Uphold the Integration of Development and Security: On a Necessary Requirement for National Security in the New Era
1. Advancing the Complete Fusion of Development and Security
(36) Development and security are like two wings in flight or the two wheels that move a cart. One of our Party’s major principles for governing China1 is the integration of development and security, increasing our consciousness of calamity, and being vigilant during times of peace.2 We must weave national security into all aspects of the entire work process of the Party and state, planning and deploying [national security policies] alongside economic and social development, [having them] work harmoniously in lockstep. We must organically harmonize the two goals of development and security; realize the positive interaction between high-quality development and security; and diligently establish long-lasting security and long-term stability.
China at present is experiencing the grandest and most unique innovations in praxis that have yet occurred in human history. The task of reform, development, and stability is a heavy one; there are numerous contradictions, risks, and challenges, as well as great tests [of our ability to] govern the state. All are without precedent. Across the globe great changes unseen in a century are profound and unprecedented. We are now closer to, and more confident and capable of, realizing the goal of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation than at any point in history. At the same time, this will require preparing [ourselves] for onerous and painstaking effort. We must courageously sail in dire straits and turn a myriad of crises into opportunities, ceaselessly realize better quality, more efficient, more equal, more sustainable, and more secure development.3 History and reality have told us: as long as we ceaselessly liberate and develop society’s productive forces;4 ceaselessly increase our economic strength, scientific and technological strength, and composite national power;5 ceaselessly [work] so that our vast people's sense of achievement, happiness, and security grows fuller day by day; and ceaselessly [work so that] the material foundation for upholding and developing Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and for realizing the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation grows more substantial day by day–then we will not fail to guide Socialism with Chinese Characteristics through wind and wave, steadfastly sailing into the distance.
2. Steadfastly Protect the Broader Landscape of Reform, Development, and Stability
(37) General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out that “reform, development, and stability are the three pivotal fulcrums of our state’s socialist modernization. Reform is a powerful driving force for economic and social development. Development is the key to solving all our economic and social problems. Only with social stability can reform and development possibly advance without ceasing.”6 Only with the continuous advance of reform and development can there possibly be a strong foundation for social stability. Leave social stability behind and not only will reform and development no longer smoothly advance, but every gain we have already made will be lost.
On a global scale, political unrest has not only caused many countries to pass up favorable opportunities for development, but has also brought grave disasters upon the peoples of these countries. To conclusively carry out the Total National Security Paradigm we must grasp firmly the formidable task of reform, development, and stability on all fronts. For the sake of constructing a favorable environment for Reform and Opening and socialist modernization, from the beginning of Reform and Opening our party has always given a high priority to correctly managing the relationship between reform, development, and stability, and on preserving the broader landscape of stability in our state and society.
Currently, our state faces an increasingly intricate and complex international dynamic. We must soberly recognize the complexity and protracted nature of the various adverse factors [we face] both internationally and domestically. Development is still our Party’s top priority in the government and rejuvenation of the state; it is still our essential and foundational work. However, economic development and the improvement of material living [standards] is not everything. They are not the sole determining factor of the people’s support.
It is necessary to uphold the worldview and methodology of dialectical materialism and historical materialism. It is necessary to correctly manage the relationship between reform, development, and stability; to unify the force of reform, the speed of development, and the load-bearing capacity of [our] society. We must never shift in our course, stray from our path, or slacken our strength. Improving the livelihood of the people [should be] the nexus of reform, development, and stability. While guaranteeing social stability, [we must] advance reform and development. [We must] promote social stability through reform and development. It is necessary to strengthen reform measures, development measures, and stability measures; and to properly grasp the relationship between individual and collective interests, short-term and long-term interests, the interests of the parts and the interests of the whole.
Facing a complex and mutable environment for security and development, it is necessary to uphold [an atmosphere] where seeking progress in stability is the keynote of our work.7 The fundamental point of seeking progress in stability lies in stabilizing the broader landscape [while still] ceaselessly forging ahead. “Stability” and “progress” should mutually promote one another. It is necessary to uphold the smooth resolution of risks in the midst of development, and to optimize development in the midst of risk resolution. Thoroughly evaluate the circumstances and the tasks of reform. Synthesize the promotion of reform with the prevention and resolution of major risks. Scientifically plan the promotion and implementation of reform with proper timing, means, and pace. Handle destabilizing and uncertain [risk] factors more actively and effectively. Strengthen our capacity for struggle,8 expand our policy space;9 improve the resilience of [our] institutions under stress; and ensure that reform [will] be steady and enduring. We must recognize that resolving long-standing difficulties in economic and social development will require a long and protracted effort, but we must never act with trepidation, passing our problems on to future generations. We must strive to indent steel and leave our footprints in stone,10 carry forward in the “spirit of hammering a nail until the job is done,”11 and press towards the future one step at a time.
3. Grasping the New Development Concept with Risk Consciousness and a Problem Oriented Approach
(38) The correctness of our development concept fundamentally determines the effectiveness and even the success or failure of development. Since the Eighteenth Party Congress, we have introduced important theories and concepts for economic and social development. Among them, the New Development Concept is the most important and essential. The New Development Concept, [which calls for] innovative, coordinated, green, open, and shared [growth], is based on a profound synthesis of the experiences and lessons of development [learned] both at home and abroad. It is [designed] to counter the prominent contradictions and problems that arise from development in China.
[We] need to follow a problem oriented approach, thoroughly analyze the reasons for the problems [we face], resolve contradictions and risks by carrying out the New Development Concept in a timely manner, and ceaselessly improve our state’s capacity in national security. [We] need to recognize that innovative development, coordinated development, green development, open development, and shared development are all premised on national security and social stability. We must use security to protect development and development to advance security. This will place our state's development and security on a safer and more trustworthy foundation.
Innovative development focuses on problems related to drivers of growth. After many years of concerted effort, China’s overall scientific and technological standards have improved considerably, but [our] capacity for innovation does not meet the requirements of high-quality development. Scientific and technological self-reliance will decide our state’s capacity for survival and development. There are many “strangleholds.”12 This is the “Achilles’ Heel” of our state’s massive economy.13 A new round of technological revolution has brought ever fiercer competition [in the realm] of science and technology. If we cannot improve our [capacity] for innovation in science and technology, we will not be able to transform the drivers of our growth. We will [then] be outmatched in global economic competition. It is necessary to uphold innovation’s central position in the overall modernization landscape; plan and advance innovation from a global perspective; thoroughly implement the “Strategy for Innovation-Driven Development”;14 accelerate the construction of a world-class great power in science and technology;15 advance the fusion of science and technology with economic and social development; cultivate new drivers of growth through education; and sculpt a leading-edge development with more first mover advantages.
The focus of coordinated development is resolving the problem of imbalanced development. China’s imbalanced development is a persistent problem that manifests in the relations among localities, [between] urban and rural areas, between material civilization and spiritual civilization, and between economic development and national defense. We must focus on adjusting these relationships and focus on the overall effectiveness of development. Otherwise the problem of the “Wooden Bucket Theory”16 will become increasingly prominent [in our society], and a series of social contradictions will continuously worsen. We must firmly grasp the broader configuration of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, unearth developmental potential through correcting and consolidating our shortcomings, strengthen our vigor [after the initial stages of this process], and ceaselessly strengthen the holistic nature of development.
The focus of green development is resolving the problem of harmony between humanity and nature. A favorable ecological environment is the foundation for the continuous development of humanity and society. As socio-economic development [matures] and living standards rise, environmental problems are often those most prone to provoking discontent among the masses. We must steadfastly walk the path of civilized development that [combines] productivity growth, prosperity, and a clean environment. We must accelerate adjustments in the structure of industry, energy, public transport, and land use.
We must coordinate socio-economic development with the population [level], natural resources, and the environment; ensure that the Chinese will develop sustainably; and make our due contribution for the security of the global ecosystem.
At the present, there is already a high degree of consensus in regards to accelerating the green transition in [our] socio-economic development. However, our state’s energy system is reliant on coal and fossil fuels, and the systems of production and daily living are placing immense pressure on our green and low-carbon transition. Our targets to reach a carbon emissions peak before 2030 and to [become] carbon neutral by 2026 are extraordinarily challenging. Realizing carbon peaking and carbon neutrality is a basic condition for realizing high-quality development. While we must pursue [this goal] unwaveringly, we cannot accomplish this task in one fell swoop. Keep to the principles of integrated planning for the entire country, prioritizing conservation, and protecting against double risks. The phasing out of traditional energy [sources] must be built on the foundation of replacing them with secure and reliable new energy [sources].
The focus of open development is resolving the problem of the interrelations between domestic and international development. The state of international economic cooperation and competition has undergone profound changes. The global economy’s governance systems and regulations are facing drastic adjustments. The [challenge of] responding to foreign economic risks and the pressure we face protecting economic security has no precedents. Our state’s overall standard of [economic] openness is not high enough, and our ability to utilize both the domestic and international markets, as well as the resources [concomitant to each], is not strong enough. We must uphold our basic state strategy of [economic] opening; construct comprehensive and open [economic] systems that are diverse and balanced as well as secure and highly efficient; develop an open model of the economy at a higher level; and use the expansion of opening up to bring about innovation, promote reform, and advance development. The more we open [the economy], the more we must prioritize security, the more necessary it becomes to properly integrate development with security, and the more necessary it becomes to put greater effort into increasing our ability to compete self sufficiently, our ability to regulate an open [market],17 and our ability to manage risk.
The focus of shared development is resolving the problem of social equality and justice. Currently, the issue of global income inequality is very prominent. In some countries the middle class has crumbled and wealth disparities are gaping. This leads to the rupture of the social [fabric], political polarization, and rampant populism. All [of these countries] provide profound lessons for our state. When it comes to sharing the gains of reform and development domestically, whether it is the concrete situation or the design of [our institutions], there are still imperfections, and the road to realizing comprehensive development and common prosperity for all of the people is still heavy and protracted.
Shared [development] is a fundamental requirement for Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. Realizing common prosperity is not only an economic question. It is also an important political question related to the foundation of the Party’s governance. With the aim of serving the people with all of our heart and soul, we must seize the New Development Concept, resolutely prevent the polarization [of our society], and never allow the emergence of a chasm between the rich and the poor that cannot be bridged. To realize our target of common prosperity [we] must first create a larger and better “cake” through the people’s collective efforts. Then through appropriate institutional arrangements this “cake” will then be cut and divided properly. This is a long-term historical process, towards which we must proceed steadily.18
We must prioritize employment in the promotion of high quality development, ensuring that economic growth drives up employment. It is necessary to give full play to the purpose and effect of redistribution, persist in the major [principle] of “distribution according to one’s work,” and perfect the policies of “distribution according to the factors of production.”19 It is necessary to raise the strength of regulations on taxation, social insurance, transfer payments and the like; optimize income distribution structures; and expand the middle class. We must support corporations and social organizations that are willing and able to actively participate in the public good [provision] and philanthropy. We must persist in doing all in our power to perfect [both] public policies and the system of institutions that serve the public, and improve basic public services in education, medicine, retirement, housing and other areas that the people find most important.
4. Firmly Safeguard the Bottom Line of Security and Development in Order to Construct a New Development Pattern
(39) Accelerating the construction of a new development pattern, which takes a large-scale cycle in the domestic market as its mainstay with a dual cycle in the domestic and international markets boosting each other, is a vital strategic task that impacts the broader landscape of China’s development. General Secretary Xi Jinping indicated that “we must firmly safeguard the bottom line of security and development. This is the vital prerequisite and guarantee for constructing a new development pattern and is the key to an unimpeded large-scale domestic cycle.”20
In recent years, economic globalization has encountered headwinds and cyclical international economic structures have undergone profound adjustments. The outbreak of COVID-19 exacerbated those headwinds, and the trend of turning inwards is on the rise in various states. The cycle of international markets and [natural] resources has clearly slowed. The [old] environment [conducive to] importing and exporting on a large scale has already changed. In an external environment characterized by the atrophy of global markets, we must concentrate our strength on properly handling our own affairs; accelerating the construction a new development pattern; strengthening our power to survive, compete, develop and [grow] sustainably in the face of various perilous circumstances, both foreseen and unforeseen; and ensure the course towards the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation is neither stifled nor crushed. Constructing a new development pattern is not a last resort or a measure of expedience. It is a forward-looking gambit for seizing the initiative of future growth. This is a war of attrition that requires tenacious fighting spirit and strategic resolution.21
The key to constructing a new development pattern lies in unimpeded economic circulation. If [economic] circulation is blocked or cut off at any point, this obstruction will manifest at the macro level as a falling growth rate, rising unemployment, the accumulation of risk, and an unbalanced balance of payments; at the micro level it will manifest as excess production, a decrease in corporate profits, falling personal incomes, and other similar problems. In China’s present stage of development, the most important task [to encourage] unimpeded economic circulation is to ensure that the supply-side [of the economy] is efficient and unobstructed. An efficient supply side is able to pierce through blockages in circulation and remove the constraints imposed by bottlenecks. We must persist in deepening the paradigm of supply side reform and realize a high-level dynamic equilibrium.
The most essential characteristic of the construction of a new development pattern is realizing a high-level of self-sufficiency and self empowerment. We must recognize that [the ability to] innovate on our own is a matter of our survival and development. On all fronts we must strengthen our deployments for scientific and technological innovation; strengthen the links between innovation and supply chains; create unique competitive advantages that are conducive to the rapid and large-scale application of new technologies and to iterative upgrades; accelerate the transformation of scientific and technological achievements into real productivity; increase standards for supply chains; protect the security of supply chains; open up a channel between scientific-technological strength and industrial, economic, and national strength; unleash new innovative vigor via reform; and accelerate the establishment of a robust country-wide system of innovation.
Forming a strong domestic market is an important pillar of the new development pattern. It is also a [natural] advantage for a large country’s economy. The cultivation of a complete system of domestic demand is advantageous for absorbing both external shocks and the effects of decreasing foreign demand, as well as for ensuring the stability of China’s economy and social environment under extreme circumstances. We must combine the implementation of our strategy of expanding domestic demand with supply side reforms in an organic manner. We must increase the interoperability of supply chain systems with domestic demand, so that production, distribution, circulation, consumption and other segments can rely more on domestic markets to realize a virtuous cycle.
Only through self-sufficiency can we realize an unimpeded, large-scale domestic cycle, weave security and development into the entire process and all fields of national development, and tirelessly make ourselves invulnerable to all attacks.22 Only then can we [navigate] constant fluctuations in international [affairs], be filled with the vigor needed to survive and develop. Then no one can cause us to fall or place us in a stranglehold.23 Since Reform and Opening, we have suffered many shocks and external risks, but we have always been able to avert disaster by relying on properly handling our own affairs and keeping the foothold for our own development inside our [own] country.
(40) We must build a scientific understanding of the relationship between a large-scale domestic cycle and a dual cycle in the international and domestic [spheres]. To construct a new development pattern means the opening of a paired [dual] cycle in the domestic and international [spheres]–it does not mean a single, sealed-off, domestic cycle. Our state’s economy is already deeply fused with the global economy. It has a relatively high degree of mutual interdependence and association with the other country’s industry, and domestic and international market demand are [both] interdependent and mutually reinforcing. To build a new development pattern and implement high quality [market] opening requires a strong domestic cycle and a solid bedrock [on which to stand]. This will allow us to attract essential resources from across the globe, become powerful competitors in a fierce international competition, and become a powerful driving force in the allocation of the world’s natural resources. We must prioritize using the international cycle both to improve the standards and efficiency of the large-scale cycle in the domestic [sphere], and to improve the quality of our factors of production and our allocation of [resources]. It is necessary to enhance the competitiveness of China’s export products and services and promote the evolution of China’s industries by participating in international market competition.
At present, the protectionist zeitgeist is on the rise, but through opening-up, cooperation, and planning for win-win development, we shall stand on the right side of history. We will staunchly promote economic globalization in the direction of openness, tolerance, inclusivity, balance, and shared benefits;24 [we will] promote the construction of an open, global economy. At the same time, we must firmly establish security and development concepts, and accelerate our perfection of their respective systems and mechanisms, correct relevant shortcomings, preserve the security of production and supply chains, and actively manage and mitigate major risks.
1. The term zhìguó lǐzhèng [治国理政], translated here as “governing China” but more literally rendered as “state governance,” has special significance in the age of Xi Jinping. The phrase is incorporated into the title of Xi Jinping’s published speeches (a literal translation of the Chinese title would be Xi Jinping on State Governance [习近平谈治国理政]; our translation here follows the official English title of Xi’s book, On the Governance of China). Describing integrated planning of development and security as a “major principle” of state governance [治国理政] is thus an unsubtle way to emphasize the importance of this concept to Xi Jinping’s broader program.
2. “Increasing our consciousness of calamity, and being vigilant during times of peace” is an ubiquitous phrase in party documents that captures an important aspect of the Party’s psyche. As one People’s Daily article puts it, “the Communist Party of China is a political party born from calamities, grown in calamities, and is becoming stronger from calamities.” This call for awareness of constant danger dates back to Mao Zedong, who admonished his cadres not to become complacent after the success of the revolution. Today, Xi quotes the phrases often to emphasize the challenges ahead. “The brighter the future, the more it is necessary to increase the awareness of potential calamities,” the People’s Daily quotes Xi. One “must be constantly prepared for danger in times of peace, and fully understand and be prepared for major risks and challenges.” For a discussion of the calamity consciousness from a party source, see Chen Shifa, “Zengqiang Youhuan Yishi 增强忧患意识 [Increase our consciousness of calamity],” Renmin Ribao 人民日报 [People’s Daily], November 2022.
3. This list of adjectives entered the party lexicon in 2015, when Xi Jinping provided guidance on how to implement the Thirteenth Five Year Plan in 2015. As part of his New Development Concept Xi exhorted the Party to pursue high-quality development–that is, development that is “more efficient, more equal, and more sustainable” [更高质量、更有效率、更加公平、更可持续] than what had come before. In 2021, the Fourteenth Five Year Plan added the phrase “more secure” [更为安全] into the list of qualities characterizing high-quality development. This addition, paired with language about “the integration of development and security,” signaled to the Party that it must take the role of national security more seriously in economic planning. The new consensus was codified at the highest level in 2022, when the 20th Party Congress amended the Party Constitution to include “secure development” as a goal of the Party’s economic work.
For a discussion of the relationship between Xi’s economic strategy and national security paradigm, see the CST glossary entries on the NEW DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT and the NEW DEVELOPMENT PATTERN. For the text of the 13th and 14th five year plans, see Xinhua News Agency, “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shisan ge wu nian guihua 中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划 [Outline of the People’s Republic of China 13th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development],” Xinhua Wang 新华网 [Xinhua Online] March 2016; Xinhua News Agency, “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shisi ge wu nian guihua he 2035 nian yuanjing mubiao gangyao 中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要 [Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035],” Xinhua Wang 新华网 [Xinhua Online], March 2021. For the 2022 constitutional amendments, see Communist Web, “ershí da dangzhang xiuzheng an xuexi wenda 二十大党章修正案学习问答 [Q&A on the 20th Congress Party Constitution Amendments],” December 2022.
4. In Marxist terminology, the phrase “productive forces” describes the combination of human labor and the means of labor (machinery, infrastructure, industrial techniques, natural resources, exploitable land, and so forth) available to society in any given stage of economic development. The exhortation to “liberate the productive forces” thus has a long history in the rhetoric of Chinese communism–Mao Zedong was urging cadres to “liberate the productive forces” all the way back in 1944, adding that the Japanese must be defeated in order to “eradicate the old politics and military affairs that [currently] block the development of the productive forces” in China. The phrase would used many times in the decades that followed, though the obstacles that the productive forces must be liberated from would change: Mao would use later the phrase to justify collectivization; during the Deng era many reformists, arguing that China’s own sclerotic bureaucracy was the main force blocking China’s economic development, repurposed Mao’s phrase to justify marketization. Ye Jianying’s 1979 argument for market reforms provide a typical example of the phrase’s usage in this era:
First, for socialism to replace capitalism, we must liberate the productive forces and achieve a constantly rising labor productivity to meet the people’s material and cultural needs. This is the fundamental aim of socialist revolution. Once the proletariat has seized political power in a country, and especially after the establishment of the socialist system, it is imperative to place the focus of work squarely on economic construction, actively expand the productive forces and gradually improve the people's standard of living.
Today the phrase is associated with many of the same things Ye tied it to in 1979: economic development, rising productivity, and rising living standards. Under Xi Jinping the Center has argued that these things will be guaranteed by cutting edge innovations in science and technology; the phrase is thus often used today to justify state investment or intervention in those sectors.
For the Ye Jianying quote, see Bill Brugger, Chinese Marxism in Flux 1978-84: Essays on Epistemology, Ideology and Political Economy (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharp Inc, 1985), 46; Mao's comments are found in Mao Zedong, " Cultural Education Problems in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region'," in Stuart Schram, Timothy Cheek, and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., Mao's Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings, vol viii (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2015).
5. The term “composite national power” [zònghé guólì 综合国力] has been commonly used in Chinese geopolitical analysis since the 1980s. The term assumes that–as was true in the Cold War–military power is not the sole determinant of success in geopolitical competition. An accurate assessment of two countries’ strengths and weaknesses must integrate measures of military power with calculations of economic strength, scientific prowess, diplomatic acumen, cultural influence, and so forth. Such a cross-domain assessment would measure composite national strength. Though the term implies a formal and comprehensive accounting of the total resources a country can bring to bear, it is rarely used with any more rigor than phrases like “smart power” or “soft power” are used in Western debates. There are no recent English language discussions of this term; a lengthy discussion of its use in China’s policy debates in the 1990s is found in Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Forest Grove, Oregon: University Press of the Pacific, 2004), ch. 5.
6. This quotation comes from a speech made by Xi Jinping during a Collective Study Session in 2012. For the text of that speech, see “Xi Jinping zai shiba jie zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhi jv dierci jiti xuexi shi de jianghua 习近平在十八届中共中央政治局第二次集体学习时的讲话 [Speech by Xi Jinping at the Second Group Study of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee],” Xinhua 新华, 31 December 2012. However, it is an almost verbatim reiteration of a development strategy first endorsed by Jiang Zemin. In an address to the Central Committee in September 1995, Jiang stated that “there is an inseparable connection among reform, development and stability,” adding that “the key to solving all of China’s problems depends on its own development.” “Zhonggong Shisi Jie Wu Zhong Quanhui 中共十四届五中全会[The Fifth Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China],” Remin Wang 人民网 [People’s Web], December 2008.
7. The phrase “seeking in progress in stability” dates to the immediate post-Tiananmen environment, a time when economic growth numbers were falling as the Party tried to slow down market liberalization in the name of regime security. The phrase would periodically return anytime far-reaching economic restructuring was on the national agenda: In the 2010s it has been closely associated with China’s drive to transition the country to a sustainable, consumption-driven economy. For that drive see the CST glossary entry NEW DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT; for a longer history of this term, Stella Chen, “Seeking Progress in Stability,” China Media Project, 17 March 2022.
8. Translated here as “struggle,” the word douzheng [斗争] is also often translated as “to battle” or “to fight.” The list of forces Party members have been directed to struggle against over the course of the Party’s history is long: imperialism, liberalism, bureaucratism, factionalism, capitalism, revisionism, nihilism, corruption, crime, and even, in one famous statement by Mao Zedong, against heaven and earth itself (“To struggle against heaven means boundless joy; to struggle against earth means boundless joy; to struggle against man means boundless joy [与天斗,其乐无穷;与地斗,其乐无穷;与人斗,其乐无穷]”). Struggle suggests a righteous underdog triumphing against unjust powers. It is less a defined set of actions than an attitude: the word is associated with mental fortitude; unyielding tenacity; absolute commitment; a willingness to ruffle feathers, ruin friendships, or sacrifice pleasant comforts for the sake of the cause; and the determination to treat enemies with the hostility they deserve.
Struggle has a distinctly Maoist flavor; the call to struggle was rarely issued in the Reform Era. Xi Jinping has resurrected these calls–most dramatically in a 2019 speech at the Central Party School where Xi used the word “struggle” more than 50 times. Xi Jinping instructed rising cadres that they must “dare to struggle” [敢于斗争] and “struggle well” [善于斗争]. “Struggle is an art,” he would go on to say, “and we must be adroit practitioners.” See Xi Jinping, Governance of China, vol III (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2020), 264. For the concerns that led Xi Jinping to resurrect the call to struggle, see the CST glossary entry SOFT BONE DISEASE. For some of the difficulties with translating this word, see David Barduski, “The Party is Struggling,” China Media Project, 6 September 2019 and Todd Hall and Pu Xiaoyu, “Dare to Fight or Dare to Struggle? Translation of a Chinese Political Concept,” CSIS: Interpret China, 8 May 2023.
9. “Policy space” is a term imported into Chinese political rhetoric from the debates that shook international development organizations in the mid-aughts. The debate began when multiple observers from the developing world accused the IMF and World Bank of eroding the sovereignty of the nations they loaned to by tying their bail-outs to a restricted menu of the macroeconomic policies on the part of loanees. Denying the leaders of these countries the freedom to yield whichever macroeconomic policy tools they thought were most appropriate to their respective national conditions was “shrinking the policy space“ these leaders could operate in. In Chinese economic debates the term is used in a similar way, signifying the range and the effectiveness of macroeconomic measures available to policy makers in Beijing. For a recent discussion of Chinese macroeconomic policy in this framework, see Zhang Qidi, “Zhenshi Kongjina De ‘Da’ Yu ‘Buda’ 政策空间的 ‘大’与 ‘不大’[The Size of Chinese Policy Space],” Jinrong Jie, April 2022.
10. Xi Jinping introduced the slogan “strive to indent steel and leave our footprints in stone” in 2013 at a meeting with the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection, the CPC’s highest institution for enforcing internal rules and combating corruption and malfeasance in the party. The point of the slogan is to emphasize the long term commitment and determination needed to build a new culture of intra-party discipline. As an official explanation of Xi Jinping Thought explains the matter:
Therefore, in the face of these two tasks, only by making up your mind, strengthening your confidence, working hard, and constantly working hard can you see results. That is to leave footprints on the "stone" and scratch marks on the "iron". Emphasizing "stepping on stones to leave marks and grasping iron marks" is actually a reminder to all comrades in the party: comprehensively and strictly governing the party requires constant alarm bells to be grasped frequently and for a long time; comprehensively deepening reform requires overcoming difficulties and overcoming difficulties. Kan, there must be such a breath and energy.
[所以,面对这样两项任务,只有痛下决心、增强信心,真抓实干、常抓不懈,才能见到成效。也就是要在“石”上留下足印,在“铁”上抓出痕迹。强调“踏石留印、抓铁有痕”,实际上就是提醒全党同志:全面从严治党需要警钟长鸣,做到经常抓、长期抓;全面深化改革需要攻坚克难、爬坡过坎,必须有那么一股气儿和劲儿。]
11. Xi Jinping first told the Party that it needed to cultivate a “spirit of hammering a nail until the job is done,” in a speech at the second plenum of the 18th Central Committee on February 28, 2013. The speech was an exhortation for the party members to implement the decisions of the Central Committee in a diligent manner. “We have already got in our hands a good blueprint,” he said. “What we should do is to follow it through to the end and make it a success. In this regard, we need to have a ‘nail’ spirit. When we use a hammer to drive in a nail, a single knock often may not be enough; we must keep knocking until it is well in place.” Xi Jinping. “Follow a Good Blueprint,” in The Governance of China Volume I. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2014), 445.
12. Or more literally, a “strangling problem” [qiǎ bózi wèntí 卡脖子问题]. The term came to prominence in the late 2010s when the United States began threatening to use export controls to curb China’s technological advance. These problems are critical inputs in Chinese supply chains, such as semiconductors, engines, CNC machine tools, and other crucial technological components that must be sourced from abroad and thus are vulnerable to foreign sanctions.
13. This intentionally echoes Xi Jinping’s 2016 statement that “The overall level of scientific and technological development in China is not high, and the ability of science and technology to support economic and social development is insufficient. This is the ‘Achilles Heel’ of China’s large economy.” See “chen li tan 《xi jin ping guan yu zong ti guo jia an quan guan lun shu zhai bian 》陈理谈《习近平关于总体国家安全观论述摘编》” [Chen Li Discusses Excerpts from Xi Jinping's Discussion on an Overall National Security View], People’s Daily, August 4, 2018.
14. Initially proposed in 2013, the “National Innovation-Driven Development Strategy” was formally adopted by the Central Committee and the State Council in May 2016. It offered a blueprint for a nationally organized innovation system that would develop a range of strategic emerging technologies and transform China’s development pattern in a fundamental way. This document marked a break from China’s earlier industrial policies. Between 2006 to 2016, China’s state-directed funds targeted a limited range of technologies and was primarily aimed at catching up to advanced economies in industrial capabilities. The 2016 strategy, by contrast, was built around the idea that a very specific wave of technological change was beginning, and that this change was going to give China a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to vault into the leading ranks of economic and technological powers. The adoption of the National Innovation-Driven Development Strategy thus marked the beginning of a new phase in China’s industrial ambition.
See a full translation of the outline at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (trans.), “中共中央 国务院印发《国家创新驱动发展战略纲要》[Outline of the National Innovation-Driven Development Strategy],” Xinhua News Agency, 19 May 2016.
For a lengthy discussion of the Innovation-Driven Development Strategy, see Barry Naughton, “Innovation-Driven Development Strategy: 2015-present,” in The Rise of China’s Industrial Policy: 1978 To 2020. (New York: Academic Network of Latin America and the Caribbean on China, 2021).
15. The goal of making China into a “world-class great power in science and technology” by the middle of the 21st century was first endorsed by the “Medium and Long-term Science and Technology Development Plan (2006-2020),” published by the State Council in 2006.
The State Council of the PRC, “Guojia zhongchangqi kexue he jishu fazhan guihua gangyao 国家中长期科学和技术发展规划纲要 (2006-2020) [Medium and Long-term Science and Technology Development Plan (2006-2020)],” The State Council Gazzete 9, 2006.
16. Also known as Cannikin’s Law, the “Wooden Bucket Theory” draws an analogy to a wooden bucket in organization theory. If a wooden bucket with wooden stave sides all at different heights is filled with water, the capacity for the bucket to hold water is determined only by its shortest stave. In the context of businesses or–in the case of the Study Guide–a government, Cannikin’s law suggests that output will never exceed the capacity of the weakest department.
17. The phrases “ability to regulate an open [market]” and “ability to regulate in an open [environment]” [开放监管能力] are commonly used in the context of China’s capital controls. Robert Kahn explains the logic behind these controls in “The Case for Chinese Capital Controls,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016.
18. The “cake theory” emerged in Chinese discourse in 2010 as thirty years of economic growth left China with an increasing gap between the “haves” and the “have nots.” In 2010, then premier Wen Jiabao said in the People’s Congress that “we must not only make the cake of social wealth bigger through economic development, but also divide the cake well through a reasonable income distribution system.” This remark generated a debate among party members over the future path of the country’s development. On one hand, Bo Xilai, then party secretary Chongqing, insisted on prioritizing redistribution over economic growth. “Deng Xiaping once said ‘let some people get rich first and then we will achieve common prosperity,’” Bo reasoned. “In China, some people have indeed become rich. But we must also realize the second half of the sentence–common prosperity.” Others disagreed. Wang Yang, then party secretary of Guangdong, argued that economic development should still be the party’s priority. “Dividing the cake should not be the focus of our work right now,” he said, “but making the cake is.”
In 2013, Xi Jinping ended this debate by staking out his own position in his address to the 18th Central Committee during its Third Plenum:
When we speak of social fairness and justice, we mean to proceed from the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people, and view and address this problem from the larger picture of social development, social harmony, and the people as a whole…. We must take economic development as the central task, promote sustained and sound growth, and “make the cake bigger,” thereby laying a more solid material foundation for greater social fairness and justice. This does not mean that we should wait to address the problem of social fairness and justice until the economy is developed. The nature of the problems may differ from period to period, bearing the features of society–developed or not so developed–in which they are found. Even when the “cake” has indeed become bigger, we must cut it fairly.
Xi Jinping, The Governance of China, vol I (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 2014), 108.
For a lengthy discussion of the debate over the “cake theory,” see Fang Ming, “Luxian Zhizheng? Wang Bo ‘Dangao Lun’ Ge ChuZhao 路线之争?汪薄“蛋糕论”各出招[The Battle over the Roads? Wang and Bo's Debates on the ‘Cake Theory’],” Duowei Xingwen 多维新闻 [Duowei News], 14 July 2011.
19. The CPC adopted the dual principle of “distribution according to one’s work” and “distribution according to the factors of production” during the Reform Era to justify the emergence of a free market under a socialist system. During the Mao era, China’s economic system was built on the principle of “distribution according to one’s work” [按劳分配], which held that the state should distribute reward to workers according to their contribution to the total production. However, this principle impeded China’s economic reform in the 1980s because it discouraged factory managers from making autonomous decisions to reinvest their profits and enlarge productive capacities. To overcome this theoretical barrier to reform, Jiang Zemin proposed a secondary principle in the 1990s: “distribution according to the factors of production” [按要素分配]. He argued that land, labor, technology, and capital were all necessary factors of production and thus should receive a share of resources proportional to their contributions to total production. This principle, combined with the Party’s increasing recognition that the market is an efficient way for resource allocation, justified the CPC’s more aggressive market reform in the 1990s. Today, official documents still use this dual principle to reconcile the existence of the free market with China’s socialist system. For a lengthy discussion of this dual principle written shortly after it was introduced, see Ma Hongwei, “Rúhé lǐjiě àn shēngchǎn yàosù fēnpèi 如何理解按生产要素分配 [How to Understand Distribution According to the Factors of Production],” People’s Daily, 4 December 1997.
20. This language is lifted directly from a speech made by Xi Jinping on the same subject at the Fifth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee in October 2020. For a full text of the speech see “Xin Fazhan Jieduan Guanche Xin Fazhan Linian Biran Yaoqiu Goujian Xin Fazhan Geju 新发展阶段贯彻新发展理念必然要求构建新发展格局 [Implementing a New Development Concept in this New Development Stage Will Inevitably Require the Construction of a New Development Structure],” Qiushi Zazhi 《求是》杂志 [Qiushi Magazine], 31 August 2022.
21. Dìng lì 定力, translated here as resolution, is a term most often associated with the disciplined concentration Buddhist monks muster in meditation. By implication, the passage is less an exhortation to stand resolute in the face of fear or danger than instructions to steel yourself with a spiritual resolution capable of banishing distraction and temptation.
22. Literally, “cultivate a body that is invulnerable to a hundred kinds of poisons and that is as indestructible as gold and steel.”
23. See footnote 12.