Guo Daibiao Dahui Shang de Baogao 决胜全面建成小康社会 夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利——在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告 [Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in an All-round Way and Winning the Great Victory of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era——Report at the Nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China],” Xinhua, 27 October 2017.
39. Xi Jinping 习近平, “Zai Pudong Kaifang 30 Zhounian Qingzhu Dahui Shang de Jianghua 在浦东开发开放30周年庆祝大会上的讲话 [Speech at the Celebration Conference of the 30th Anniversary of the Development and Opening of Pudong] ,” Xinhua 新华, 12 November 2020. 
40. CST editors could not locate this exact quotation in Chua's work, but the final chapter of Amy Chua's Day of Empire advances a similar argument. Amy Chua, Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance—and Why They Fall (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), 318-343.
41. Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, 211-212.  
42. See the CST glossary entry LEADERSHIP CORE for the meaning of this term. This entire section is a long and transparent justification for the centralization of power under Xi Jinping.  
43. Frederick Engels, "On Authority," Marxists Internet Archive, (or. pub 1872). 
44. The phrase “cobweb model” doe not have an established meanig in contemporary interntional relations; most often the phrase “cobweb model” is used in reference to an economic theory used to analyze supply and demand in markets characterized by time lags and adjustments.  
45. This is a major theme of Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn: Yale Univresity Press, 1968). 
46. CST editors could not locate Lin's original article. 
47.  The term "Bismark trap" is not a well established concept in either western or Chinese scholarship. CST editors were unable to find any mention of it outside of this passage.
48. Debate over the cause of the USSR’s fall has been wide ranging in Chinese academia, with critics of the official position pointing to the systemic decay of the Soviet economy or the failure of the USSR to reform the inflexible and rigid political structure it inherited from Stalin. For examples of critical arguments, see Wang Xiaoxiao 王笑笑, “Sulian Jubiande Genben Yuanyin 苏东剧变的根本原因 [The Fundamental Reason for the Transformation of theSoviet Union]” Aisixiang 爱思想, 4 March 2013; Huang Lifu 黄立茀, “Sulian Yinhe Sangshi Gaige Liangji  苏联因何丧失改革良机? Why did the USSR miss the chanceto reform?” Aisixiang 爱思想, 15 October 2009; Liu Xingyi 刘新宜, “Sugong Kuatai, Sulian Wangguode Yuanyin  苏共垮台、苏联亡国的原因 [Reasons for the Collapse of the Soviet Communist Party and the Demise of the USSR]” Aisixiang 爱思想, 14 November 2004. For longer presentations of the official view published around the same time as Liu’sarticle, see  Cheng Zhihua 陈之骅, “Lishi Xuwuzhuyi Gaoluan Sulian 历史虚无主义搞乱苏联 [Historical Nihilism Ruined the Soviet Union],” Aisixiang 爱思想, 18 September 2013 and Wang Tingyou 汪亭友, “Liang Zhong Duiweide Shijieguan he Lichang Guanchuan SulianYanbian Yanjiu 两种对立的世界观和立场贯穿苏联演变研究 [The Ideological Divide in the Study of the Soviet Collapse],”Aisixiang, 20 Feb 2014.
49. It is unclear when Deng Xiaoping said those words, but they are frequently referenced by party leaders. See Jiang Zemin 江泽民, “Jiang Zemin Zai Mao Zedong Tongzhi Danchen Yibai Zhounian Jinian Dahui Shang De Jianghua. 江泽民在毛泽东同志诞辰一百周年纪念大会上的讲话 [Jiang Zemin's Speech at the Commemoration Ceremony of the 100th Anniversary of Comrade Mao Zedong's Birth], Xinhua, 27 November 2009. 

Cite This Article

China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. “General Laws of the Rise of Great Powers.” An excerpt from National Security and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers. Translated by Dylan Levi King. San Francisco: Center for Strategic Translation, 2024.

Originally published in Zhongguo Xiandai Guoji Guanxi Yanjiuyuan 中国现代国际关系研究院 China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, Daguo Xingshuai yu Guojia Anquan 大国兴衰与国家安全 [National Security and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers] (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe 时事出版社 [Shishi Publishing], 2021), 73-100.

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General Laws of the Rise of Great Powers

大国崛起的一般规律

Author
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
中国现代国际关系研究院
original publication
National Security and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers
大国兴衰与国家安全
publication date
April 15, 2021
Translator
Dylan Levi King
Translation date
February 29, 2024

Introduction

Empires climb and crumble. Powers wax and wane. Such has it ever been. So shall it ever be. If there is a logic behind this cycle of rise and fall, then the leaders of the Communist Party of China would like to know it. This is the stated aim of National Security and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers, whose third chapter is translated below. Through historical case studies this book promises to reveal the historical forces that decide the fate of nations—and demonstrate how the Party has leveraged these forces to secure China’s national rejuvenation.

National Security and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers (henceforth: Rise and Fall) was published in 2021, seven years after Xi Jinping introduced the Total National Security Paradigm to the Party writ large. The paradigm is a complex of ideas intended to guide cadres as they minimize risk and extinguish threats in all fields of state activity. “The Total National Security Paradigm is not just a guiding principle for the state’s security agencies,” the introduction to Rise and Fall instructs. “It should become the world view and the methodology of every cadre in all tasks. And it should also become a required lesson for the people of China, which is on its path from a big nation to a strong nation.”1

This introduction was written by Peng Yuan, who was then serving as the director of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR).2 CICIR is a research center run by the Ministry of State Security (MSS), China’s premier intelligence agency.3 Like Peng, the nine authors of Rise and Fall are all scholars affiliated with CICIR.4 Their work was published by the Total National Security Paradigm Research Center [总体国家安全观研究中心], a think tank staffed by former CICIR analysts tasked with developing concepts and educational materials for the Central National Security Commission. It is the fifth book in a series. Each title in this series ties the Total National Security Paradigm to a topic of interest, such as “culture” or “biosecurity.”5 Their tone is academic but accessible. As the series introduction puts it, the purpose of this research is to “raise the general awareness for national security” and develop a standard curriculum for all levels of national security studies.

Xi Jinping seeks to instill widespread awareness—what he calls “calamity consciousness” [忧患意识]—of the grand historical stakes at play in the otherwise mundane tasks handled by communist bureaucrats.6  Books like this are part of that program. Though not as authoritative as the doctrinal manuals published by high-level party organs, the books in this series, each written by a collection of MSS analysts and scholars for an internal audience, present the consensus viewpoints of China’s civilian state security apparatus on the grand questions of diplomacy, war, and economic development that in theory should be guiding the priorities of millions of cadres.

Most pages of Rise and Fall are devoted to individual case studies. There are chapter length discussions of imperial Spain and Portugal, the Netherlands, the British Empire, post-Meiji Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The chapter translated below attempts to synthesize the lessons of these case studies into a set of “general laws” [一般规律] with universal application.

These laws are not difficult to summarize: For the last five hundred years international relations have been characterized by intense competition between various great powers. Other things being equal, the relative strength of a state is a function of the territory, population, and natural resources it controls. Yet other things have not been equal. Since the advent of the scientific and commercial revolutions, technology has provided the most decisive advantage on the international stage. Power flows from prosperity. Prosperity, from productivity. Therefore, nations rise by successfully incorporating advanced technology into their national economy. Failure to catch the latest techno-scientific wave means stagnation, decline, and defeat.

Some elements of scientific development lie beyond the control of statesmen. Economic productivity diffuses geographically: the best way to predict whether a country will claim great scientists or build path breaking industries is whether its neighbors are doing the same thing. Nations thus do not rise alone, but in clusters. Successful development in these clusters always follows a specific pattern: foreign investment supports the creation of light industries with minimal capital requirements, such as textiles. The wealth generated by light industry can be invested in more capital-intensive heavy industries, such as steel. As productivity increases the tertiary sector of the economy begins to grow. By this point a rising nation should have the educational and technological infrastructure needed to become a hub of innovation in its own right.

Many failures in development are the result of deviations from this path. So it was with the Communist bloc during the Cold War, whose members unwisely tried to leap directly to the heavy industry stage of industrial development. Rise and Fall argues that the many developing nations that have prioritized political liberalization over industrialization have fallen victim to a similar trap.

 21st century China has avoided all traps. Blessed with enormous advantages in territory, population, and natural resources, integrated into the largest economic trade network in world history, governed by a stable center of rule, and having successfully ridden the development escalator to the frontiers of scientific discovery, the People’s Republic of China has mastered the arts of the rising power. The only thing it now lacks is outright technological supremacy.

Perhaps the most interesting aspects of this narrative are the things missing from it. There is no general discussion of military strategy and military technology; the trade-offs between force structure, readiness, and weapons development; or even the necessary balance between guns and butter. The rise and fall of great powers is not presented as a story of summits, alliances, security compacts, and international organizations, nor one of conquest and colonies. There is no mention of taxation, national debt, monetary policy, fiscal policy, or economic troubles—like financial crises or hyperinflation—that are not directly related to total factor productivity. Nor is there, outside of a few oblique references in the section lauding Xi-style centralized leadership, any mention of corruption, social cohesion, ethnic tensions, inter-elite conflict, or civil war. This chapter is likewise completely silent on the problems posed by espionage, psychological warfare, sabotage, or ideological subversion.

There are other sources, many authoritative, that discuss these other elements of national power at great length and even with great passion. It is nevertheless striking that a report on the rise and fall of great powers composed by Chinese intelligence analysts with the words “national security” in its title has so little to say about diplomacy, strategy, or spycraft. Rise and decline are understood in techno-industrial terms. Everything else is either a distraction from or a downstream consequence of that fundamental.

This analytical approach may have less to do with universal historical patterns than with the perception Chinese analysts have of their own country’s modern rise. The impoverished China of the 1970s did not become the strong China of the 2020s through military conquest or diplomatic acumen. Industrialization paved China’s path to greatness. It is natural for analysts who lived through this transformation to think of national power as a function of total factor productivity—and to find that lesson confirmed to them across the breadth of the historical record.

It is likewise natural for these analysts to link the economic triumphs of China’s recent past to a national telos for China’s country’s future. The obvious takeaway of this study is that China’s future will be determined by China’s ability to master and develop new technologies. International competition is technological competition. This competition must be resourced accordingly.7

In the actual annals of history there are many kingdoms and empires who achieved advantage by other means. Rise and Fall’s synthesis chapter has little to say about them. It offers no guidance to the great power whose economy falters or to the super-power that has fallen behind in the scientific race. It seems that the intellectual apparatus of the state security system lacks stock answers for those problems. Any Central Committee forced to return to traditional tools of diplomacy or defense to secure Chinese power will thus be improvising in uncharted territory. They will not be able to rely on the personal experience of its members to guide their actions—or any set of well-understood historical patterns.

—THE EDITORS

1. Zhongguo Xiandai Guoji Guanxi Yanjiuyuan 中国现代国际关系研究院 China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, Daguo Xingshuai yu Guojia Anquan 大国兴衰与国家安全 [National Security and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers] (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe 时事出版社 [Shishi Publishing], 2021), x.
2. The current president of CICIR is Yang Mingjie [楊明杰]; Yuan Peng [袁鹏] served as the president of CICIR from 2018 to 2023.  According to a Taiwanese news outlet, Yuan changed his name to Yuan Yikun [袁亦鲲] and was appointed deputy minister at the Ministry of State Security in March 2023. See Chen Kuan-yu 陳冠宇, “Zhongguo dui Mei zhuanjia Yuan Peng Gaiming Chu Ren Guo'anbu Fubuzhang 中國對美專家袁鵬改名 出任國安部副部長 [Chinese Expert on the United States Yuan Peng Changes Name and is Appointed Deputy Minister of the Ministry of State Security]," China Times 中时电子报, 8 August 2023; Russel Hsiao, "Personnel Changes at the PRC’s Organs for Taiwan Intelligence Analysis," Global Taiwan Brief Vol 8. Issue 16 (2023), 1-3. Though this appointment has not been confirmed by official sources, it is standard practice for MSS officials who have worked under aliases in the world of Chinese think tanks to revert to their real names upon advancing to a higher level position in the MSS. For examples, see Alex Joske, Spies and Lies (Melbourne: Hardy Grant Books, 2023), passim.  
3. Peter Mattis and Matthew Brazil, Chinese Communist Espionage: An Intelligence Primer (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2019), 57; “Profile of MSS-Affiliated PRC Foreign Policy Think Tank CICIR,” Open Source Center, 25 August 2011.
4. National Security in the Rise and Fall of Great Powers has nine contributors. All were employed by CICIR as analysts at the time the book was published. Zhang Yunchen [张运成] is the president of CICIR’s World Economics Studies Institute and the editor-in-chief of the book. Huang Ying [黄莺] is the vice president of the World Economics Studies Institute and specializes in global financial governance. Chen Wenxin [陈文鑫] is the acting president of the American Studies Institute and specializes in US-China relations, Asian-Pancific strategy, and American foreign policy. Zhao Xiongtu [赵宏图] is the department head of Energies Security Studies Center. Xu Gang [徐刚] is the acting department head of the Belt and Road Studies Center. Ni Jianjun [倪建军] is the acting president of the World Economics Studies Institute and specializes in economic security and international economic governance. Tang Qi [汤祺] is an analyst in the Northeastern Asia Studies Center. Li Yan [李艳] is the department head of the Cyber and Information Security Center and specializes in cyberspace governance. Shi Gang [石刚] is an analyst on piracy.  
The book does not specify the authorship of each chapter. Based on their expertise, this chapter is likely drafted by the CICIR team from the World Economics Studies Institute: Zhang Yunchen, Huang Ying, and Ni Jianjun.  
5. The series connects national security to six different areas of national concerns: Geography and National Security [地理与国家安全] (2021), History and National Security [历史与国家安全] (2021), Culture and National Security [文化与国家安全] (2021), Biosecurity and National Security [生物安全与国家安全] (2021), National Security and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers [大国兴衰与国家安全] (2021), and National Security and the Great Changes Unseen in a Century [百年变局与国家安全] (2021).
6. “Increasing our consciousness of calamity, and being vigilant during times of peace” [忧患意识,居安思危] is an ubiquitous phrase in CPC documents that captures an important aspect of the Party’s psyche. As one People’s Daily article puts it, “the Communist Party of China is a political party born from calamities, grown in calamities, and is becoming stronger from calamities.” This call for awareness of constant danger dates back to Mao Zedong, who admonished his cadres not to become complacent after the success of the revolution. Today, Xi quotes the phrases often to emphasize the challenges ahead. “The brighter the future, the more it is necessary to increase the awareness of potential calamities,” the People’s Daily quotes Xi. One “must be constantly prepared for danger in times of peace, and fully understand and be prepared for major risks and challenges.” For a discussion of the calamity consciousness from a party source, see Chen Shifa, “Zengqiang Youhuan Yishi 增强忧患意识 [Increase our Consciousness of Calamity],” Renmin Ribao 人民日报 [People’s Daily], November 2022.
7. The authors makes this point explicitly in the book's final chapter: 
As society develops the factors that determine the so-called life cycle of nations are not static. As we all know, today's society has entered the information age. The information revolution dominated by information and communication technology (ICT) is not only changing science, technology and the economy, but also is changing politics, the military and social life. Information superiority is becoming the commanding heights of competition in composite national strength. Although material hard power is the basis of composite national strength, soft power can become an ‘amplifier’ of composite national strength. Therefore.... the countries that can occupy leadership positions are not those with the most resources, but those that can control the political environment and make other countries ‘do what they want.’ Whoever leads a new round of scientific and technological revolution led by the information revolution will be able to occupy a leadership position in the future political landscape.
“随着社会的发展,决定所谓国家生命周期的要素并非一成不变。众所周知,当今社会已进入信息化时代,以信息和通信技术(ICT)为主的信息革命不仅改变着科技与经济,也改变着政治,军事和社会生活。信息优势正在成为综合国力竞争的制高点。物质形态的硬实力因素固然是综合国力的基础,但是软实力因素却可以成为综合国力的“倍增器”。因此,哈瑟夫·奈认为,“信息正在变成实力”,权力的性质已由“高资本含量”(capital rich)变为“高信息含量”(information rich)。能够占据领导地位的国家并不是拥有最多资源的国家,而是那些可以控制政治环境并使别国“做其所思”的国家。谁能领导以信息革命为主导的新一轮科技革命,谁就能在未来政治格局中占据领导地位。“ 
See China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, National Security and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers, 283.

Chapter Three: General Laws of the Rise of Great Powers

The rise and decline of great powers, with each power replacing the next in its turn, is a common phenomenon in human history. Innumerable expert scholars and elite thinkers have conducted thorough research and contemplation of this in an attempt to find deep underlying laws, but, thus far, there is no satisfactory solution to uphold as a standard. Nevertheless, history contains to some degree an internal causal logic, and there are shared characteristics in the path and the experience of nations that have risen in the past. For late developing countries with the necessary fundamental conditions the only way to seize the opportunity and realize such a rise is to absorb the experience of early developing countries and formulate strategies appropriate to both their own conditions and those of their age.

Achieving the status of a great power most often depends on population [levels], territory [size], natural resources, geographical location, economic power, military strength, soft power, and other factors of this sort. Among these, population, territory, and natural resources are the most fundamental factors.1 They are the material basis for determining whether a country has the potential to become a great power. But whether and to what extent that potential can be realized depends to a great extent on acquired strategies and favorable opportunities. A suitable national strategy can not only propel the rise of a great power and help it to avoid potential detours along the way, but it also has a bearing on whether a great power can hold on to its [great power] status. For example, after losing its status as the dominant global power Britain was able to hold onto its influence for several more decades. This was because they made the decision to play along with the United States rather than offering opposition. 

The more areas of superiority that a great power possesses, the greater its composite national strength will be, and the longer its age of prosperity will last. The outstanding advantages of Britain and the United States in the elements that confer superiority, such as scientific innovation and government efficiency, as well as their leadership, respectively, of the First and Second Industrial Revolutions, secured their status as unprecedented global superpowers.2 But American achievements were greater and their supremacy more outstanding. Apart from the benefits of latecomer's advantage, [America’s success] is due to a historical heritage that provided population, territory, and natural resources, which allowed it to benefit from economies of scale. However, if a great power is deficient in certain aspects, [these deficiencies] can be compensated by [strength] in other aspects. For instance, Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands had relatively small populations, but they relied on their overwhelming commercial and military superiority to become, at least for a time, dominant global powers. 

Great power status also depends on the conditions of international competition. Paul Kennedy, in his book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, says that the rise and fall of great powers is relative, and must be considered against the global situation and in comparison to the prospects of other nations.3 In the final decade of the 20th century, the collapse of the Soviet Union, formerly a peer competitor of the United States, gave its rival the unprecedented status of sole global superpower. China during the Song dynasty was considered to be the most advanced civilization in the world, and was at the pinnacle of scientific, technological, and economic power, but it was, unfortunately, reaching that status at a time when nomadic peoples were becoming the preeminent powers. The four main rivals of the Song, namely the Tangut people of the Western Xia, the Khitan of the Great Liao, the Jurchens of the Great Jin, and the Mongolians, had powerful cavalry forces that neutralized the wealth advantage of the agrarian great power, obstructing its potential rise as the overlord of a “global order under Chinese governance.”4 

Every Measurement Conforms to its Standard When Blessed By the Gifts of Nature


A poem by Qing dynasty poet Hong Liangji reads: “When blessed by all the gifts of nature, one's every measurement conforms to its standard / As perfect as the roundness of the moon.”5 This line about being exceptionally blessed by natural conditions refers to the superior factors and opportunities needed for success. As great powers rise, temporal, geographic, and demographic factors are all indispensable. Superior geography or demography, as well as other similar development factors, can sometimes be more important and have a more decisive influence than institutions and systems. There is no guarantee that these conditions will produce the rise of a great power; the lack of these fundamental conditions, however, necessarily precludes the possibility of the rise of a great power. When the level of science and technology [among competing powers] is similar, then geographic and demographic conditions become more important for ensuring the rise of a great power and for [that power’s ability to] persist over time.

There is Strength in Great Numbers

After Malthus proposed his “population theory,” international society has paid close attention to the potential negative impacts of population, believing that population growth can hinder the development of poor nations. However, in recent years more and more attention is being paid to the positive impact of population growth on development. Population and territory are important preconditions for the rise of a great power. Territory means natural resources and space for development; population represents a labor force and a market. Without exception, historical empires such as Persia, Rome, Macedonia, the Han, and the Tang had large populations and vast territory. Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands relied on extensive colonies, as well as their advantages in other areas, such as commercial capital, maritime navigation, and military power, but they quickly declined due to an insufficient population in their core territory and a lack of territory. In the industrial age, the division of labor in society became increasingly complex, with more demands made on the labor force and the market, making it difficult for countries lacking in population and territory to rise as great powers.

On the eve of the Industrial Revolution, the population of Britain was quite large. After the Industrial Revolution, Britain, having had the benefit of developing early, used the full potential of her population and natural resources. At the peak of its prosperity, Britain, which possessed only 2% of the global population, held more than 30% of global GDP, accounted for a fifth of global trade, and held two-fifths of manufacturing trade volume. However, as other Western countries successively industrialized, the limitations of Britain’s limited population and natural resources became apparent. British politician Leo Amery asked, “How can these little islands hold their own in the long run against such great and rich empires as the United States and Germany are rapidly becoming? How can we, with forty million people, compete with states nearly double our size?”6

The population of the United States was far greater in scale than that of England, France, Germany, and Japan, its territory was many times larger, and its prospects for population growth outstripped those of other developed nations. To a certain extent, if we say that the industrialization of Britain, Germany, France, and Japan were each driven by a single motor, the eastern, central, and western regions of the United States, with their population and land area, are equivalent to two, three, or more motors. Consequently, the time needed by the United States to complete full industrialization was longer, its economic prosperity of a longer duration, and its position as a great power and hegemonic power unprecedented. As Zbigniew Brzezinski says in The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, America is “the sole and, indeed, the first truly global power.”7

As the saying goes, “a small boat is easy to maneuver.” Japan, with its relatively low population, as well as minimal political and cultural resistance, was able to rapidly embark on industrialization after the Meiji Restoration. As a result of the advantages of early development, and using indemnities paid after the First Sino-Japanese War, international financing, and a technological crowding-out effect, Japan completed industrialization in a relatively short span of time and progressed to the ranks of developed nations. Much like Britain, Japan pulled off a miracle despite its small-scale population and territory and rose to become the second-largest economy in the world. But population and territory limited their space for growth, and as labor power, markets, and technology reached their limits, growth based on Japan's export-oriented economy was gradually exhausted, and after the 1990s it fell into a prolonged depression.

Population and territorial superiority allowed China to become the only one of the four great ancient civilizations to have continued to the present, and provided it with “a threshold for accommodation and an ability to absorb.” L. S. Stavrianos said that “being too large and cohesive to be conquered outright like India and the other countries of Southeast Asia, China was never to succumb entirely [to the Western challenge].”8 But it was precisely China’s massive population and deep-rooted traditional culture that provided great resistance to and delayed the beginning of the country’s early industrialization, which experienced numerous failed attempts and defeats. At the beginning of Reform and Opening, the population once again became a burden, and a certain amount of family planning policy was required to free China from the “poverty trap.” After the country's economic takeoff, the massive “demographic dividend” was considered a major factor in the Chinese miracle. At present, the “demographic dividend” has expired, but educational level and per-capita income will provide an unprecedented “talent dividend” and “market dividend.” Once a population of 1.3 billion people has grown wealthy, the result will be a supersized marketplace.

India’s massive population and expansive territory gave its civilization an important position in the ancient world, but these [factors] also became a burden at the beginning of industrialization. In early 2020, the Indian economy surpassed those of England and France, becoming the fifth-largest in the world. Goldman Sachs projects that India will have the third-largest economy in the world by 2040.9 As countries in Europe and East Asia face increasingly grave issues with aging and shrinking populations, India’s population numbers and [age] composition present massive advantages and potential. They can rely on “a continued abundance in their youth cohort.” [As] the American scholar [Fareed] Zakaria says: “If demography is destiny then India is secure.”10

Neighbors Are Dearer Than Distant Relatives11

Considering the economic achievements of China after Reform and Opening, University of Wisconsin-Madison professor Edward Friedman said that one of the important factors was that China was “located in East Asia and not East Africa.”12 Here he is emphasizing the importance of the environment on China’s periphery to China's rise. After Reform and Opening, China [joined] a trend of postwar development in East Asia. To a certain extent China’s economic achievements are due to the collective rise of the region—beginning with Japan's modernization and the accomplishment of postwar industrialization, spreading to the Four Asian Tigers, and then turning into an industrialization wave that reached China's shores and gradually spread inland.

There is usually a fair deal of friction between neighboring countries, but at the level of civilizational and economic development, it is often the case that “neighbors are dearer than distant relatives.” Historically, the great majority of ancient and powerful states were concentrated on the Eurasian Continent, and they tended to rise and fall in sequence and as groups. After the Industrial Revolution, the main developed countries were found in Europe and North America. Looking at the rise and fall of many great powers, we see the cluster effect and peripheral diffusion effect quite strongly in economic development and civilizational progress. This is seen even more clearly in the collective rise of East Asia, or the arrival of what is called the “Asia-Pacific century.” The course of China’s Belt and Road Initiative provides further evidence [for this fact].

The “takeoff” of Europe was also a collective process. The rise of Venice and other Italian city-states, Portugal, Spain, and Holland provided an economic core and a stable foundation for the collective rise of Europe. The British economy rose on a foundation of trade with countries on the coast of the Atlantic. It was part of an Atlantic economy. After the Industrial Revolution, British capital leaped beyond the English Channel and spread to France and other Western European regions. In the same time period, modern manufacturing made landfall in North America; to a certain extent, the economy of the United States represents an inheritance and continuation of the British economy. Europe provided funding, labor, technology, and a market for the United States. In the late 19th century, the backward countries of Europe caught up with advanced countries in Europe and North America without interruption, and the Atlantic economies experienced a collective takeoff.

After the midpoint of the 20th century, Japan was the destination for much of the manufacturing capacity transferred out of the United States, and it entered a period of high-speed growth. At the end of the 20th century, China became another “factory of the world.” In the 1950s and 1960s, New China received the support of the Soviet Union to build enterprises and facilities, building a foundation for the later “takeoff.” Reform and Opening at the end of the 1970s can be seen as another stop on the westward march of industrialization. “The meeting of the westward and eastward advances of industrialization created the ‘Chinese miracle.’”

Over the previous five centuries, there have been three structural power shifts, as well as the successive rise of great powers and their [respective] regional communities. The first power shift came with the rise of Europe. The second power shift was the rise of America and its allies. Currently, the international community, following a “flying geese paradigm,” with the Asia-Pacific region at the head of a “V” formation, is undergoing a third modern power shift. As the Belt and Road Initiative gathers momentum, people expect to see the collective rise of the Belt and Road countries. In The Silk Roads: A New History of the World, Peter Frankopan writes: “The world is spinning on its axis back to where it began a thousand years before on the Silk Road.”13

Craft a High-Quality Friend Circle

Looking back over the last five centuries at the temporal and spatial sequence with which great powers rose, late developing great powers were either neighbors of great powers that rose before them, or they were the "distant relatives" or friends, namely states with which they had a close relationship based on shared cultural, political, or other relationship–for example, the relationship between a tributary state and the suzerain, or between states in an alliance. Social and political proximity has a major impact on trade and investment; similar cultural environments make it easier to pass knowledge and technology. In The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia, Eric Jones takes the rise of Europe’s overseas dependencies as proof that [shared] elements, such as culture and political systems, can to a great extent make up for the geographical distance. The examples of this include America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and even South Africa, which all realized industrialization. It was because of large differences between their culture and political systems that the [wildfire of] European industrialization “abruptly died” at “the asbestos edge of the Muslim sphere.”14

Japan has submitted to Western civilization; apart from Japan's own “abandon Asia, learn from Europe” strategy,15 the great strategic importance attached to the country and the support extended to them by the United States had a major role in the rise of Japan. After the country was opened up by the United States Japan became an American export market and shipping depot. After that Japan became an increasingly important element of America’s international strategy. Following the Second World War, Japan started to receive support from America to counterbalance Eastern powers; economic aid, direct investment, and favored access to American markets were the most important external causes of Japan's rapid development.

During the period when Western powers took the dominant position in economics, science, and technology, estrangement or even antagonism caused many countries to lose timely opportunities for development. Argentina's missed opportunities to achieve economic success are considered to be related to its unwise diplomatic alliances. As Dambisa Moyo points out in Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth—and How to Fix It: “Among the biggest policy errors occurred when Argentina failed in 1944 to align itself with the United States, which was beginning its economic ascendancy. Instead, its leaders chose to align with Britain, just then commencing its economic decline.”16 After the Second World War, countries in Eastern Europe and elsewhere joined the Soviet camp, pursuing Soviet-style industrialization, and thereby distancing themselves from the center of global markets and core technologies.

The State that Esteems Industry will Increase in Wisdom Day by Day17


Economic growth is a prerequisite to and a necessary foundation for the rise of a great power; this is one of the greatest challenges faced by great powers in maintaining their status. Paul Kennedy, in his book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, emphasizes that the rise and fall of a great power comes down most decisively to relative economic power over other nations. In the era of agricultural economies, the great powers of the world were usually those with a high degree of agricultural development. After the Age of Discovery, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and other countries with limited population and territory rose in succession, relying on commercial and military power that had no previous precedents. After the arrival of industrial society, a timely realization of industrialization became a precondition for the rise of great powers. For a modern economy to be prosperous and strong it requires a powerful, diversified, and creative manufacturing industry.

Manufacturing can Rejuvenate a Nation

The manufacturing industry is the source of technological innovation and the force behind economic growth. In comparison to pre-industrial society, the Industrial Revolution produced astonishing increases in productivity. From the first year of the common era to 1400 the annual growth of the global economy was on average only 0.05%. In contrast, in the Netherlands during the 17th century, post-Industrial Revolution Britain, the United States during the 19th century, and the East Asian economies during the second half of the 20th century had average respective growth rates of 0.5%, 2%, 4%, and 8-10%, respectively. Before the 15th century, it took 1400 years for the global economy to double in size, but it took the East Asian economies only seven or eight years to pull off the same feat in the 20th century.

By the end of the 18th century, Britain had already established the foundations for industrialization, not only in the form of artisans’ workshops but also a highly-regarded shipbuilding industry, and its pig iron production accounting for around 15% of world output. By 1870, Britain possessed a third of the world's manufacturing output.

Owing to its unparalleled natural endowments and immigration and investment from Europe, the American economy was quite large from its founding. After the Civil War, the United States rapidly carried out the process of industrialization. In 1870, the United States accounted for less than a quarter of the world's manufacturing capacity, but that rose to around 36% by the 1880s. In the century that followed, America held onto its hegemony over global manufacturing.

Germany’s takeoff came in the final three decades of the 19th century when it completed the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy. On the foundation of coal, iron, and other traditional pillar industries, the chemical and electrical industries also quickly developed; Germany became a global leader in the chemical industry, producing half of the world's synthetic fuel. Despite the distorted development of military industrialization under Hitler and the postwar division of the country, Germany recovered its status as a major manufacturing power and a major trading power following the reunification of the country in 1990.

Changes in the proportion of global manufacturing held by individual powers are reflected in shifts in the patterns of development of great powers. In 1750, China produced a third of global finished goods, putting it in first place ahead of India. Around 1860, Britain overtook China; America captured the top spot in 1900, followed by England and Germany in second and third place, respectively. In 1953, the system had shifted so that the manufacturing industry was captured [entirely] by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain. However, America still [had a commanding lead], outstripping Soviet production by four times or more. In 1980, the United States and the Soviet Union were still out ahead, but Japan overtook Britain for third place.

Becoming a major manufacturing power provides crucial security for the goal of realizing the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation. At the founding of New China, the country was fundamentally a grindingly poor and backward agricultural nation.18 China has now become the foremost industrial power in the world. The modern industrial system of China is the most comprehensive, encompassing forty-one major industrial categories, and producing over two hundred of the top five hundred industrial products in the world. In 2010, China surpassed the United States in manufacturing value-added, and by 2018, the Chinese manufacturing industry commanded 28% of global output. The fundamental national conditions produced by becoming a major industrial power support the realization of the Two Centenary Goals.19 At the gathering to celebrate the 40th anniversary of Reform and Opening, General Secretary Xi Jinping stated that becoming the foremost manufacturing power was necessary for “the Chinese people to take a decisive step on their journey towards wealth and strength.”20

Conforming to the Laws of Industrialization

In the modern sense, economic development usually means a transition from agriculture to low-tech industry, then on to high-tech industries and service industries. Each country's path to industrialization is not identical, but they conform to a similar law of industrial progress, usually developing industry in a sequence that begins with food, moves next to textiles, then machinery, chemicals, electronics, and so on, developing around these focal points in turn. As primary, secondary, and tertiary industries evolve successively to take the main position in social production, the dominant industry also upgrades gradually from labor-intensive to capital- and technology-intensive. In the industrialization of developed nations, light industry usually develops first, followed by heavy industry.

Many late developing countries became impatient for results, rearranged this development sequence, and wandered off the path [of industrialized development]. After the October Revolution, the Soviet Union continued its process of industrialization under a planned economy. In the first Five-Year Plan, issued in 1929, the emphasis was on developing coal, iron and steel, and other industries, mobilizing the natural resources of the entire country toward heavy industrialization. Although Soviet industrialization achieved some degree of success, there were imbalances owing to the fact that forceful government intervention was excessively focused on heavy industry. After its founding, New China mimicked the Soviet Union's planned economy and emphasis on heavy industry. In the 1950s, the process of industrialization was delayed by the arrival of the Great Leap Forward, which destroyed China’s agricultural foundation.21 Industrialization began with heavy industry, but due to distortions in the process of distributing the essential factors of production and excessive political interference, it was hard to sustain.

However, for newly industrializing countries, following the law of industrial development–in which light industry follows heavy industry and there is progressive step-by-step development–has proven a crucial element of success. At the beginning of the 1980s, China also gave up on the strategy of prioritizing heavy industry, allowing light industry to develop rapidly. In the 1990s, the Chinese electronic information industry was one of the fastest growing industrial sectors. From the end of the 1990s, China entered a stage of heavy industrialization, with heavy industry outstripping the expansion of light industry.

Integrating With the International Industrial Chain

One important prerequisite for the industrialization of late-developing countries is successfully taking on labor-intensive industries for international markets. Based on its natural resources, close cultural ties, and convenient maritime links with Europe, and especially its powerful economic momentum, the United States became in the second half of the 19th century the largest beneficiary of the overseas transfer of manufacturing from Britain. In 1914, the United States ranked first place globally in terms of the scale of capital input, with British bond investment accounting for 85.9% of foreign investment. After this international transfer of industry, America gradually became the new “factory of the world.”

After the United States established itself as the global economic, industrial, and technological leader, it undertook a program of industrial restructuring, which saw the manufacture of iron and steel, textiles, chemicals, ships, common industrial machinery, and other similar products move overseas. Although they had a lower level of development, relatively good foundations for development and strategic relationships with the United States meant that Japan and West Germany became the destination for American manufacturing. They quickly became top global suppliers of labor-intensive manufactured goods. Consequently, the pace of industrialization in these two countries increased with tremendous speed, and their composite national strength rapidly grew. Japan became yet another “factory of the world,” and West Germany became a major economic power.

In the 1970s, it was Japan's outbound transfer of the labor-intensive textile and other light industries, as well as capital-intensive industries, like iron and steel, chemicals, and shipbuilding that created the economic miracle of the Four Asian Tigers. The scope of the economic systems of the Four Asian Tigers was small, however, and the pace of industrial upgrading was rapid, which meant th fat taking up high-tech manufacturing from Japan required them, too, to start moving labor-intensive industries overseas. It was at this time that China, vigorously pursuing Reform and Opening, and with the advantage of low costs and geographic advantages, became the main destination for labor-intensive industry transfers from the Four Asian Tigers. Through actively promoting the domestic market economy, actively calling for foreign investment, and taking advantage of a relatively good industrial foundation, China's industrialization process experienced a remarkable acceleration; China became another “factory of the world.”

The aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis set off a new round of global industrial transfers. China became a major exporting country and also a recipient; excepting central and western regions in China, much of the industrial transfer was directed toward countries along the Belt and Road. There is hope that the Belt and Road countries might synchronize with Asia, which has high rates of economic and trade growth. Estimates hold that the average annual GDP growth rate of the Belt and Road countries will be significantly higher than the global average, opening up the hopeful possibility of a new global economic growth area. 

Take the Initiative in Innovation


Scientific and technological innovation is a key force for economic growth, and it serves as a crucial indicator of the actual strength of a great power. Prior to the 1950s, the contribution of scientific and technological progress to the economies of developed countries was 20-40%, rising to 60-80% in the 1960s. Between 2001 and 2009, the value added for high tech industries in the manufacturing sector in the United States went from 17% to 21.3%.22 For late developing countries, copying and assimilating advanced technologies from developed countries is key to their rise as a nation, but becoming the dominant global power requires the assistance of revolutionary scientific and technological innovations, as occurred in the United States and Britain following their respective scientific and technological revolutions.

Science and Technology Sustain the Rise of Nations

Economic development ultimately relies on obtaining and mastering advanced science and technology. Putting science and technology to use has become increasingly important since the Age of Discovery. As Adam Smith pointed out, the division of labor and the expansion of markets stimulate technological innovation; the wealth of nations is increased through greater labor productivity [produced by the division of labor and technology]. Robert Solow, winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, holds the belief that, in the long-term, the only source of economic growth is industrial progress.23 Seven-eighths of the growth in the per capita GDP of the United States during the first half of the 20th century can be attributed to technological progress.

Geographical power shifts among great powers often follow shifts among the centers of scientific and technological development. The well-known American historian William H. McNeill believes that the Islamic world was far more scientifically and technologically advanced between 750 and 1100 AD than Europe.24 After the year 1000, China became the global leader in science and technology. By the 15th century, the global center of science and technology began to shift to the Mediterranean region and Europe. Although the entire population of Portugal was equal only to that of Nanjing, that country's maritime fleet had military coercive power that far exceeded Zheng He's armada. After the Age of Discovery, the West rose, and Italy, Britain, France, Germany, America, and other nations successively became global techno-scientific centers.25

In the middle 16th century, a number of important thinkers in natural philosophy emerged in the city-states of Italy, transforming them into centers of scientific activity. Through the 16th and 17th centuries a number of thinkers in Britain burst forth, including William Gilbert, Robert Boyle, Isaac Newton, Edmond Halley, and others, who initiated a number of modern scientific disciplines, including physics, chemistry, and physiology. From the mid-18th to mid-19th centuries, France produced a great number of scientific thinkers, including Jean le Rond d'Alembert and Pierre Simon Marquis de Laplace, who made outstanding contributions in a number of fields, including thermodynamics, chemistry, and celestial mechanics, which would provide the theoretical foundation for the internal combustion revolution and the chemical revolution. From the 1820s forward German science advanced by leaps and bounds. Germany became the world leader in disciplines such as organic chemistry and particle physics. In the 1920s, the United States, taking advantage of the revolution in information technology, replaced Germany as the global scientific center, and took a position at the front line of scientific progress. 

At present, the major global science and technology centers are concentrated in the developed nations of Europe and North America, but trends show a shift toward the Asia-Pacific region. Japanese scientific and technological power remains impressive, but developing economies are claiming a greater proportion of research and development, which has led to an enhanced capacity for technological innovation. Pan Jiaofeng, President of the Institutes of Science and Development of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, is among those who have pointed out that a new round of techno-scientific revolution and industrial transformation is currently being fermented, which will provide China with the opportunity to become the center of global science and technology and the world leader in techno-scientific development.26

Lead in High Technology Industries

Economically successful nations generally place a high degree of emphasis on scientific and technological innovation. [For example,] when 18th century Britain became a technological leader it rapidly became a powerful European, Continental, and world power. In 2012, the United States, Japan, and Germany accounted, respectively, for 26.44, 22.35, and 9.61% of patent applications under the Patent Cooperation Treaty. Scientific and technological development emerges from a wide range of industrial practices and commercial drivers. Wen Yi, a professor at Tsinghua University, believes that “So long as a nation steps out onto the road of Industrial Revolution and becomes the factory of the world, it has the possibility of becoming the world leader in technological innovation. But if an industrialized nation abandons its manufacturing industry, it will very likely come by degrees to lose its technological advantage and capacity for innovation.”27

American science and technology has always been considered formidable and is renowned as among the best in the world. Many of the most important inventions in human history, including the incandescent bulb, the cotton gin, universal machine parts, and the production line came from the United States. Vaclav Smil writes in his Made in the USA: The Rise and Retreat of American Manufacturing: “[America's] enormous post-1865 leap was primarily driven by technical advances. These developments made the United States not only the largest mass producer of goods but also the leader in commercializing new inventions, setting up entirely new industries, introducing new ways of production, and raising labor productivity. More than a century later the country, and the world, still continue to benefit from many of those epoch-making advances.”28

Presently, the United States faces many problems in economic growth, but it is still the preeminent global power in science and technology. In informatization, aerospace, artificial intelligence, medicine, military technology, and other high-tech industries, the United States has overwhelming technical superiority. American research and development expenditures are the highest in the world, and the country has a strong foundation in basic scientific research and abundant resources in scientific and technical manpower. Between 1901 and 2019, a total of 613 scientists received the Nobel Prize, among which 287 were American citizens. Americans have a near monopoly on the Turing Award in computer science, and the country is home to 59% of researchers in artificial intelligence. The United States also claims forty of the world's top hundred universities, as well as the majority of the top technology companies.

Drawing on the capital, expertise, and equipment of early developing countries is the main way that late developing countries can rapidly close the technology gap. In 1789, when Briton Samuel Slater went to the United States and built from memory his own version of Richard Arkwright's spinning jenny, his machine kicked off the beginning of modern American industrialization.29 In the middle 19th century, German and American railways were only opened by importing British equipment and capital. In the early years of the Soviet Union, Lenin's New Economic Policy leased certain enterprises to management from America, Japan, and other countries. During the first Five-Year Plan, Stalin engaged experts from America, Germany, and other countries as advisers on key enterprises. After the Second World War, Japan imported advanced technology from Britain and America; they would sometimes go so far as to dismantle Western products in order to reverse engineer the designs. In the manufacture of some products, like automobiles, optical equipment, precision instruments, and precision machine tools, Japan's style of imitation led to great success.

For long periods of time, China was the global leader in science and technology, but it has missed out on the techno-scientific revolutions of the past five hundred years. New China is an example of a country catching up from behind in science and technology, with the country making outstanding achievements in high-tech fields, with the Two Bombs, One Satellite project as one example.30 In recent years, China has pulled off quantum leaps in numerous fields, including digital information technology, 5G, and artificial intelligence, accelerating its progress into the ranks of the global leaders in science and technology. Among patents approved globally in 2017, China claimed 30%, with the United States taking 23%, Japan 14%, South Korea 9%, and Europe 8%. Beginning in 2007, China began to award more doctorates in the natural sciences and engineering each year than the United States does.

China still has a not insignificant gap to close with the United States in the fields of science and technology, but the [Chinese] growth rate is rapid and there is potential for development. Between 2000 and 2017, China's research and development expenditures grew at an average of 17.3%, easily beating the American rate of 4.3%. In their book Created in China: How China is Becoming a Global Innovator, Georges Haour and Max von Zedtwitz point out: "China’s pragmatic and entrepreneurial spirit, massive investment in R&D, compounded by its Confucian tradition and the extensive use of the Internet by its urban population, means that the country is about to become a major country for innovation.”31

Rough Seas Reveal the Strength of the Mast32


Since the 1980s, the ideas of neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus have been widely disseminated, and developed countries demanded that developing nations adopt what are termed “good policies” and “good institutions” in the interests of economic development. But in actual practice, these sorts of policies and institutions [can only be] the result of industrialization. For late developing countries in the process of rising as a great power, a stable government and good social order play a larger role in the process of industrialization than “Western-style democracy.” Many of those countries that blindly accepted the Washington Consensus did not merely fail to grow their economies but sank into political turmoil.

Strong and Effective Government

In Political Order in Changing Societies, Samuel Huntington points out that in third world countries, the process of modernization, economic development, and socio-cultural transformation take priority.33 Political modernization is only possible with their realization. Those countries that attempt to jump forward to a modern Western system in a short period of time  ignore the reality that political modernization is a gradual process. They inevitably discover that attempting to accelerate the process paradoxically leads to delays. The transition from tradition to modernity requires a strong government, namely a government with the ability to balance political participation against political institutionalization. “In terms of observable behavior, the crucial distinction between a politically developed society and an underdeveloped one is the number, size, and effectiveness of its organizations.”

In The Mystery of Economic Growth, Elhanan Helpman says that a powerful political system supports national development and economic growth, and that longer-lasting regimes are better for the creation of policy that accelerates growth.34 In developing countries, a lack of reliable government administration, law enforcement, and justice usually leads to terrible economic outcomes. As Dambisa Moyo notes in Edge of Chaos: “In 2014, violence cost the global economy US $14.3 trillion—or 13.4 percent of world GDP.”35 One of the key reasons given for Argentina's "steep decline" since the 1930s is that “over a fifty-year period, between 1930 and the mid-1970s, Argentina had six military coups.”

As well as promoting economic growth, stable governments are more likely to make long-term investments in things like public services and infrastructure. Zakaria points out that the stories of development in Japan, the United States, Europe, and China share a single thread, which is strong and reliable political institutions. “The Chinese government enjoys a high rate of popular support,” Zakaria writes, “which helps make it possible to carry out designated strategies.”36 He notes the comments of a senior Indian government official: “We have to do many things that are politically popular but are foolish. They depress our long-term economic potential. But politicians need votes in the short term. China can take the long view. And while it doesn't do everything right, it makes many decisions that are smart and far-sighted.”

An Open and Inclusive Strategy for Foreign Relations 

Since at present globalization is still far from complete, and national boundaries and geography remain boundaries to the flow of key elements [of the economy], openness is crucial for the economic growth of late developing countries. There is a positive correlation between economic growth and many indexes of openness to trade; there is a negative correlation between disruptions of free trade and economic growth; and countries open to trade tend to grow at twice the rate of countries that adopt a closed-door policy. In Whither the World: The Political Economy of the Future, Grzegorz Kołodko points out that closed economies are not able to grow quickly over the long term.37 Looking at the rise and fall of great powers gives us ample proof that "tolerance" is an essential condition for the rise of great powers, and "isolation" inevitably leads to decline.

Reform and Opening has been the magic formula in China's modernization drive. In General Secretary Xi Jinping's report at 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, he spoke about “promoting a new [development] pattern of opening-up on all fronts”; he emphasized that “openness brings progress, while self-seclusion leaves one lagging behind,” and “China will not close its doors to the world but will only open them wider”; and he concluded that “China adheres to the fundamental national policy of opening up and pursues development with its doors open wider.”38 At a November, 12th, 2020 celebration of the 30th anniversary of Pudong's development and opening-up, General Secretary Xi Jinping went a step further, calling for the need to promote high quality institutional opening up, to further open up the door to the country, so that every nation might partake of the opportunities provided by China's development, and to actively participate in global economic governance.39

The United States was once a country with a high degree of openness. From the westward march of technology to explosive industrial development, and then in its victory in the Second World War, immigrants have contributed to the advancement and success of the United States. America's victory in the race to the development of the atomic bomb is inseparable from the fact that it was able to attract immigrant scientists from Europe. At the dawn of the computer age, the United States gained its position as the [world’s] technological and economic leader through this same ability to attract talent from around the world. Silicon Valley produced one of the greatest explosions of wealth in human history, and the creativity of immigrants was crucial to that story, too.

But Yale professor Amy Chua says that the United States is “losing this excellent quality, and its dominance faces an unprecedented threat.”40 Zakaria claims: American politics is now beyond cure, mired in factional struggle, and increasingly inefficient.41 With Trump's victory came the popularity of the slogan "America first"; this meant vigorous trade protectionism and active restrictions on immigration. The reversal of the open-door policy is another step down the road to America losing its status as a great power.

Build a Strong Leadership Core42

Leaders in the development of history can play important functions, directly affecting the trajectory and velocity of a rising great power. Engels pointed out that authority is a universal phenomenon in human behavior.43 The "cobweb model" of political science proves that even the most complex web has a core.44 Huntington believes that modernization requires authority with a transformative capacity, and authority must be concentrated in the hands of certain powerful individuals or groups.45

Leaders can play a key role at turning points in history. Behind the rise of many great powers were important individuals and leaders who were capable of transforming the fate of the nation. Liu Xinru of the theory department of People's Liberation Army Daily argues that a strong leadership core is a crucial element for the rise of a great power.46 This is particularly true in critical periods when a strong leadership core and a leader capable of making history is indispensable. 

After Portugal and Spain emerged from feudal division and became unified nation-states, there emerged strong central governments and monarchical powers. Portugal sponsored seafarers to explore new territory in the name of the state, and voyages of discovery became a planned and organized national strategy. Prince Henry [the Navigator] created the first state-run school for maritime navigation in human history and built a world-class armada. After Spain became a unified nation-state, Queen Isabella planned ambitious maritime expeditions and even sold her jewels to fund Columbus's expedition.

Britain built the most powerful navy in Europe with the support of Queen Elizabeth. King Louis XIV of France established absolute monarchical power, transforming the country from a disunited feudal aristocracy into a great and powerful nation. Bismarck, the “Iron Chancellor” of Germany, implemented social reforms, propelling Germany's composite national strength to become the strongest in continental Europe. Peter the First, Tsar of Russia, initiated an epoch-making modernization movement for which he is remembered as the "greatest ruler" in Russian history. In the Meiji Restoration, Japan abrogated the authority of a hereditary aristocracy, reinforced central authority, and forced through political, economic, and social reforms. Japan’s rise to great power status was the final result [of these centralizing reforms].

George Washington, the first president of the United States, had an important role in many aspects of the establishment and founding of the country. In 1787 he presided over the Constitutional Convention that gave the country the basic law that is still in use today, and established the authority of the president as the head of state.Thomas Jefferson, the founder of the Democratic Party, drafted the Declaration of Independence, and through diplomatic and other methods nearly doubled the territory of the United States. Abraham Lincoln won victory in the Civil War and issued the Emancipation Proclamation, preserving the integrity of the federation. Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal saved the United States from the abyss of economic crisis, allowing it to win the Second World War and become a superpower.

Historically, countries without a strong leadership core often fall into the "Bismarck trap."47 After the Franco-Prussian War, Bismarck, attempting to isolate and weaken France, advocated France adopt a multi-party republican system, believing that an unstable republican system would turn France into an unstable volcano. Between 1875 and 1940, France was ruled by 102 separate administrations, each lasting an average of five months, with two lasting a single day. The Soviet Union collapsed for a complex set of reasons, but one of the most important was the loss of authority by the ruling party.48

“Among majestic mountains, the great peak stands out.” Establishing a strong leadership core for the Party was one of the great lessons of revolutionary victory. “Without Mao Zedong,” Deng Xiaoping proclaimed with great emotion, “the Chinese people would have been forced to grope in the dark for much longer.”49 The historic achievements made by the Party and the country since the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party are fundamentally linked to the ability of the o, with Xi Jinping as its core, to steer the ship of state. At a crucial moment for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation, General Secretary Xi Jinping demonstrated a self-confident political will, and made farsighted strategic decisions, showing his willingness to take on the role of “the guiding spirit” and the “strong mast in rough seas.”

Bibliography

1. [UK] Paul Kennedy, translated by Wang Baozun et al. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. Published by CITIC Press in 2013.

2. [US] Samuel P. Huntington, translated by Wang Guanhua et al. Political Order in Changing Societies. Published by Lifelong·Reader·New Knowledge Joint Publishing Co., Ltd. in 1989.

3. [US] Jared Diamond, translated by Luan Qi. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. Published by CITIC Press in 2017.

4. [US] Zbigniew Brzezinski, translated by China Institute of International Studies. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. Published by Shanghai People's Publishing House in 1998.

5. [US] L. S. Stavrianos, translated by Wu Xiangying, Liang Chimin, Dong Shuhui, Wang Chang. A Global History: From Prehistory to the 21st Century. Published by Peking University Press in 2006.

6. [US] Fareed Zakaria, translated by Zhao Guangcheng, Lin Minwang. The Post-American World: The Rise of the Rest. Published by CITIC Press in 2009.

7. [US] Amy Chua, translated by Liu Haiqing, Yang Liwu. Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance - and Why They Fall. Published by New World Press in 2010.

8. [US] Tonio Andrade, translated by Zhang Xiaoduo. The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History. Published by CITIC Press in 2019.

9. [US] Dambisa Moyo, translated by Wang Yuqing. Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth—and How to Fix It. Published by CITIC Press in 2019.

10. [US] Vaclav Smil, translated by Li Fenghai, Liu Yinlong. Made in the USA: The Rise and Retreat of American Manufacturing. Published by China Machine Press in 2014.

11. [US] William H. McNeill, translated by Sun Yue, Chen Zhijian, Yu Zhan. The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community. Published by CITIC Press in 2018.

12. [UK] Eric Jones, translated by Chen Xiaobai. The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia. Published by Huaxia Publishing House in 2015.

13. [UK] Zhang Xiazhun, translated by Yan Rong. The Hypocrisy of Wealth: The Myth of Free Trade and the Hidden History of Capitalism. Published by Social Sciences Academic Press in 2009.

14. [Poland] Grzegorz W. Kolodko, translated by Long Yun'an. Whither the World: The Political Economy of the Future. Published by Central Compilation and Translation Press in 2015.

15. [Japan] Kenichi Ohmae, translated by Zhu Yuewei. A Society of Stagnation: How Protectionism and the Anti-Globalization Crisis Can Be Addressed. Published by Beijing Times-Huawen Publishing House in 2019.

16. Zhang Fan. Industrial Shift: The Geographical Migration of World Manufacturing and Central Markets. Published by Peking University Press in 2019.

17. Wen Yi. The Great Industrial Revolution in China: A Critique of the General Principles of 'Developmental Political Economy.' Published by Tsinghua University Press in 2016.

1. See glossary for COMPOSITE NATIONAL STRENGTH.
2. Historians often divide the industrial revolution into two waves of innovation: the First Industrial Revolution, which saw the application of steam power to mechanized work, occurred roughly between the late 18th century and the mid-19th century, beginning in Britain. The Second Industrial Revolution occurred roughly between the mid-19th century and early 20th century. It was marked by further advancements in technology, particularly in the areas of steel production, electrification, fossil fuel use, and chemical manufacturing. This period also saw the rise of large-scale industrial corporations and the expansion of industrialization to other countries beyond Britain, notably the United States and Germany.
3. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987). 
4. The Xia, Liao, and Jin were all founded by non-Han ethnic groups that rose to power on China's periphery contemporaneously with the Song Dynasty. The Western Xia (1038-1227 AD) was located in what is today the the northwest of China. The Liao Dynasty (907 to 1125 AD) controlled a vast territory in present-day Northeast China, Mongolia, and portions of Russia. The Jin Dynasty (1115 to 1234 AD) conquered the Liao Dynasty in 1125 and then ended the Northern Song period in 1127,  establishing control over all of northern China. The Mongols conquered the remainder of the Song Dynasty in 1279, marking the end of the Southern Song period and the beginning of the Yuan Dynasty in China.
These comments on the Song Dynasty's relative lack of military power passage despite its economic brilliance appear to closely parallel a passage from Tonio Andrade’s The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History. To quote:
Recent work on Song history shows that the Song didn’t neglect war nearly as much as this argument would suggest… So how do we resolve the puzzle of the Song’s inability to prevail? The answer has less to do with the weakness of the Song than with the strength of its enemies. Over its 319 years, the Song faced four primary foes. The most famous (and deadly) was the Mongol Empire, which didn’t just overpower the Song: its conquests stretched from Kiev to Baghdad, Kabul to Kaifeng. Before the Mongols, the Song faced other implacable enemies from Central and Northern Asia: the Tanguts of the Xi Xia dynasty, the Khitans of the Liao dynasty, and the Jurchens of the Jin dynasty.  [...] As Paul Jakov Smith writes, ‘The rapid evolution of Inner Asian statecraft in the tenth to thirteenth centuries allowed states on the northern frontier to support formidable armies that offset agrarian China’s advantages in wealth and numbers, hereby blocking [the] Song from assuming a position of supremacy at the center of a China-dominated world order and relegating it to a position of equal participant in a multi-state East Asian system.’
Tonio Andrade, The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 25-26. 
5. All the section titles are idioms, famous quotes, sayings, or excerpts from classical Chinese literature. 
The stanza, “When blessed by all the gifts of nature, one's every measurement conforms to its standard / As perfect as the roundness of the moon” is excerpted from Book II of “Poetry and Discourse from North of the River” [北江诗话] by Hong Liangji [洪亮吉]  (1746-1809).  
6. This quote is taken from Fareed Zakaria’s 2008 article in Foreign Affairs, “The Future of American Power.” See Fareed Zakaria, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 3 (2008): 18–43.
7. The Chinese is not an exact quote of Brzezinski's. The closest line to this quotation in The Grand Chessboard is the following: “The defeat and collapse of the Soviet Union was the final step in the rapid ascendance of a Western Hemisphere power, the United States, as the sole and, indeed, the first truly global power.” See Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997), xii. 
8. The author are likely paraphrasing the following section from L. S. Stavrianos’ A Global History: From Prehistory to the 21st Century: “China, by contrast, was unable to reorganize itself to meet the Western challenge. Yet, being too large and cohesive to be conquered outright like India and the other countries of Southeast Asia, China was never to succumb entirely." The argument that China's size allowed it to assimilate invaders is not found in Stavrianos' bok. L. S. Stavrianos, A Global History: From Prehistory to the 21st Century (New York: Pearson, 1998). 
9. Goldmsn Sachs still stands by this prediction. See Goldman Sachs, “How India Could Rise to the World’s Second Biggest Economy,” 6 July 2023. 
10. Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: WW Norton, 2008), 132.  
11. The idiom “[close] neighbors are dearer than distant relatives” originates from Book IV of Yuan Dynasty play Dong Tang Lao [东堂老], authored by Qin Jianfu [秦简夫]. 
12. CST editors could not locate the original source of this quotation. But the same view is a commonplace in Chinese international relations scholarship. For example, see Yan Xuetong, “Diplomacy Should Focus on Neighbors,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 27, 2015. 
13. Peter Frankopan, The Silk Roads: A New History of the World (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), xiv.
14. This quotation from Eric Jones’ 1981 book The European Miracle has been modified to better fit within the text, but th description of the Muslim world as "asbestos"perhaps only make sense with a much larger excerpt:.

Nothing is clearer than that the fires of modernisation and industrialisation in Britain and Belgium and the Rhineland, quickly burned to the fringes of this European system. Even Russia and the Christian colonies of the Ottoman empire smouldered. But at the asbestos edge of the Muslim sphere the fires abruptly died. They never took light over most of the non-European world, Europe’s overseas annexes excepted.

See Eric Jones, Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
15. In the Japanese context, “脱亚入欧”abandon Asia, learn from Europeis a Meiji era slogan associated with the famous Japanese political theorist Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901). The phrase first appeared in an anonymous 1885 editorial for the Jiji Shimpo likely written by Fukuzawa.  It advocated that Japan to distance itself from its Asian neighbors and to adopt European political, economic, and cultural models instead. It stemmed from the perception that Europe represented modernity, progress, and power, while Asia was seen as backward and inferior.
16. Dambisa Moyo, Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth—and How to Fix It (New York: Basic Books, 2018), ch. 2.
17. The subtitle 国向工则日新日智A state that esteems industry will increase in wisdom day by dayis taken from Kang Youwei’s 1989 petition to the Qing emperor arguing that the dynasy should establish an award for industrial innovation. The complete couplet is: 国尚农,则守旧日愚;国尚工,则日新日智 [If a country esteems agriculture, it will remain conservative and ignorant day by day; if a country esteems industry, it will progress daily with new knowledge and wisdom].  
18. The idiom 一穷二白 [yī qióng èr bái] is used to describe a person or family in a state of extreme poverty, lacking all possessions and resources necessary for sustenance or improvement of life.
19. The Two Centenary Goals refer to two significant milestones set by the CPC to guide the country's development and to celebrate two important anniversaries. The first centenary goal was to mark the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CPC in 2021 by achieving a MODERATELY PROSPEROUS SOCIETY in all respects [全面建成小康社会]. The second centenary goal is to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China in 2049 by building China into a modern, socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful [富强、民主、文明、和谐、美丽的社会主义现代化国家].
20. See Xi Jinping 习近平, “Zai Qingzhu Gaige Kaifang 40 Zhounian Dahui Shang De Jianghua 在庆祝改革开放40周年大会上的讲话 [Speech at the 40th Anniversary Celebration of Reform and Opening-Up Conference],” Xinhua Wang 新华网 [Xinhua Online], 18 December 2018. 
21. The Great Leap Forward, a Maoist social and economic campaign that lasted from 1958 to 1962, attempted to take China from "feudalism" to "socialism" without (as Marxist theory would predict) any intervening period of capitalism in between. The cash course industrialization program was funded through the requisition of all agricultural surplus. The resulting famine killed tens of millions of people. This event is sometimes glossed over in Chinese historiography as "three years of natural disasters." Frank assessments of the Great Leap Forward's true costs and consequences are not unknown, but few and far enough between that their presence in a document like this should not be taken for granted.
22. The authors of National Security and The Rise and Fall of Great Powers do not include citations for any of the economic statistics cited here, nor can these numbers be found in any of the works included in the bibliography.
23. Robert Solow was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1987 for his contributions to the theory of long term economic growth as a function of capital accumulation, population growth, and productivity growth driven by changing technology.
24. See William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 417-456.
25. Zheng He was a Ming admiral and diplomat who commanded seven expeditionary treasure voyages to Southeast Asia, South Asia, West Asia, and East Africa from 1405 to 1433. The contrast between Zheg He's voyages, which did not lead to sustaied conact between the Chinese state and the places he visited, is often contratsted in global history textbooks wit the smaller but more commercialy successful voyages of the European Age of Discovery.
26. For an example of Pan Jiaofeng’s theory on techno–scientific revolution, see Pan Jiaofeng 潘教峰, “Zhongguo Jianshe Shijie Keji Zhongxin Yinglai Zhanlue Jiyu Qi 中国建设世界科技中心迎来战略机遇期 [China's construction of a Global Science and Technology Center Enters a Strategic Opportunity Period],” CNICN, Feb 2019.
In it, he argues that the current incubation period of a new technological revolution  presents a strategic opportunity for China to establish itself as a global technological center. He argues that China, as a latecomer in technological innovation, must adopt a global perspective, engage in forward-looking research, and strategically position itself to achieve significant advancements in technological innovation and become a world technology center.
27. CST editors are unable to locate the original quote. For an example of Wen Yi’s argument, see Wen Yi, “The Making of an Economic Superpower---Unlocking China’s Secret of Rapid Industrialization,” Working Paper 2015-006B, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2015. In it, Wen argues that China’s economic rise could not be adequately explained by neoclassical economic theory. Instead, he introduces what he calls the “new stage theory” that emphasizes the role of the state’s economic policy in facilitating industrialization and industrial upgrading. 
28. Vaclav Smil, Made in the USA: The Rise and Retreat of American Manufacturing (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015), 23. 
29. Slater's adaptation of the spinning jenny in 1789 is an early example of industrial espionage一and by extension, an American precedent for the widespread IP theft hat powered China's own rise.
30. The “Two Bombs, One Satellite” project refers to China's efforts in the mid-20th century to develop nuclear bombs, hydrogen bombs, and artificial satellites. 
31. Edward T. Johnson and Max von Zedtwitz, Created in China: How China is Becoming a Global Innovator (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 9.
32. 沧海横流显砥柱rough seas reveal the strength of the mastis a Chinese idiom that metaphorically describes a situation where the true essence of a person becomes clear only amidst great turmoil and diversity. It usually appears as a couplet, 沧海横流显砥柱,万山磅礴看主峰, which can be literally translated as “amidst the tumultuous sea, the mast stands firm; in the vast expanse of mountains, the main peak towers above.” The couplet does not originate from a single author. The preceding line is from Guo Moruo [郭沫若]'s “Man Jiang Hong” [满江红], and the following line is from Qing Dynasty Zeng Guofan [曾国藩]’s "Letter to the Former Chen Yu Ming” [复陈右铭太守书]. 
33. See Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 35. 
34. Elhanan Helpman, The Mystery of Economic Growth (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2010).
35. This passage is a combination of two quotes from Dambisa Moyo’s Edge of Chaos. The first can be found on page 54 and the second can be found on page 49.  
36. This passage is quoted from page 95 of Fareed Zakaria’s The Post-American World, but the CICIR researchers–or the translator of a Chinese version of the book–interpret it in a way that subverts Zakaria's original meaning. Zakariaargues that public support does not matter to the Chinese government, not that the Chinese government enjoys such support: “It is awkward to point out, but unavoidable: not having to respond to the public has often helped Beijing carry out its strategy.” Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 95.
37. While this is not presented as a direct quote, it resembles a line from the book: “The contemporary world has no example of a closed economy, tied by protectionist practices, which would be able to grow fast over the long term.” Grzegorz W. Kolodko, Whither the World: The Political Economy of the Future Volume 1 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 91. 
38. Xi Jinping, “Juesheng Quan Mianjian Cheng Xiaokang Shehui Duoqu Xin Shidai Zhongguo Tese Shehuizhuyi Weida Shengli Zai Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shijiu Ci Quan Guo Daibiao Dahui Shang de Baogao 决胜全面建成小康社会 夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利——在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告 [Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in an All-round Way and Winning the Great Victory of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era——Report at the Nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China],” Xinhua, 27 October 2017.
39. Xi Jinping 习近平, “Zai Pudong Kaifang 30 Zhounian Qingzhu Dahui Shang de Jianghua 在浦东开发开放30周年庆祝大会上的讲话 [Speech at the Celebration Conference of the 30th Anniversary of the Development and Opening of Pudong] ,” Xinhua 新华, 12 November 2020. 
40. CST editors could not locate this exact quotation in Chua's work, but the final chapter of Amy Chua's Day of Empire advances a similar argument. Amy Chua, Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance—and Why They Fall (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), 318-343.
41. Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, 211-212.  
42. See the CST glossary entry LEADERSHIP CORE for the meaning of this term. This entire section is a long and transparent justification for the centralization of power under Xi Jinping.  
43. Frederick Engels, "On Authority," Marxists Internet Archive, (or. pub 1872). 
44. The phrase “cobweb model” doe not have an established meanig in contemporary interntional relations; most often the phrase “cobweb model” is used in reference to an economic theory used to analyze supply and demand in markets characterized by time lags and adjustments.  
45. This is a major theme of Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn: Yale Univresity Press, 1968). 
46. CST editors could not locate Lin's original article. 
47.  The term "Bismark trap" is not a well established concept in either western or Chinese scholarship. CST editors were unable to find any mention of it outside of this passage.
48. Debate over the cause of the USSR’s fall has been wide ranging in Chinese academia, with critics of the official position pointing to the systemic decay of the Soviet economy or the failure of the USSR to reform the inflexible and rigid political structure it inherited from Stalin. For examples of critical arguments, see Wang Xiaoxiao 王笑笑, “Sulian Jubiande Genben Yuanyin 苏东剧变的根本原因 [The Fundamental Reason for the Transformation of theSoviet Union]” Aisixiang 爱思想, 4 March 2013; Huang Lifu 黄立茀, “Sulian Yinhe Sangshi Gaige Liangji  苏联因何丧失改革良机? Why did the USSR miss the chanceto reform?” Aisixiang 爱思想, 15 October 2009; Liu Xingyi 刘新宜, “Sugong Kuatai, Sulian Wangguode Yuanyin  苏共垮台、苏联亡国的原因 [Reasons for the Collapse of the Soviet Communist Party and the Demise of the USSR]” Aisixiang 爱思想, 14 November 2004. For longer presentations of the official view published around the same time as Liu’sarticle, see  Cheng Zhihua 陈之骅, “Lishi Xuwuzhuyi Gaoluan Sulian 历史虚无主义搞乱苏联 [Historical Nihilism Ruined the Soviet Union],” Aisixiang 爱思想, 18 September 2013 and Wang Tingyou 汪亭友, “Liang Zhong Duiweide Shijieguan he Lichang Guanchuan SulianYanbian Yanjiu 两种对立的世界观和立场贯穿苏联演变研究 [The Ideological Divide in the Study of the Soviet Collapse],”Aisixiang, 20 Feb 2014.
49. It is unclear when Deng Xiaoping said those words, but they are frequently referenced by party leaders. See Jiang Zemin 江泽民, “Jiang Zemin Zai Mao Zedong Tongzhi Danchen Yibai Zhounian Jinian Dahui Shang De Jianghua. 江泽民在毛泽东同志诞辰一百周年纪念大会上的讲话 [Jiang Zemin's Speech at the Commemoration Ceremony of the 100th Anniversary of Comrade Mao Zedong's Birth], Xinhua, 27 November 2009. 

第三章 大国崛起的一般规律

人类历史上,大国兴衰的交互更替是一种常见现象。无数的专家学者、智者精英对此都进行过深入的研究和思考,试图找出深蕴其中的历史规律,但迄今尚无令人满意的标准答案。不过,历史总在一定范围内存在因果逻辑,各有特点的大国崛起也不乏相似的路径和经验。具备基本条件的后发国家,只有充分吸纳先发国家经验,制定适合自身和时代特色的战略,才能抓住机遇实现崛起。

大国地位往往取决于人口、领土、自然资源、地理位置、经济实力、军事力量和软实力等一系列因素,其中人口、领土、资源等是基本要素和物质基础,决定着一国成为世界大国的潜力。但潜力能否得到发挥及发挥到何种程度,在很大程度上取决于后天的战略和机遇等。恰当的国家战略不仅可以助推大国崛起,少走弯路,也事关大国地位的延续。如英国在丧失世界主导地位后,决定适应美国唤起而非对抗,将影响力又延续了几十年。

大国具备的优势越多,综合实力越强,繁荣持续的时间也更久。英美在科技创新、政府效率等方面优势都较突出,分别引领了第一次和第二次工业革命,各自形成前所未有的世界超级大国地位。但美国成就更大、霸权更突出,除后发优势外,主要在于人口、领土和资源等底蕴史深厚,规模效应更持久。不过,某些方面极其突出也可以部分弥补大国其他方面的不足。如葡萄牙、西班牙及荷兰,虽然人口较少,但凭借商业和军事等方面的压倒性优势而成为称霸一时的世界大国。

大国地位还取决于国际竞争态势。保罗·肯尼迪在《大国的兴衰》一书中表示,大国的兴衰是相对的,取决于当时环境下与其他国冢实力升降的比较。20世纪最后10年,苏联这个实力相当的竞争对手的倒下,成就了美国前所未有的唯一超级大国地位。中国在宋朝时被认为是当时世界上最先进的文明,在科技和经济等方面都处历史上的巅峰,但不幸生逢游牧民族实力超群的时代。西夏党项人、辽国契丹人、金国女真人及蒙古人四个主要敌人都有着强大的骑兵,平抑掉宋朝作为农业大国在财富上的优势,阻止了其成为“中国治下世界秩序”的霸主。

得天独厚开盈尺

得天独厚通常是指成功所需具备的优越条件和机遇,出自清代诗人洪亮吉的诗句“得天独厚开盈尺,与月同圆到十分”。在大国崛起的过程中,天时、地利、人和同样不可或缺。其中,优越的地理、人口等发展要素与环境,有时比制度等更重要、更具决定性影响。具备这些条件的,不一定必然崛起为世界大国,但若没有这些基本条件,则肯定无法称其为大国。在科技等其他条件相似的情况下,地缘和人口等方面的优势越突出,崛起为世界大国的可能性越大,持续时间也更久。

“人多力量大”

自马尔萨斯提出“人口论”后,国际社会对人口的消极影响强调较多,认为人口增长阻碍了贫困国家的发展。但近年来,人口对经济增长的正面影响受到越来越多关注。一定的人口和领土是大国崛起重要的前提条件。领土意味着资源和发展空间,人口代表着劳动力和市场。历史上,波斯、罗马、马其顿、汉、唐等帝国无不拥有众多人口和广袤疆域。葡萄牙、西班牙和荷兰虽凭借大量殖民地及商业资本、航海及军事等方面的优势而成为世界大国,但也因本土人口和领土规模不足而很快衰落。在工业时代,社会分工越来越复杂,对劳动力和市场的要求更高,不具备人口和领土优势的国家成为世界大国的难度越来越大。

工业革命前夕,英国的人口已具相当规模。工业革命后,英国凭借巨大的先发优势,将人口和资源潜力发挥到极致。在鼎盛时期,只占世界人口2%的英国,GDP占全球的30%以上,对外贸易额占世界的1/5,制造业贸易额占世界的2/5。不过,随着其他西方国家先后完成工业化,英国在人口和资源方面的局限开始显现。英国政治家利奥·艾默瑞指出:“在美、德等庞大而富有的帝国快速发展的情况下,这些小岛的支配地位怎么可能长期维持下去呢?我们的人口只有4000万,怎么可能与人口是我们2倍的那些国家竞争呢?”

美国的人口规模远超英、法、德、日等,领土更是它们的多倍,人口增长前景也优于其他发达国家。这决定了美国在劳动力、资源,特别是在市场等方面有着其他西方国家不具备的巨大优势。一定程度上,如果说英、德、法、日等的工业化分别只有一个发动机驱动的话,美国的东、中、西部以人口和面积衡噩相当千两三个甚至更多的发动机。因此,美国的工业化全面完成所需时间更长,经济繁荣持续得更久,取得的世界大国地位和霸权也前无古人。如布热津斯基在《大棋局》一书中所言:“美国成为第一个也是唯一真正的全球性大国,在全球享有至高无上的地位。”

日本人口较少,政治和文化阻力小,"船小好调头”,在明治维新后迅速进入工业化。由于取得先发优势,通过中日甲午战争赔款、国际资金和技术的挤占效应等,日本在较短时间内完成工业化,跻身发达国家行列。与英国类似,日本也以较小的人口规模和领土面积一度创造了世界第二大经济体的奇迹。但人口和领土也限制了增长空间,随着人力、市场、技术等逐渐接近极限,日本外向型经济增长的潜力日渐耗尽,在20世纪90年代后陷入长期低迷。

人口与地域等优势使得中国成为古代四大文明中唯一延续至今的文明,具有强大的"容纳之槛与消化之功"。斯塔夫里阿诺斯表示:"中国太大、太具有疑聚力,不可能像印度和东南亚国家那样被彻底彻服,总能同化或驱逐入侵者。”也正是人口规模庞大、传统文化根深蒂固,使得中国工业化启动面临的阻力大、需要的时间长,经历了多次尝试与失败。改革开放之初,人口一度成为负担,计划生育政策一定程度上助推中国摆脱"贫困陷阱"。经济起飞后,巨大的“人口红利”被认为是中国奇迹的重要因素。当前传统的“人口红利”减弱,但教育水平和人均收入的提高将带来前所未有的“人才红利”和“市场红利”, 13亿人一旦有了钱,就出现了一个超级市场。

印度庞大的人口和广袤的领土使其古代文明在世界上占据重要地位,也成为工业化起步的很大负担。2020年初,印度超过英国和法国成为世界第五大经济体。高盛预测,2040年印度将成为世界第三大经济体。在欧洲和东亚等国家因日益严重的老龄化而面临增长难题的情况下,印度在人口数队和构成方面有着巨大的优势和潜力,"继续拥有一个充裕的年轻人群体”。美国知名学者扎卡利亚断言:“如果人口决定命运的话,印度的未来将高枕无忧。”

“远亲不如近邻”

针对中国改革开放后取得的经济成就,美国威斯康辛大学教授爱德华·弗里曼曾指出,其中一个重要原因在于中国 “位于东亚而非东非”。在这里,他重点强凋的是中国崛起的重要周边环境。改革开放后,中国处于二战后总体快速发展的东亚地区,相关经济成就的取得在一定程度上得益于东亚的群体性崛起一—先是日本的现代化和战后工业化的完成,再有亚洲“四小龙”,之后从中国沿海开始的工业化浪潮逐渐扩展到内地。

邻国间的摩擦一般较多,但在文明和经济发展层面,往往是 “远亲不如近邻”。历史上,大多数文明古国和强国都集中在欧亚大陆,呈接力式和群体性崛起。工业革命后,发达国家主要集中在欧洲和北美。诸多大国的兴衰表明,经济发展和文明进步有着较强的集群效应和周边扩散效应。这在东亚群体性崛起或“亚太世纪"的来临中有着更为充分的体现,也将在中国倡导的“一带一路”建设的推进过程中得到进一步证明。

欧洲的”起飞”是一个整体过程。威尼斯等意大利城邦、葡萄牙、西班牙和荷兰先后以商业为核心的崛起为欧洲群体性崛起开了先河,卖定了坚实基础。英国经济建立在大西洋沿岸国家的贸易基础之上,是大西洋经济。工业革命后,英国资本等跨过英吉利海峡向法国等西欧地区外溢。与此同时,现代制造业在北美登陆,在某种程度上美国经济成为英国经济的传承和继续。欧洲为美国经济的发展提供了资金、劳动力、技术及市场。19世纪晚期,欧洲落后国家不断追赶欧美先进国家,大西洋经济各实现整体起飞。

20世纪中叶后,日本承接了许多从美国转移出来的制造业,进入高速增长时代。20世纪末,中国成为又一个“世界工厂”。新中国曾在20世纪50—60年代接收了苏联援建的企业和设备,为后来丁业 “起飞” 打下了基础。20世纪70年代末的改革开放,可以看作工业化西进的重要一站。“工业化东进与西进在中国的交汇最终实现了中国的工业化,创造了 ‘中国奇迹’”。

500年来,世界范围内发生了三次结构性的权力转移,也见证了部分区域的大国群体性崛起。第一次权力转移是欧洲的崛起。第二次权力转移是美国及其盟友的崛起。目前,国际社会正经历着近现代历史上的第三次权力转移,即亚太地区的群体性和 “雁阵式” 崛起。未来随着 “一带一路” 建设的加速推进,人们也有望见证部分 “一带一路”国家的群体性崛起。彼得·弗兰科潘在《丝绸之路一一部全新的世界史》一书中强调,“世界旋转的轴心正在回到那个让它旋转千年的初始之地一丝绸之路”。

打造高质批的朋友圈

从500年来大国崛起的时空顺序上看,后发大国不是先发大国的邻国,就是“远亲”或朋友,即在文化或政治等方面存在特殊关系的国家,如宗主国、盟国等。社会与政治距离对贸易和投资有着重要的影响,相似的文化环境易于知识和技术的传播。埃里克·琼斯在《欧洲奇迹一一-欧亚史中的环境、经济和地缘政治》一书中称,欧洲海外属地的兴起表明,文化和政治制度等因素在很大程度上可以弥补地理上的距离,如美国、加拿大、澳大利亚、新西兰甚至南非等都先后实现了工业化。也正因文化和政治制度迥异,“欧洲工业化的火苗在伊斯兰世界的’石棉’边缘陡然熄灭了”。

日本屈服西方文明,除了自身积极“脱亚入欧“外,美国在战略上的重视与扶持对日本的崛起起着非常重要的作用。在被美国打开国门后,日本成为美国的出口市场和航运补给站。在此后美国的国际战略中,日本成为越来越重要的一环。二战后,日本成为美国重点扶持以抗衡东方的对象,经济援助、直接投资和美国市场等有利条件是其高速发展的重要外因。

在西方经济科技占主导地位的时期,与经济发达国家的疏远乃至敌对使许多国家错失发展良机。阿根廷错失经济成功的良机被认为与结盟失策密切相关。丹比萨·莫约在《增长危机》一书中指出:“阿根廷最大的失误发生在1944年,当时它未能与美国结盟,而美国随后开始了经济腾飞。阿根廷领导人选择与英国结盟,从那时起阿根廷开始了经济衰退。” 二战后,东欧等国家加入苏联阵营,推行苏式工业化,从而远离了世界中心市场与核心技术。

 国向工则日新日智

经资增长是大国崛起的前提和基础,维持大国地位面临的最一大挑战往往也来自经资。保罗·肯尼迪在《大国的兴衰》一书中强调:大国之兴衰,最终、更重要、更具决定性的因素,是相对于他国而言的经济实力。农业经济时代,世界大国往往是农业发达的国家。大航海后,葡萄牙、西班牙和荷兰等领土和人口规模有限的国家先后崛起,依靠的是当时无与伦比的商业和军事等实力。进入工业社会后,实现工业化是大国崛起的必备条件。现代经济体要想真正实现繁荣富强,就必须有强大、多样和富于创造性的制造业。

制造业兴国

制造业是技术创新的源泉,是经济增长的原动力。与前工业社会相比,工业革命使生产力惊人地提高。公元元年到公元1400年,世界经济年均增长率仅有0.05%,而17世纪的荷兰  工业革命后的英国、19世纪的美国和20世纪后半期的东亚经济体的年均增长率分别增至0.5%       2%、4%和8%- 10%。15世纪前,世界经济总量翻番需要1400年,而20世纪的东亚经济体经济总量翻番只需7一8年。

18世纪末,英国就已经建立起强大的工业基础,不仅拥有大批工艺稍湛的手工家庭作坊,还有令人敬畏的造船能力,生铁产显占据全球总产砬的15%左右。1870年,英国在全球制造业产出中占近1/3。

得益于独一无二的自然秉赋和来自欧洲的移民、投资等,美国在建国之初就成为一个庞大的经济体。南北战争结束后.美国迅速进入工业化进程。1870年,美团制造业占全球的比例不足 1/4,但到19世纪80年代末就增至36%左右。在此后一个世纪里,美国一直维持着世界制造业霸主的地位。

德国在19世纪下半叶最后30年起飞,完成从农业经济向工业经济的转型。在煤炭和钢铁等传统支柱产业的基础上,化学和电气等新兴产业得到迅速发展,德国成为世界级的化学工业大国,1877年合成燃料产挝占世界的一半。此后虽经历希特勒时期畸形的军事工业发展和二战后的分裂,但在1990年重新统一后,德国再次成为世界重要的制造业大国和贸易大国。

制造业占世界比例的变化也反映出大国格局的演变。1750年,中国生产全球制成品的1/3'居世界第一,印度排第二。 1860年左右,英国超过中国。1900年,美国排名第一,英闰和德国分居第二、第三。1953年,世界制造业的顺序变为美国、苏联和英国,不过美团领先苏联达4倍以上。1980年,美国和苏联继续领跑,日本超过英国成为第三名。

成为制造业大国是实现中华民族伟大复兴的重要保防。新中国成立之初,基本是一个“一穷二白”的落后农业国。中国现已成为世界第一大工业国,是全世界唯一拥有包括41个工业大类的最完整现代工业体系的国家,500种主要工业品中有200多种产掀居全球第一。2010年中国制造业增加值首次超过美国, 2018年中国制造业增加值占世界份额达28%以上。世界工业大国的基本国情,有力支撑了“两个一百年“目标的逐步实现。习近平总书记在“改革开放40周年庆祝大会”上指出:成为全球制造业第一大国,标志着“中国人民在富起来、强起来的征程上迈出了决定性的步伐!”

顺应工业化规律

现代经济发展一般意味着从农业向低技术产业再到高技术产业和服务业的转型。各国工业化道路不尽相同,但产业递进规律相似,基本上按照食品、纺织、机械、化工、电子等序列有重点、有先后地发展。随着第一、二、三产业在社会生产中主体地位的依次演变,主导产业也由劳动密集型逐渐向资金和技术密集型升级。发达国家的工业化,均是先发展轻工业,后发展重工业。

许多后发国家在工业化过程中急于求成,颠倒发展顺序,走了不少弯路。“十月革命”后,苏联在计划经济下继续工业化进程。1929年发布第一个五年计划,重点发展煤炭、钢铁等行业,调动全国资源实现重工业化。苏联的工业化虽取得一定成就,但由于政府强力干预、过于注重重工业,产业发展失调。新中国成立后,模仿苏联实行计划经济,重点发展重工业。20世纪50年代末的“大跃进”又破坏了工业化的农业基础,延缓了工业化进程。从重工业起步的工业化,由于内在生产要素配置的扭曲和政治的过度干预,往往难以持久。

而顺应产业发展规律,先轻后重、逐级递进是新兴工业化国家成功的重要经验。20世纪80年代初,中国也放弃了优先发展重工业战略,轻纺工业得到迅速发展。20世纪90年代,中国的电子信息产业成为发展最快的产业部门之一。从20世纪90年代末开始,中国进入重化工业阶段,重工业的增速超过轻工业。

融入国际产业链

顺利承接国外的劳动密集型产业是后发国家实现工业化的重要前提。19世纪下半叶,美国凭借其良好的自然资源、与欧洲紧密的人文纽带、便利的海洋运输条件,特别是强劲的经济发展势头,成为英国产业海外转移的最大受益者。 1914年,美国资本输入规模居世界之首,其中英国对美债券投资占其总投资的85.9%。此次国际产业转移后,美国逐渐成为新的“世界工厂”。

美国在确立了全球经济和产业技术领先地位后,率先进行产业结构调整,将钢铁、纺织、日化、造船、普通工业机械等传统产业向外转移。日本、联邦德国等因经济发展水平较低但又具有较好的发展基础以及战略盟友关系而成为美国产业转移的主要承接地,很快成为全球劳动密集型产品的主要供应者。两国因此大大加快了工业化进程,综合国力迅速提升。日本发展成又一个 “世界工厂",联邦德国也成为世界经济强国。

20世纪70年代,日本向外转移轻纺等劳动密集型产业及钢铁、化工和造船等资本密集型产业,造就了亚洲“四小龙”的经济奇迹。但“四小龙“经济体盘小,产业升级周期短,在承接了日本高科技产业后,急需把劳动密集型产业转移出去。而此时大力改革开放的中国凭借低成本和地理等优势成为亚洲“四小龙”劳动密集型产业转移的主要承接者。在国内积极推进市场经济、国外积极吸引海外投资、充分发挥产业比较优势的基础上,中国工业化进程显著加快,成为新的“世界工厂”。

2008年全球金融危机以后,全球掀起新一轮国际产业转移浪潮。中国成为主要输出国和引领者,承接地除中国中西部地区外,主要是“一带一路”沿线国家。亚洲经济与贸易的高增长态势也有望同步向“一带一路”地区传递。预计未来,“一带一路”国家GDP年均增速将显著高千全球平均水平,有望打造成新的世界经济增长带。

走好创新先手棋

科技创新是经济增长的重要动力,也是大国实力的主要标志。在20世纪50年代前,经济发达国家科技进步的贡献率为20%- 40%, 60年代以来升至60%-80%。在2001—2009年间,美国高技术产业增加值占制造业增加值的比重由17%升至21.3%。对后发国家而言,模仿和吸收发达国家的先进技术是崛起的重要途径,但要成为主导性的世界大国,就必须有革命性的科技创新做支撑,如英国和美国对前几次科技革命的引领。

科技支撑崛起

经济发展最终要靠获取并掌握先进技术来实现。“大航海”以来,科技作用日益突出。亚当·斯密指出:劳动分工和市场的扩大促进了技术创新,国家财富增长直接源于劳动生产率的提高。诺贝尔经济学奖获得者罗伯特·索洛认为:长期看,经济增长的唯一源泉是技术进步。美国20世纪前半期人均产出的增长中,有7/8要归因于技术进步。

世界大国权力在地理上的转移也往往伴随着科技发展中心的转移。美国知名历史学家威廉·麦克尼尔认为,公元750一1100年,伊斯兰世界在科学和技术方面远远超过欧洲。公元1000年后,中国的科学技术世界领先。到了15世纪,世界科技中心开始向地中海和欧洲转移。葡萄牙全国人口只相当于南京的人口,但它船队的威慑力远远超过郑和的大船队。“大航海”后,西方崛起,意、英、法、德、美等先后成为世界科技中心。

16世纪中期,意大利城邦出现了一批重要的自然哲学家,使之成为近代科学活动中心。英国在16—17世纪涌现出吉尔伯特、波义耳、牛顿、哈雷等各领域大师,开辟了力学、化学、生理学等多个现代学科。18世纪中期到19世纪中期,法国涌现出达朗伯、拉普拉斯等一大批科学家、在热力学、化学、天体力学等领域做出突出贡献,为内燃机革命和化学革命提供了理论基础。19世纪20年代起,德国科学发展突飞猛进,有机化学、量子力学等成为引领世界的带头学科。20世纪20年代,美国取代德国成为世界科学中心,抓住信息技术革命等机遇,站上世界科学前沿。

当前世界科技中心主要集中在欧美发达国家,但呈现出向亚太转移的趋势。日本科技实力依然突出,新兴经济体在全球研发中的占比越来越高,技术创新能力明显增强。中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院院长潘教峰等指出,世界正酝酿新一轮科技革命和产业变革,为中国建设世界科技中心、再次引领世界科技发展提供了难得的机遇。

引领高新产业

经济成功的国家往往高度重视科技创新,18世纪新技术的领先者英国迅速成为欧、洲乃至世界一流工业强国。 2012年,美国、日本和德国的《专利合作条约》(PCT)专利申请匮分别达到世界总掀的26.44%、22.35%和9.61%。科技创 新来源千广泛的工业实践和商业驱动。清华大学教授文一认为: “只要踏上工业革命的大道,成为世界工厂,任何国家都可能成为全球技术创新的领导者,但若一个工业化国家放弃制造业,就很可能逐渐丧失技术优势和创新力。”

美国的科学技术一直以强大著称于世。人类历史上很重要的发明,如白炽灯、轧棉机、通用零件、生产线等都源自美国。瓦拉科夫·斯米尔在《美国制造--国家繁荣为什么离不开制造业》一书中指出:“美国在1865年之后实现飞跃的主要动力在于技术进步,这些进步不仅让美国成为世界最大的大宗商品生产国,也让美国在新发明的商业化、推行新生产模式和提高劳动生产率等方面成为领导者。一个多世纪后,美国乃至整个世界仍在受益千其中很多具有划时代意义的技术发明。”

目前,美国经济增长面临诸多难题,但在科技方面仍是世界第一强国。在信息化、航天、人工智能、医学、军工等高新科技领域,美国均有蓿压倒性的技术优势。美国研发支出居世界首位,有着强大的基础科学研究实力及雄厚的科技人力资源。  1901-2019年,共有613位科学家获诺贝尔奖,其中美国籍为287人。美国人几乎垄断了计算机科学领域的图灵奖,汇聚了59%的世界顶级人工智能研究人员。美国还拥有40所世界百强大学,汇聚着全球大部分顶尖科技公司。

引进先发国家资本、人才和设备等是后发大国缩短技术差距的主要途径。1789年,英国人斯莱特来到美国,凭记忆造出阿克莱特纺织机,成为美国近代工业的开端。19世纪中叶,德、美铁路开通之始,输入了英国的机器和资本。在苏联早期,列宁的新经济政策曾把某些企业租给美、日等国经营。第一个五年计划期间,斯大林聘请了美、德等国专家做重点企业建设的顾问。二战后,日本大足输入英、美先进技术,有时把西方产品拆开,以反向设计加以仿造改进。在汽车制造、光学器材、精密仪器和精密机床等方面,日本的这种模仿式创新取得较大的成功。

中国在历史上的很长时期内都居于世界科技领先地位,但在过去500年里错过了前几次科技革命。新中国成立后,科技发展呈后来居上之势,在“两弹一星”等高端科技领域取得突出成绩。近年来,中国在电子通信、5G、人工智能等诸多领域实现重大突破.加快向世界科技强国迈进。在2017年全球批准的专利中,中国占30%,高于美、日、韩和欧洲的23%、14%、9%和 8%。自2007年起,中国每年授予的自然科学和工学博士学位超过美国。

中国在科技领域和美国比仍有不小的差距,但增长速度快、发展潜力大。2000一2017年,中国研发支出年均增长17.3%,远超美国的4.3%。乔治·杂尔和马克斯·冯·泽德绯茨在《从中国制造到中国创造:中国如何成为全球创新者》一书中指出: “实用主义、企业家精神、大规模研发投入、儒家文化传统及互联网高度普及等,将推动中国成为全球创新者。”

沧海横流显砥柱

自20世纪80年代起,新自由主义和“华盛顿共识”广为传播,发达国家纷纷要求发展中国家采取一系列所谓的“好政策”和“好制度”来促进经济发展。但实际上,这些政策和制度多数是工业化的结果。相对于“西式民主",稳定的政局和良好的社会秩序在后发国家工业化和大国崛起过程中起着更为重要的作用。那些盲目接受“华盛顿共识”的国家,不仅未实现经济增长,多数还陷入政治动荡。

强大高效的政府

寒缪尔·亨廷顿在《变革社会中的政治秩序》一书中指出:在第三世界国家现代化过程中,经济发展和社会文化改造具有优先地位,政治现代化只有在前者发展后才能水到渠成。那些企图在短期内跨越到西方现代制度的国家,忽视了政治现代化的渐进性,往往欲速则不达。要实现从传统到现代的过渡,必须建立起强大的政府,即有能力制衡政治参与和政治制度化的政府。“各国间最重要的政治分野不在于政府的形式,而在于有效程度。”

赫尔普曼在《经济增长的秘密》一书中指出:强大政治体制支撑着国家发展和经济增长,存续较长的政权更利于形成促进增长的政策。在发展中国家,若没有可靠的政府行政、警务和司法部门,糟糕的经济结果往往会接踵而至。丹比萨·莫约在《增长危机》一书中强调:“2014年,暴力使全球经济损失14.3万亿美元,占世界GDP的13.4%。20世纪30年代起阿根廷经济急剧衰退,一个重要原因是1930年至20世纪70年代爆发了六次军事政变。”

稳定的政府更容易在公共服务和基础设施等方面进行长远投资,推动经济增长。扎卡利亚指出:日本、美国、欧洲和中国的发展故事有一条共同的主线,就是强大和可信赖的政治体制。“中国政府有很高的民意支持率,有助于其贯彻执行既定的战略”。印度政府官员曾表示:“我们不得不做了许多政治上广受欢迎的蠢事,这些愚蠢的做法会削弱我们的长期经济潜力,但政治人物在短期内需要的是选票,而中国政府则可以做长远打算。”

开放包容的对外战略

当今全球化远未完成,国界和地理仍然阻碍要素流动,开放对后发国家经济增长更为重要。衡盐贸易开放度的很多指标都与经济增长正相关,而自由贸易的扭曲与经济增长负相关,贸易开放国家的增速往往比闭关自守的国家要快一倍以上。格泽高兹·科勒德克在《21世纪政治经济学:世界将何去何从》一书中指出:封闭的经济体不可能出现长期快速增长,大国兴衰的历史多次证明,“宽容”是大国形成的必要条件,而“孤立“往往与没落相关。

改革开放是中国现代化建设不断取得成就的重要法宝。习近平总书记在党的十九大报告中,提出“推动形成全面开放新格局",强调“开放带来进步,封闭必然落后“中国开放的大门不会关闭,只会越开越大”“中国坚持对外开放的基本国策,坚持打开国门搞建设“。2020年11月12日在浦东开发开放30周年庆祝大会上,习近平总书记进一步指出,要深入推进高水平制度型开放,敞开大门欢迎各国分享中国发展机遇,积极参与全球经济治理。

美国曾是一个高度开放的国家。从西进运动到工业的爆炸式发展,再到第二次世界大战的胜利,移民推动了美国的进步和成功。美国之所以在原子弹研制竞赛中获胜,与它能吸引那些欧洲移民科学家密不可分。计算机时代初期,美国在技术和经济领域取得突出的领导地位,同样与能吸引世界各地大批天才移民相关。硅谷催生了人类史上的财富爆炸,移民的创造力至关重要。

但美国耶鲁大学教授艾米·蔡表示:美国“今天正失去这种优秀素质,其优势正面临前所未有的威胁"。扎卡利亚指出:美国政治已经病入膏肓,深陷党派斗争中难以自拔,运作效率十分低下。特别是特朗普政府上台后,处处强调“美国优先”,大搞贸易保护主义,极力限制移民。开放政策的倒退,将进一步侵蚀美国的大国地位。

坚强有力的领导核心

领袖人物在历史发展中有着特殊的作用,关系到大国崛起的方向和速度。恩格斯曾指出,权威是植根于人类行为的一种普遍现象。政治学上的"蜘蛛网模型”表明,再复杂的蜘蛛网,也有一个“网核"。亨廷顿认为、现代化要求具有变革能力的权威,而权威必须集中于某些坚强有力的个人或集团手中。

领袖人物在历史的转折关头往往起着非比寻讯的作用。诸多世界大国的崛起,都离不开那些改变国家命运的重要人物和领导人。《解放军报》理论部原主任刘新如认为,一个有权威的领导核心是大国崛起的关键要素,越是大国崛起的关键时期,越离不开强有力的领导核心和引领时代的领袖人物。

葡萄牙和西班牙在从封建分裂状态中走出后,形成统一的民族国家,出现了强大的中央政府及王权权威。葡萄牙以国家名义支持航海家对未知世界的探索,航海大发现成为有计划、有组织的国家战略。亨利王子主持建立起人类历史上第一所国立航海学校,组建了世界一流的船队。西班牙成为统一民族国家后,伊莎贝尔女王雄心勃勃地谋划远洋探险计划,为资助哥伦布远航,甚至卖掉了王冠上的明珠。

英国在伊丽莎白王权力显支持下,建立起欧洲最强大的海军。法国国王路易十四建立起绝对王权,把法国从一盘散沙的贵族封建制政权凝聚成一个强大国家。德国“铁血宰相"俾斯麦大规膜实施社会改革,使德国综合国力跃居欧洲大陆之首。沙皇俄国的彼得一世发起具划时代意义的“强制性的现代化运动”,成为俄罗斯历史上“最伟大的帝王”。日本通过明治维新废除了贵族世袭特权,加强了中央集权,强制推行政治、经济和社会改革,最终跻身世界大国行列。

美国首任总统华盛顿,在开国和建章立制等方面都发挥了重要作用,1787年主持制宪会议制定了沿用至今的宪法,在制度上确立了总统作为同家元首的权威;民主党创始人杰斐逊主笔起草了《独立宣言》,通过外交等手段使美国领土增加了近一倍;林肯领导取得了南北战争的胜利,颁布了“解放黑奴宣言”,维护了联邦的统一;富兰克林·罗斯福的“新政”从经济危机的深渊中拯救了美国,使之得以赢得二战并在战后成为超级大国。

从历史上看,没有领导核心的国家往往会陷入"俾斯麦陷阱"。在普法战争后,俾斯麦从孤立、削弱法国的战略目的出发,主张在法国实行多党执政的共和制,认为一个不稳定的共和制政权可以使法国像一座不稳定的火山。1875—1940年,法国更换了102届政府,平均每个内阁只存活5个多月,甚至有两个内阁仅存在一天。苏联亡党亡国原因复杂,但执政党权威的丧失是重要原因之一。

“万山磅礴看主峰”,确立强有力的领导核心,是中国共产党取得革命胜利的宝贵经验。邓小平曾深情地说:“如果没有毛泽东,中国人民还要在黑暗中摸索更长的时间”。党的十八大以来,党和国家事业取得历史性成就,根本在于以习近平同志为核心的党中央的掌舵领航。在中华民族迈向伟大复兴的关键时刻,习近平总书记充分展现了自信笃定的政治意志力,战略判断高瞻远瞩,发挥着“主心骨” “中流祗柱”作用。

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2.【美】寒缪尔·亨廷顿著,王冠华等译:《变革社会中的政治秩序》,生活·读书·新知三联书店1989年版。

3.【美】贾雷德·戴蒙德著,栾奇译:《为什么有的国家富裕,有的国家贫穷》,中信出版社2017年版。

4.【美】茲比格涅夫·布热津斯基著,中国国际问题研究所译:《大棋局--美国的首要地位及其地缘战略》,上海人民出版社1998年版。

5.【美】斯塔夫里阿诺斯著,吴象婴,梁赤民 ,董书慧 , 王昶译:《全球通史--从史前到21世纪》,北京大学出版社2006年版。

6.【美】 法里德·札卡瑞亚著,赵广成、林民旺译:《后美国世界: 大国崛起的经济新秩序时代,中信出版社2009年版。

7.【美】艾米.蔡著, 刘海青 杨礼武译:《大国兴亡录》新世界出版社2010年版。

8.【美】欧阳泰著,张孝铎译:《从丹药到枪炮:世界史上的中国军事格局》,中信出版社2019年版。

9.【美】 丹比萨·莫约,王雨晴译:《增长危机》,中信出版社2019年版。

10.【美】 瓦科拉夫·斯米尔,李凤海,刘寅龙译:《美国制造:国家繁荣为什么离不开制造业》,机械工业出版社2014年版。

11.【美】威廉·麦克尼尔,  孙岳 陈志坚 于展译:《西方的兴起:人类共同体史》,中信出版社2018年版。

12.【英】埃里克·琼斯著,陈小白译,《欧洲奇迹欧亚史中的环境、经济和地缘政治》,华夏出版社2015年版。

13.【英】张夏准著,严荣译,《富国的伪善: 自由贸易的迷思与资本主义秘史》,社会科学文献出版社2009年版。

14.【波兰】格泽高滋·W.科勒德克著,龙云安译:《 21世纪政治经济学:世界将何去何从》,中央编译出版社2015年版。

15.【日】大前研一著,朱悦玮译:《 低增长社会: 保护主义与反全球化危机的应对之道》,北京时代华文书局2019年版。

16. 张帆:《产业漂移: 世界制造业和中心市场的地理大迁移》,北京大学出版社2019年版。

17 文一:《伟大的中国工业革命 “发展政治经济学”一般原理批判纲要》,清华大学出版社2016年版。

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